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Introduction 
 
Human integrity owes its existence, at a deep level,  
to the patterns of approval and recognition. 
- Axel Honneth1 
 
The purpose of this contribution to social justice theory is to address problems within 
recognition theory by clarifying the roles of misrecognition and struggles for recognition in 
human behavior. Following Honneth and others, I accept that recognition is integral to 
individuals’ self-realization and to social justice, and I accept Honneth’s idea that struggles 
against injustice are often struggles for recognition. Those who seek justice seek not only 
material changes but also a change in their place in society. Workers striking for better pay 
and working conditions are also fighting for recognition of their needs, dignity, and moral 
right to just compensation for their labor. Women who have fought for the vote, property 
rights, equal pay, control of their bodies, and similar causes have been seeking a change in 
society’s recognition norms to include women as full members of society. The Black Lives 
Matter movement seeks not only the end of violence against African-Americans but also 
recognition as human beings. The movement’s name itself is an explicit appeal to 
recognition: They are seeking recognition that their lives also matter. Recognition has been 
cast by some, most notably Charles Taylor, as public political struggles between social 
groups, but recognition is also at the heart of interpersonal relations. Mutual recognition 
enables friendship, romantic partnerships, and other relations of care, but the guiding 
norms of recognition also facilitate less-personal relations by socializing us into our 
culture’s normative expectations for individuals’ roles and behaviors. The importance of 
recognition in individuals’ lives and in social justice movements makes it a vital element in 
social and critical theory.  
This study will begin with Axel Honneth, harvesting his insights to craft a foundation 
for understanding injustice and struggles against it. A number of excellent scholars have 
put forward improvements to Honneth’s conceptualizations, and this study seeks to 
                                                 
1
 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (London: Polity, 
2003), 131. 
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advance the study of recognition a step or two further with some friendly amendments and 
corrections to Honneth’s work. Perhaps Honneth’s clearest summary of his project is this: 
Essentially, my idea amounts to the hypothesis that all social integration 
depends on reliable forms of mutual recognition, whose insufficiencies and 
deficits are always tied to feelings of misrecognition, which, in turn, can be 
regarded as the engine of social change.2 
Honneth has attempted to show that subjects’ experiences of misrecognition cause moral 
injuries, a psychological suffering that leads to feelings of moral indignation over having 
their intuitive notions of justice violated. Moral feelings of indignation are, Honneth 
claims, the motives for social resistance and rebellion that contribute to social change and 
moral progress.3 Honneth therefore calls for struggles for recognition to be the guiding 
thread of critical theory.4 In his oeuvre, he has developed a critical theory linking 
subjective moral experiences of suffering, intersubjectivity, and normative intent that 
attempts to avoid structuralism and totalizing analysis. By “recognition” Honneth refers to 
“attitudes and practices by which individuals or social groups are affirmed in certain of 
their qualities.”5 There are two keys to Honneth’s concept of recognition. The first is that 
individuals are socialized into a lifeworld of recognition norms that denote what behaviors 
and contributions by human individuals should be honored and what behaviors should be 
censured. The second is that receiving recognition on the basis of these norms enables an 
individual to develop a positive relation-to-self, his or her sense of place in society, and 
most importantly his or her autonomy to be able to determine and realize his or her own 
desires and intentions freely. Thus, individuals desire and need to both receive and give 
recognition to achieve their ends in society. For Honneth, justice is linked very closely to 
how, and as what, subjects mutually recognize each other and to what extent society’s 
relations of recognition support intersubjective relationships of mutual respect6 and grant 
all members of society the opportunity to participate in institutions of recognition.7 Thus, 
                                                 
2
 Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange 
(London: Verso, 2003), 245. 
3
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 131-139, 161-163. Axel Honneth, Disrespect (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2007), 71. 
4
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 144. 
5
 Axel Honneth, “Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions.” Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 45 (4), 2002, 505. 
6
 Honneth, Disrespect, 71, 130. 
7
 Axel Honneth, The I in We, trans. Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012), 61. 
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Honneth’s view of justice extends beyond the distribution of labor and the distribution of 
resources while including them in the quality of social relations and the personal integrity 
of all members of society.8  
A number of philosophers have criticized the concept of recognition in general and 
specifically Honneth’s use of it in social theory. To mention just a few: Nancy Fraser 
agrees with Honneth that recognition is central to critical theory but says Honneth has a 
monistic framework in which a properly differentiated account of recognition is all that is 
required for critical theory. She further charges that 
Honneth overextends the category of recognition to the point that it loses its 
critical force. Inflating that concept beyond all recognition, he transforms a 
limited but precise instrument of social criticism into a bloated and blunted 
catchall that fails to rise to the challenges of our time.9 
Lois McNay accuses recognition theory of binding agency too tightly to identity and 
relying on a reductive notion of power that neglects how social structures outside 
intersubjective interactions condition human experience.10 Danielle Petherbridge similarly 
argues that Honneth attempts to transform Foucault’s notion of power/struggle into a 
concept of recognition/struggle but that this move fails largely because he does not include 
an adequate account of power in his recognition theory.11 Patchen Markell criticizes 
recognition as an impossible and incoherent idea requiring a world of mutual transparency 
and invulnerable identities in which struggles for recognition are part of the problem rather 
than the solution of identity-based injustice.12 
Some of these critiques of recognition have merit, and I agree there are flaws in 
Honneth’s account; however, I still believe recognition is a highly useful concept if we can 
address its shortcomings. This study will amend recognition theory and answer some of its 
shortcomings through an analysis and rethinking of two important concepts: misrecognition 
and struggles for recognition. I believe that Honneth is correct about the importance of 
recognition in individuals’ lives, how the denial of recognition can motivate social 
resistance, and how that resistance can lead to normative change. Despite the shortcomings 
                                                 
8
 Fraser and Honneth, 177-183. 
9
 Fraser and Honneth, 201. 
10
 Lois McNay, Against Recognition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
11
 Danielle Petherbridge, The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013), 
92-93. 
12
 Markell, Patchen, Bound by Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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in Honneth’s recognition theory, his voluminous writings provide us with a wealth of detail 
and insights on which I wish to build in directions that Honneth did not travel, attempting 
to illuminate how individuals experience recognition and misrecognition and how they 
struggle for recognition and justice. There are a number of aspects of Honneth’s large 
volume of work that I am not addressing in this study. I am not undertaking a genealogical 
study of Honneth’s philosophy, an extensive reconstruction of it, or an analysis of his 
historical and macrosocial theories or his views on child development. I am also not 
engaging in meta-questions about critical or social theory. My aim is to explore a particular 
set of questions and problems arising from Honneth’s work, attempting to solve them so as 
to provide a phenomenological foundation of misrecognition that can help shed light on the 
causes of injustice. I should also add that my focus is not on a “politics of recognition” or 
politics of misrecognition because I think that focusing on the experiences of individuals is 
the path to enhancing our understanding of social injustice. I will argue, in fact, that 
thinking in terms of group identities is a contributor to misrecognition and injustice. 
This study is composed of two stand-alone but connected parts. In Part One, I 
critique Honneth’s account of misrecognition and provide an alternative view of 
misrecognition that replaces his account. First, I analyze ways in which Honneth’s accounts 
of recognition and misrecognition are insufficient, especially in terms of misrecognition. I 
critique Honneth’s argument for the separation of recognition into three modes—love, 
respect, and esteem/solidarity—and reveal problems with this division. Despite the internal 
logic of his typology, it does not help us to see clearly what is going on when individuals 
give or withhold recognition. His separation of legal respect and social esteem in terms of 
unifying under universal rights versus differentiating between distinctive traits does not 
appreciate the complexities involved in legal and esteem recognitions. His restriction of 
love recognition to the family sphere fails to include the many forms and degrees that 
intimate relations can take and unduly separates it from solidarity. The analysis reveals that 
recognition can be described better as behaviors in which individuals and social institutions 
engage in varying degrees with recognition norms and with individuals. I then reconstruct 
Honneth’s account of misrecognition, showing that he presents misrecognition as the 
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contrary of recognition, which I argue is lacking in sufficient complexity and detail to 
describe the phenomena of misrecognition and individuals’ experiences of it.  
To build a more robust and fine-grained picture of misrecognition, I first critique 
Honneth’s typology of misrecognition as the contrary of recognition. Honneth is correct to 
understand that recognition is guided by social norms; however, it is not the case that 
misrecognition is always a violation of recognition norms. The social norms themselves 
may be at fault either in being intrinsically biased against some members of society or in 
inadequately reflecting individuals’ attributes and needs. Also, if Honneth’s typology of 
recognition is inadequately complex and fine-grained to describe recognition behavior, then 
presenting misrecognition as the contrary of recognition within that typology will also be 
inadequately complex and fine-grained to describe the ways in which recognition relations 
can go wrong.  
To address this concern, I craft a multidimensional view of misrecognition that 
replaces Honneth’s binary account of misrecognition as the contrary to recognition without 
replacing Honneth’s conceptions of the value of recognition. The dimensions I identify are 
the levels of engagement with recognition norms, with other individuals, and with action. 
The multidimensional characterization of misrecognition describes it as a varied 
phenomenon that is more than the contrary of recognition. Disengagement from social 
norms is misrecognition, but I identify forms of engagement with social norms that also 
lead to misrecognition and result in domination and oppression. One example is what I call 
“pathological recognition” in which the recognition norms are intrinsically biased and, 
though appearing to recognize individuals positively, in practice reduce those individuals’ 
social status and autonomy. Normative discrimination provides another example, denoting 
the engagement with a recognition order that designates social groups as having particular 
traits that should be negatively recognized. Lack of engagement with individuals includes a 
quotidian forgetfulness of others or deliberate and selective disengagement from others all 
of which result in misrecognition. I also identify ways engagement with individuals can 
result in misrecognition. The action dimension of engagement in misrecognition is the level 
of action of the engagement with or disengagement from norms and/or other individuals. 
This multidimensional view allows for a more robust and fine-grained account of what 
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goes wrong in recognition relations leading to misrecognition and injustice. By replacing 
Honneth’s overly simplified account of misrecognition with a more robust, 
multidimensional account, we can address one weakness in recognition theory and better 
equip it to address its practical aims of diagnosing injustice.  
One complaint about the concept of recognition is that it is limiting and inflexible 
and maintains, if not creates, injustice and oppression. If recognition means conformity to 
homogeneity and ideological power structures, then recognition is at best problematic. It is 
true that some forms of forced conformity are labeled “recognition” by both defenders and 
critics of recognition, but I will argue that these forms of “recognition” are distortions of 
recognition that are, in practice, pathological. This identification shows that much of the 
criticism of recognition is directed at pathological forms of recognition and, therefore, is 
actually criticizing injustices that are misrecognitions, for which healthy mutual 
recognition is the remedy. Pathological forms of recognition assume that identity is solely 
group oriented. As I will show, this assumption of group identity is inherently a 
misrecognition of individuals that leads to injustice. The injustices of the oppression of 
women, racial minorities, and workers are better understood, I argue, through the 
multidimensional view of misrecognition, which sees misrecognition behaviors along 
dimensions of engagement with norms, engagement with other individuals. and 
engagement with action. For example, within institutional racism are varieties of 
misrecognition behaviors and associated varieties of injustices suffered by marginalized 
groups that are revealed by applying the multidimensional view to individual behaviors. 
The multidimensional view of misrecognition opens up the complexities of social 
behaviors by appreciating the conflicts between recognition demands that individuals face 
and the ways social norms and individual involvements turn into behaviors of injustice.  
Part Two of this study is a critical examination of Honneth’s account of struggles for 
recognition—the emancipation from injustice. Honneth sees struggles for recognition as 
the driving force for historical change. I accept Honneth’s statement of the importance to 
critical theory of struggles for recognition, but if struggles for recognition are to be the 
“guiding thread of critical theory,”13 then he needs a fuller account of what is involved in 
                                                 
13
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 144. 
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struggles for recognition. To understand better how oppression and other injustices are 
resisted, and why often they are not, we need a revised account of struggles for recognition 
and their preconditions that correct some omissions in Honneth’s account. 
My critique of Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition identifies two 
problems: His premise that emotional experiences of misrecognition motivate struggles for 
recognition is contradictory without an account of individual agency, and his theoretical 
reliance on political resistance movements leaves out other paths that responses to injustice 
can take. I propose the following solutions to these two problems: First, Honneth claims 
that experiences of injustice will motivate individuals to a struggle for recognition, but how 
can an individual, being damaged by misrecognition and lacking the recognition that 
Honneth says is necessary for one to be autonomous, have the capacity to struggle for 
recognition? To solve this dilemma, we need to include some conception of individual 
agency and responsibility in the undertaking of struggles for recognition. I incorporate the 
response model of recognition, Christine Korsgaard’s concept of self-constitution,14 
McNay’s interpretation of habitus,15 and insights from several other philosophers to give us 
a conceptual basis for how an individual could develop the oppositional consciousness to 
respond to experiences of suffering subjectively with a struggle for recognition within a 
cultural power structure. The ideas that individuals’ actions contribute to the constitution of 
their practical identities—composed of their roles, relationships, and membership in social 
groups—and that they can act out of that sense of self despite the misrecognition they 
receive from others, helps resolve the agency dilemma of how an individual undertakes a 
struggle for recognition. 
Second, I take issue with the tendency in recognition theory, not just in Honneth, to 
consider struggles for recognition predominantly as collective political movements for 
legal justice. I argue that Honneth incorrectly collapses interpretive structures that inform 
individuals that they are being treated unjustly with collective political movements against 
injustice. Although political struggles for recognition are the most accessible to social 
theory, considering only or predominantly such collective movements creates a lacuna that 
                                                 
14
 Korsgaard, Christine M., Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Kindle locations 375-377. 
15
 McNay, Against Recognition. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 10 of 226 
hides other forms and aspects of struggles for recognition. Most specifically, this 
theoretical view leaves out the very personal aspects that we can find in struggles for 
recognition. By decentralizing struggles for recognition from collective political 
movements and adding the concept of individual agency, we can craft a more robust picture 
of struggles for recognition. 
Instead of connecting struggles for recognition with political resistance movements 
as Honneth does, I argue there are two types of struggles for recognition:  
• Affirmational: The ongoing efforts of individuals to seek recognition that 
constructs and affirms their personal identities and their place in society. 
Affirmational struggles attempt to fulfill human needs that are present prior to 
any particular social interaction and are the constant general condition of being 
a social individual. 
• Rectificatory: Responses to circumstances or instances of misrecognition that 
seek to rectify perceived injustices and restore healthy recognition relations. 
Rectificatory struggles attempt to fulfill needs caused by feelings of being 
misrecognized. 
The familiarity of continually needing to affirm one’s identity and social relations is a 
resource for individuals to draw on in engaging in rectificatory struggles against injustice. 
Placing these struggles in the context of social power relations and the multidimensional 
view of misrecognition clarifies how individuals respond to misrecognition with varying 
struggles for recognition. At the heart of the struggle for recognition is a struggle for 
authority, Cillian McBride observes16—a struggle over the authority and power to interpret 
and apply recognition norms. Struggles for power and authority over recognition norms 
and relations play out not only between social institutions and cultural groups but also 
intersubjectively among individuals and factor heavily in all interpersonal relations, 
including with whom we choose to have relationships. This insight is central to 
understanding how any individual responds to experiences of misrecognition—whether to 
acquiesce, withdraw, or undertake a rectificatory struggle. Individuals need an interpretive 
structure to understand the moral content of their experiences and what options of response 
                                                 
16
 Cillian McBride, Recognition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 136, 152cf. 
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are available to them. However, struggles for recognition are not limited to collective 
political struggles for legal rights or social esteem; they include struggles over identity, 
which, though they have personal, social, and political dimensions, are always struggles 
undertaken by individuals in the service of their own individual concerns. This 
understanding amends Honneth’s account by opening up other phenomena of individual 
responses to injustice, including forming and joining subcultures to increase potential 
recognition relations and perhaps separating from others either through subcultural 
antagonism toward others and the self-recognition that I call “manufactured recognition.” 
Finally, I deal with another gap in Honneth’s theory (and social theory in general): 
the question of why, if experiencing misrecognition is a prerequisite for struggles for 
recognition, then how is it that anyone not so injured can join in solidarity with those who 
have been injured by misrecognition? Why did white people join the American civil rights 
movement; why do heterosexuals join same-sex marriage legalization movements; and so 
on? The answer to this gap is to understand that love recognition can extend beyond the 
family sphere where Honneth places it and that compassion for others can join with a 
rational understanding that others are being misrecognized. Joining another’s struggle is a 
movement of recognizing other individuals and their rectificatory struggles as people and 
causes worth our time and energy. 
My expanded view of struggles for recognition takes it beyond identity politics and 
group political conflicts into everyday social experiences, expanding Honneth’s account. 
Collective social movements and the social changes they engender are best seen as arising 
from the dynamic social interactions between individuals who, in the context of their own 
lives, take action. Actions against injustice do not have to be political, organized collective 
action, and this is significant for social and political philosophy. The insights into struggles 
for recognition, combined with the multidimensional view of misrecognition, contribute to 
social theory with a set of conceptual tools that strengthen our understandings of how and 
why individuals contribute to injustices and respond to injustices. It also casts new light on 
political movements, social conflicts, and the dynamics of interpersonal relations. 
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Part One: Rethinking recognition and misrecognition  
 
We cannot make sense of social conflicts, and the way our embeddedness in the 
social world gives rise to moral and ethical dilemmas, without understanding the 
way that our sensitivity to recognition orients us in the world. 
- Cillian McBride17 
 
Placing recognition and struggles for recognition at the center of critical theory is, I 
believe, the best approach, but Honneth’s functionalist account of recognition does not 
capture the full picture of the complexities of recognition. Recognition is an interpersonal 
social relation, and a very complex set of relations that are as varied as the individuals 
involved in them. I argue that Honneth’s theory of recognition is fundamentally correct but 
lacks sufficient complexity for it to explain the moral experiences of individuals. 
Honneth’s recognition theory provides insights into how individuals are socialized and how 
responses to injustice lead to social change. However, Honneth lacks a robust account of 
how the individual experiences and contributes to recognition and misrecognition. This 
lack is particularly problematic for Honneth given the importance of misrecognition in his 
account of social struggles. We need a more robust and fine-grained account of recognition 
relations and what goes wrong in them. To craft such an account, I will first argue for the 
need to go beyond Honneth’s tripartite typology of recognition and then move to the 
argument for the need to go beyond Honneth’s view that misrecognition is the contrary of 
recognition. 
1.1 – Rethinking Honneth’s Hegelian tripartite structure of 
recognition  
My argument in this chapter is that contrary to Honneth’s, recognition is not simply a 
matter of separate social spheres of family, state, and civil society but of different types of 
intersubjective relations. My argument will proceed as follows. First, I establish some 
essentials of Honneth’s account of recognition demonstrating his Hegelian tripartite 
structure of recognition. I do not dispute that there is a difference between legal recognition 
                                                 
17
 McBride, 8. 
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and esteem recognition but that one of Honneth’s descriptions of the difference—that legal 
recognition unifies subjects under general norms while esteem recognition differentiates 
subjects on the basis of a graduated appraisal of particular traits and contributions—is not 
entirely accurate. Showing that both legal recognition and esteem recognition involve both 
inclusion and exclusion of individuals, I argue that that something additional is at work in 
both modes of recognition than what Honneth’s typology delineates. I then explore the 
problems with both Honneth’s account of love recognition in the family sphere, and his 
account of solidarity, which he places in the same civil sphere as he places esteem and 
work and economic activity. I argue that Honneth’s portrayal of solidarity as public and 
love as private and that they are different modes of recognition introduces unnecessary 
confusion over affectional bonds such as friendships that obscures some of the ways in 
which individuals receive self-esteem. From the above, I argue that recognition can be 
understood as two types of engagements—engagement with norms and engagement with 
individuals, which manifest in varying ways, including the inclusion and exclusion of 
others. Using the two engagements, we can unpack what is going on in recognition 
relations and see that the operative question in recognition is the recognition relations 
involved and the object of recognition behavior rather than how the recognition can 
theoretically be mapped to a social sphere. My argument is not that Honneth is incorrect 
but that increased focus on the aspect of the object of engagement in recognition will 
improve our understanding of recognition relations and how they can go wrong. 
Honneth adopts the concept of recognition from Hegel and states that his intention is 
to employ “Hegel’s model of recognition as the key to specifying the universal conditions 
under which human beings can form an identity,” conceptualizing Hegel’s structures of 
mutual recognition as preconditions for self-realization and as practical conditions for the 
development of a positive relation-to-self.18 By “recognition” Honneth refers to “attitudes 
and practices by which individuals or social groups are affirmed in certain of their 
qualities.”19 Honneth refers to recognition “in its most elementary form” as the care we 
                                                 
18
 Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 500. 
19
 Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 505. 
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take to maintain a fluent interaction with our surroundings with the character of an 
affirmative, existentially colored style of caring comportment.20  
Honneth accepts Hegel’s position that recognition is essential for providing the 
conditions under which human individuals can form an identity and a positive relation-to-
self.21 Within Honneth’s discussion of recognition, we can trace a path of human 
development, which, generally stated, posits that through receiving recognition, an 
individual becomes socialized to the norms of his or her community, comes to realize what 
capabilities and possibilities he or she has within society, and through this process of 
socialization into recognition relationships individuals become self-realizing and 
autonomous. For individuals to be self-realizing, certain practices of mutual recognition 
must exist; a special type of normative status must be ascribed to individuals; and, finally, a 
specific form of individual relation-to-self must be developed.22  
Honneth describes recognition as a socializing movement.23 Honneth states that 
individuals can become members of society only by developing, via the 
experience of mutual recognition, an awareness of how rights and duties are 
reciprocally distributed in the context of particular tasks.24 
Mutual recognition socially integrates subjects into society’s normative expectations of 
them and what they can reasonably expect of others. We learn to recognize others by 
internalizing normative attitudes by which we can know ourselves to be socially accepted 
members of the social lifeworld.25 The socialization process is ordered by recognition 
norms:  
Individuals learn in the process of their socialization to internalize 
culturally specific norms of recognition … These kinds of internalized 
norms are what regulate how subjects deal with each other legitimately in 
various social relationships. They regulate what kind of expectations I can 
have of others, what duties I have toward them and what kind of behavior I 
can count on from them.26 
                                                 
20
 Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
37. 
21
 Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 500. 
22
 Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right, trans. Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013), 105. 
23
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 19. 
24
 Honneth, “Grounding Recognition,” 501. 
25
 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 78. Also, Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 68, and 
Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 35. 
26
 Honneth, Reification, 153. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 15 of 226 
By showing us what behaviors and values we should internalize, recognition helps us to 
orient ourselves in the social world and helps us learn how to be successful in our social 
endeavors.  
To describe the normative framework of recognition, Honneth turns to Hegel’s 
tripartite structure of the social world. Hegel saw society divided into the institutional 
complexes of family, civil society, and the state. Honneth says that Hegel has indicated  
for each of these three institutional complexes, how they: (a) contribute to 
the formation of the subjective capacities that subjects, as members of 
society, require for actualizing all of their various freedoms; (b) are capable 
of providing the social roles and responsibilities that can serve subjects as 
rational goals for their self-actualization; and finally (c) provide a necessary 
and, taken altogether, sufficient contribution to preserving the 'material' 
conditions upon which the reproduction of modern societies depend.27 
Hegel’s structure of ethical life provides Honneth with an account of normative authority 
that gives subjects their practical identities, their place in society, and their ethical duties 
that enable them to attain individual autonomy within the objective ethical order. Honneth 
argues that the three institutional complexes of family, civil society, and the state must 
form both subsystems of societal reproduction and stations of individual self-
actualization.28 Honneth’s move extends Hegel’s tripartite structure of ethical life into a 
tripartite structure of the individual human being. Honneth holds that human beings have 
three practical relations-to-self related to certain capabilities that they possess. Each 
practical relation-to-self is developed in relationships in which one is affirmed or 
recognized by others according to distinct types of recognition. Thus, there are three forms 
of recognition that correspond to Hegel’s three social spheres—“three forms of practical 
attitudes, each reflecting the primary aim of a certain affirmation of the other.”29 These 
three forms he defines as: “Love, (the central idea of intimate relationships), the equality 
principle (the norm of legal relations), and the achievement principle (the standard of social 
hierarchy).”30 Honneth usually refers to these modes of recognition as “love,” “respect,” 
and “esteem,” respectively. Honneth sees recognition processes as unfolding within the 
tripartite structure of society developed by Hegel.  
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Honneth assumes that the internal tripartite structure of three differentiated aspects of 
self-relation mirrors the tripartite structure of society.31 Within the subject, he theorizes that 
there is a genetically primary level of self-relation in which a subject conceives of its needs 
and desires as an expressible part of its own person. This valuing of one’s needs he calls 
“self-confidence,” and it is a prerequisite for the subject to develop further through the 
other levels of self-relation. The second level is where a subject relates to itself as a morally 
accountable subject and learns the value of its own moral judgment, a valuing he calls 
“self-respect.” The third level is where a subject relates to itself as having valuable 
capabilities, which he calls “self-worth.” These three stages he sees as “a sequence of 
necessary presuppositions under normal conditions” that forms a subject’s self-relation.32 
By “self-relation” or “relation-to-self,” Honneth means “the consciousness or feeling that a 
person has of him or herself with regard to the capabilities and rights he or she enjoys.”33 
Recognition in each of the three spheres of recognition map to the three practical relations-
to-self: the family to self-confidence, the state to self-respect, and civil society to self-
esteem. Using this mapping, Honneth believes we can systematically consider forms of 
misrecognition as the negative equivalents of the corresponding forms of recognition, 
which allows us to identify the social experiences that would generate the pressures that 
could motivate struggles for recognition in the social process.34 
Honneth’s reasoning for connections between the subject’s internal structure and 
society’s structure makes sense. As McBride observes, if the self is socially extended, then 
it has multiple layers each entailing its own set of relations. There is the external 
relationship we have with others and the internal relationship we have with ourselves, and 
Honneth believes that the external relationship determines the nature of the internal 
relationship.35 Receiving recognition in all three forms of social relations—affectionate 
care, legal recognition, and social esteem—is necessary for human subjects to acquire 
undistorted and positive relations-to-self. Self-confidence that one’s needs and desires have 
value can only come, Honneth says, from recognition in the form of unconditional care, 
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which legitimately can be expected only from tight mutual bonds of family. Self-worth 
legitimately can be expected to develop only through understanding oneself as valuable 
within a shared normative interpretive structure found in concrete communities. Self-
respect, however, because it is tied to legal recognition of one’s universal rights, is a 
categorical obligation in all levels of interaction.36 Honneth holds that particular modes of 
recognition (love, respect, esteem) are structured by the normative content of particular 
spheres of recognition, and, therefore, particular modes of recognition can come only from 
their related sphere of recognition through its particular form of social relation. The 
typology set down by Honneth is that there are three social spheres that have their 
respective recognition norms and that there are social institutions that structure and 
maintain these norms. If the social institutions are healthy, then subjects will receive the 
recognition they require for self-realization, but if the social institutions are pathological, 
then subjects will be unable to achieve self-realization.  
Combining his descriptions of recognition across his works, I demonstrate Honneth’s 
tripartite structure of recognition as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 - Honneth’s Topology of Recognition  
Spheres of 
Recognition  
(D 131-133)37 
(RR 138-142) 
 
Forms of Social 
Relations  
(RR 138-142) 
Modes of 
Recognition 
(GR 501, 506) 
(RR 143) 
(SR 129) 
What Is 
Recognized as 
Valuable 
(D 138-139) 
Practical Relation-to-Self 
(D 138-139) 
(RR 138-142) 
(SR 129) 
Family - 
intimate 
relationships 
Intimate 
relationships 
Love Individual needs 
and 
particularities 
Self-confidence: 
“My individual needs and 
desires are of unique 
value.” 
The state -  
legal 
Legal and 
political 
relations 
 
Respect/equal 
rights 
 
Moral agency 
and equality 
Self-respect:  
“My moral accountability 
and authority is equal to 
others’.” 
Civil society - 
economic  
Loose-knit 
social relations 
within civil 
society 
Esteem/solidarity Productive 
capacities and 
achievements 
Self-esteem: 
“My capabilities are of 
concrete value to the 
community.” 
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Distinguishing his typology from Hegel’s, Honneth portrays Hegel’s typology of 
recognition spheres as being an “institutionalist way of thinking”38 that interprets social 
institutions too concretely as legally constituted spheres. Honneth criticizes Hegel’s 
understanding of ethical life as falling entirely under the organizational and legislative 
authority of the modern state whose central institutions represent the only areas of practice 
in which subjects can receive the recognition and education that enables their self-
realization. Instead of Hegel’s insistence that the state, though only the third sphere of 
ethical life, is also the organizational framework for family and civil society, Honneth sees 
society as a complex of spheres of recognition offering various forms of social 
institutionalization.39 Love, rights, and solidarity are three modes of recognition that set 
down the formal structural requirements for communicative interaction within which 
human beings can feel assured of their dignity and integrity. Honneth stresses that he does 
not go so far as to say that these requirements delineate the particular institutional 
manifestations in which these modes of recognition may be finalized, but he does specify 
that they compose “the moral infrastructures which must belong to a social lifeworld if it is 
to be able to protect its members.”40 So, although Honneth thinks there is variation in the 
institutional manifestations of the tripartite moral structure, he thinks the structure itself is 
necessary for the successful functioning of a society. This thought underlies much of his 
work.  
By shifting from Hegel’s conception of three concrete social institutions to three less 
concrete principles of reciprocal recognition, Honneth can show, whereas Hegel cannot, 
how within the family there is both love and legal recognition, which he says are two types 
of recognition that should be combined to protect personal integrity. However, he warns 
against the subordination of familial recognition to the sphere of legal recognition. “If 
[legal] recognition vanishes then the autonomy of individual family members is threatened; 
if [care] recognition evaporates, the emotional bond within the family will be destroyed.”41 
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He illustrates this tension in his comments on the film Kramer vs. Kramer.42 Honneth says 
that the main characters, as they go through a bitter divorce and custody battle, show in 
their actions the social pathology of the lifeworld being subordinated under the medium of 
law. The father especially, Honneth says, calculates his actions toward his child in terms of 
his legal status in the custody battle. The film’s audience is brought to question whether the 
father’s actions are expressions of true feelings or attempts to conform to legal demands. 
The parents are compelled by the same law that they invoke to protect their interests to 
block out their lifeworld of caring family communication and dependencies. Honneth later 
puts this distinction in harsher terms: “Whoever exercises the individual right to divorce as 
a means of separating from one's spouse has destroyed any possibility of commonly 
discussing their separate life paths in the future in light of their shared experiences.”43 To 
this overly literal interpretation of the division between forms of social relations, I say, 
from my experiences as a divorced person, this seems harsh and misses the possible desire 
to separate oneself from a nonbeneficial relationship whose shared experiences are what 
impedes one’s future life path. It is possible that divorce, by releasing the psychological 
clinging to shared experiences, is the healthy life path for both involved. Honneth’s larger 
point remains, though, when he warns that intrusion of the legal into intimate relationships 
is a sign of a social pathology. Family members must be recognized as being subjects with 
universal rights, but in general, he is concerned that the clinging to legal rights is a focus on 
escaping from communicative obligations. Family members can hide behind the juridical to 
avoid their other obligations, abandoning existing attachments and replacing 
communicative obligations with strategic attitudes as soon as legal conflicts threaten.44  
Because he holds that the subject’s relations-to-self mirror the social spheres, 
Honneth follows Hegel’s notion of three degrees in the realization of freedom. First, a 
subject must experience the recognition of love and develop self-confidence, and only then 
can the subject move on to the second stage of experiencing legal recognition and 
developing individual self-determination. Finally, the freedom of personal self-realization 
arises from receiving recognition from the community.45 The subject’s freedom is therefore 
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not measured according to the distance the subject can establish between itself and the 
cultural lifeworld, but according to the degree of recognition it can find in its social 
environment for its freely chosen goals. Instead of being defined by the scale of distance 
from all normative bonds, an increase in personal individuality is determined by the degree 
to which individual differences are communicatively granted by society. Honneth asserts 
that built into each sphere of recognition are publicly justified normative standards for 
interaction that shape subjective claims for recognition within communicative relations.46 
Thus, for Honneth, the three spheres of recognition are learned in stages in a formative 
process of ethical life. The subject is socialized into each sphere, confirmed as a member of 
society, and assimilated into its communal ethical life. Honneth says that “what is 
demanded or expected in terms of moral action relates to a circle of subjects whose size 
varies with the type of recognition at hand.”47 This reference to size relates to Honneth’s 
position that recognition is first learned within the family sphere and that other relations of 
recognition are “merely filled out at later stages through the acquisition of conceptions 
about the reciprocal ascription of abilities and rights.”48 The family sphere being the social 
sphere of smallest scope and the economic and legal spheres being larger in scope, it seems 
that Honneth believes that if there is love recognition within the family sphere, then other 
aspects of a subject’s social relations eventually and inevitably fall into place. 
The idea that society and ethical life can be divided into three social spheres is a 
constant throughout Honneth’s work, including his more recent book Freedom’s Right in 
which he explores three spheres of social freedom—the personal, the markets, and the 
public political. Honneth’s modes of recognition formally track to his institutional spheres 
of recognition—the personal, the civil/economic, and the legal—that correspond to Hegel’s 
stages of social development. The question is this: Is recognition’s socialization process 
best described in terms of three social spheres? There are two issues here: How do we 
describe the sources of recognition behaviors, and how do we describe how recognition 
behaviors affect individuals? When we consider a particular recognition behavior, does 
mapping the behavior onto the legal, the civil, and the family spheres of recognition 
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sufficiently illuminate what is going on? To address these questions, we need to be clear on 
the concept of what being recognized means and then flesh out what it means in terms of 
sources and effects of recognition. 
The first step is to address recognition in terms of communities. Honneth defines 
recognition in terms of one being socially recognized as a member of a community. Human 
individuals live within the context of their community. They are not isolated subjects. 
Individuals become autonomous and self-realizing within a community and because of a 
community. Mutual recognition affirms individuals who have incorporated society’s values 
into their lives and maintains their inclusion in the community. Individuals learn to 
perceive in other individuals qualities to which they can respond with the proper 
recognitional behavior appropriate to their relationships with each person. Looked at in this 
way, acts of recognition are acts learned through socialization that demonstrate to others 
the individual’s integration into the social lifeworld and enables the individual to see him- 
or herself as a member of any human community.49 Social integration is a process of 
inclusion through stable forms of recognition. One is recognized as a member of the 
community insofar as one recognizes the others. 
Honneth defines two communities: political communities and value communities. A 
political community is composed of legal subjects who are bearers of legal rights and 
duties that are distributed by their community.50 In the political community that is the 
universalizable interests of all members of the society, one can experience legal recognition 
and form self-respect. In the value community that is the cultural self-understanding and 
value convictions of a society, one can experience esteem recognition and form self-
esteem.51 This conception links the political community with the legal sphere of 
recognition and the value community with the civil society sphere of recognition, with 
the corresponding forms of social relations and modes of recognition. That Honneth 
discusses both communities as institutional macrosocial spheres limits the explanatory 
power of his theory. What is a community? That was a much simpler question to answer in 
Hegel’s time before social, political, and technological changes altered the structures of the 
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family, social democracy, and culture. Ease of communication and travel, the emergence of 
mass media and more recently social media, increased mobility and diversity, and various 
other changes have transformed many aspects of human society. Individuals are socialized 
by their community into their community, but community is now more varied than what is 
implied by the Hegelian three social spheres that Honneth adopts. Partly as a result of this 
increased social complexity, the mutual influences between what Honneth calls the legal 
and value communities are deeper than he accounts for. A deeper analysis is required to 
understand recognition in our contemporary world. 
A deeper analysis of Honneth’s connection between his spheres of recognition and 
the practical relations-to-self shows that his tripartite structure misses several aspects of 
human social experience, subsuming them under an overly static and monolithic52 
theoretical overlay. A phenomenological look at recognition shows a more complex 
picture. Lines dividing the three spheres are more permeable than Honneth seems to credit. 
My contention is that, in terms of recognition, the intended object of recognition behavior 
is more salient than the social sphere in which the recognition behavior occurs. To explain 
this requires an analysis of the difference between legal recognition and esteem 
recognition.  
Honneth’s thinking in defending the distinction between legal respect and social 
esteem is that respect recognition is the empirical application of general norms, whereas 
esteem recognition is the graduated appraisal of particular traits and contributions as 
distinct from those of others. In the former, one is recognized as sharing a set of qualities 
with all other members of one’s community53; in the latter, one is recognized as being 
distinct—individuated—from other members of the community.54 The idea of equal rights 
entails that all subjects share certain universal human qualities and thus should be granted 
equal rights with all other members of society.55 Accordingly, subjects acquire legal rights 
and develop self-respect by being recognized as possessing the same legal rights and moral 
accountability as others. Within legal recognition, positive qualities have a universal 
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sense—being a human being entitles one to human rights; being a citizen entitles one to 
citizenship rights. Political rights, even voting rights defined as one person, one vote, are 
not addressed to the individual as an individual, but to the citizen as a member of the 
democratic community of rights. Self-esteem is different for Honneth, involving a sense of 
what it is that makes one special and unique, and esteeming others involves seeing their 
unique traits and contributions. Subjects esteem each other as persons of unequal social 
standing based on hierarchically graded traits and contributions. Social esteem is directed at 
the particular qualities that characterize people in their personal differences. Thus, legal 
recognition unifies all individuals under legal norms, whereas esteem recognition 
differentiates individuals under esteem norms.56 The distinction means, Honneth argues, 
that one can demand legal recognition as being treated uniformly, but one cannot demand 
esteem recognition because it must be earned by distinctive behavior.  
The distinction between the universalizing of legal rights and the individuating of 
esteem is basically correct but is more complex than Honneth’s typology delineates. 
Delving into this complexity shows that something additional is at work in both modes of 
recognition—legal respect and social esteem—that makes them more similar than the 
tripartite structure indicates. Looking first at the legal norms, we see that legal statutes are 
not always a practice of universalizing. This reminds us that justice is more than an 
adherence to legal norms, with important consequences for recognition and misrecognition. 
Many laws and legal institutions do not bring all subjects under universal norms but 
use legal recognition to divide the population between those with certain rights and those 
without them. Many laws and legal institutions de facto favor the rich, creating a two-tiered 
justice system. Honneth’s formula of universal legal respect recognition holds only in an 
ideal society in which all human individuals are brought under the homogeneity of high-
minded concepts such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Honneth would 
probably defend his view by pointing out that universal rights are a normative value to 
which society should aspire, made all the more important because society suffers legal 
inequality. I agree, but the point I seek to make is that as important as moral ideals are, 
rights themselves are not always unifying but are based on differentiating individuals, 
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occasionally in an unjust way. To be included in any community is to be respected (in 
Honneth’s legalistic meaning of the term) as a member with all the spoken and unspoken 
rights and privileges that membership entails. I can demand the rights to which I am 
entitled as a member of a community, such as a trade union or an interest organization. We 
think of legal rights in the same way because legal rights are usually tied to citizenship, 
which is a membership in a political community. The rights of citizenship are denied to 
migrants who are not members of the political community. Legal recognition is universal 
only within a differentiated and bounded concept of community differentiated from 
noncommunity. The recognition of citizenship includes some individuals and excludes 
others.  
There are also justifiable instances of legal differentiation—for example, the “reverse 
discrimination” of affirmative action. Treating minorities strictly under universal legal 
standards will not emancipate them from traditional patterns of discrimination. Legal 
programs sought to help African-Americans and women in the United States and Dalits and 
Adivasi in India who had long been legally excluded from equal opportunity in their 
societies.57 Laws were passed requiring processes of admission to schools and hiring in 
jobs to differentiate deliberately on the basis of social class, race, and gender by setting 
quotas or targets of inclusion of members of oppressed groups. The aim was to emancipate 
oppressed people from past discrimination by enacting a targeted “reverse discrimination.” 
Certainly, the ideal that underpins these laws is that of universal rights and equal 
opportunity, but the argument is that unifying the oppressed with the nonoppressed requires 
a period of differentiation. Some would argue that the programs have helped lower poverty 
and raise self-respect in oppressed groups, whereas others would argue that the programs 
only mask deeper social problems of discrimination or are themselves discriminatory by 
favoring social class, race, and gender over individual merit, creating special rights for 
certain social groups. In the argument over whether these legal programs are unifying or 
differentiating, the answer is, both, and this is why the debate is difficult to resolve. 
The principles and practices of legal recognition are based on inclusion and 
exclusion—legal recognition is universal only among those included by definition. This has 
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implications for recognition and misrecognition and their effects on individuals who are not 
adequately included in Honneth’s account. My contention is that the legal is the 
establishment of inclusion and exclusion of a right and that struggles for legal recognition 
are challenges to the existing formulation of inclusion and exclusion. For example, rights 
related to marriage include married couples and exclude nonmarried people who are barred 
from being legally recognized in tax status, government benefits, and property rights. Only 
recently were same-sex couples included in marriage rights. The struggle for recognition of 
same-sex marriage reveals the dual nature of legal recognition as inclusion and exclusion. 
We can legitimately say that legal recognition of marriage rights should be universally 
extended to all couples and should not be restricted to heterosexual couples. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act used the concept and language of legal recognition to 
include and exclude people under a universal definition of marriage. The law stated that 
“the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”58 Proponents of the law saw it as defending a universal moral norm of 
the legal recognition of marriage that same-sex marriages did not respect. Their idea of 
inclusion was defining marriage as “between one man and one woman” to the exclusion of 
“one man and one man” and “one woman and one woman.” Proponents believed the 
morally justified social relation and structure of marriage was a heterosexual one and 
rejected the struggle for recognition by homosexual couples for marriage inclusion. 
Advocates of same-sex marriage opposed the Defense of Marriage Act saying that it 
wrongfully denied same-sex couples inclusion in the legal recognition of marriage and the 
rights conferred by it. The social conflict over same-sex marriage saw both sides appealing 
to what they saw as universal recognition norms. The question I am raising is this: To what 
are both sides appealing when they are appealing to recognition? Both appeal to the value 
of a universal legal standard—what defines legal marriage. The question is not whether 
legal recognition should go to married couples but who are to be included within the 
community of married people—a difference that is a question of value. The conflict is over 
whether same-sex couples are to be included in the value community of who is entitled to 
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the legal status of marriage. The argument for legalizing same-sex marriage is that same-
sex couples should be valued by society in the same way that heterosexual couples are. 
Those who believe same-sex couples should be excluded from legal marriage also hold 
homosexuals in poor esteem, and their exclusion of homosexuals extends beyond the legal 
sphere into civil society. 
Questions about who is included in and excluded from legal communities also 
involve questions about who is included in and excluded from value communities, which 
Honneth associates with esteem. Esteem recognition is not wholly an issue of 
differentiation as Honneth’s account implies but is another form of exclusion and inclusion. 
Even in a situation in which I am esteemed for my achievements, I am individuated on 
condition of my membership in a community. If I am esteemed for writing an exceptionally 
good PhD dissertation, that is possible only because I am recognized as a member of the 
community of postgraduate philosophy students at a university that is recognized as a 
member of accredited degree-granting institutions. My particular achievement is predicated 
on my sharing the same general characteristics as other PhD students and students within 
my discipline. Subjects can mutually esteem each other as individualized persons only 
when they share an orientation to the same values and goals, which Honneth 
acknowledges.59 This unifying framework of esteem is why I can demand social esteem in 
terms of equal treatment. I can say that anyone who achieves a particular goal should 
receive the honors connected with it. We are due that honor if we have achieved that goal, 
but that honor can be denied based on discrimination either against a group or against a 
particular individual, both of which would be misrecognitions. One has every right to 
demand some types of esteem on the basis of an appeal to collective norms similar to 
demands for legal recognition. Tenure and promotion are good examples. If one has 
fulfilled the practical requirements for tenure, then one can legitimately claim one is 
entitled to it. Esteem recognition or lack of it is an expression of inclusion similar to that of 
legal recognition, and inclusion into a community entitles one to any rights associated with 
community membership. A lecturer granted the esteem of tenure is being included in the 
community of tenured faculty at the same time he or she is being differentiated from those 
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who lack the qualifications for tenure and are excluded from it. The rights of tenure now 
accrue to the professor as they apply universally to all members of the exclusive 
community.  
That esteem is inclusion into a social status that is dependent on membership in a 
value community fits with Honneth’s association of esteem with solidarity within the civil 
sphere. However, this association is problematic for Honneth as is his account of solidarity. 
Within Honneth’s typology, esteem and solidarity fit within the civil sphere of recognition, 
which is a tenuous gap-filler between legal recognition and love recognition. Theoretically, 
this civil sphere serves two purposes: It gives subjects the possibility of relating to their 
concrete traits and contributions in ways that rights and love cannot, and it covers the social 
territory between the institutions of the state and the family. The problem for Honneth is 
that the he talks variously of “love, rights, and solidarity” and “love, rights, and esteem,” 
but the relationship between esteem and solidarity is not firmly established. Honneth sees 
solidarity as subjects respecting and approving each other in each subject’s particular 
qualities as interpreted by means of shared ideas of a good life,60 which fits with the idea of 
differentiation in terms of inclusion into a value community. Still, there seems to me to be a 
tension between esteem and solidarity. The idea of esteem is a distinguishing of an 
individual from the crowd of others. This is especially true of honors or awards, which are 
given to a select few to elevate how they are regarded by others. More general forms of 
esteem recognition still confer onto an individual a special status and privilege that is not 
universalizable to the general population. However, solidarity unifies individuals into a 
group identity and value community. Honneth gives the example of war creating 
“spontaneous relationships of solidarity and sympathy across social boundaries.”61 True, 
war is an experience of great strain and sacrifice that brings people into common cause, but 
Honneth’s contention that war creates a new constellation of values in which 
accomplishments are newly esteemed seems overly optimistic, especially in the long term. 
Women filled many work roles during World War II, but their contributions were not 
esteemed—at least compared with those of men, who remained differentiated with a higher 
social status—and women’s lesser social position remained after the war. Also, the 
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relationships of solidarity in war are more matters of survival or of hostility toward an 
enemy than an expansion of mutual recognition across social boundaries—solidarity in war 
is a violent form of inclusion and exclusion. Honneth’s hope for solidarity is that it is a 
form of recognition that can provide the communicative basis on which individuals who 
have been isolated by legal misrecognition can unite within the context of an ethical 
community.62 He sees solidarity as a necessary prerequisite for shared activity in the public 
sphere; therefore, he counts as just whatever is capable of promoting social attitudes of 
solidarity.63 Mostly, Honneth associates solidarity with the civil sphere, though he also 
links it to the family sphere, referring to the family as a community of solidarity.64 This 
certainly makes sense because any social unit regardless of size must interact in solidarity 
to maintain itself as a social unit. Honneth places family in a separate sphere that he refers 
to as either “family” or “intimate relations,” the corresponding mode of recognition being 
love. To this third mode of recognition, love, I now turn. 
Honneth defines love relationships as primary affectional relationships that “are 
constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people.”65 This is a 
good definition with which to start, but Honneth focuses his inquiry, on the one hand, on 
the institution of the modern family as established by capitalist industrialization,66 and, on 
the other hand, on object-relations theory of the mother-child relation.67 This theoretical 
approach reduces family to a set of institutionalized relations of husband to wife and 
mother to child. Honneth sees the modern capitalist nuclear family as a private sphere 
separate from the rest of society and (at least ideally) independent of social and economic 
expectations. Honneth describes the family as having been “liberated” from the public 
sphere by changes in social and economic sphere starting in the 19th century.68 Honneth’s 
view of the family trends toward traditional gender roles. Honneth’s typology theoretically 
takes an institutional view of family as child raising more than a view of family as relations 
of love.  
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Fraser has criticized Honneth for his view of family ideologically mystifying 
women’s labor as “care.”69 Her point that what Honneth calls affective care in child raising 
is actually women’s labor is well founded. Honneth constructs the family sphere as a 
private site of the marriage bond and child development,70 which has the side effect of 
obscuring women’s labor in the household. Honneth’s views of the family sphere stem 
from the great emphasis he places on the importance of early childhood development, 
wherein young children develop from the continuity of parental care an understanding of 
their needs and their identity as a loved person. That loving relations help one develop a 
sense of self-confidence is uncontroversial, but Honneth adopts a version of psychoanalytic 
theory that all loving relationships are driven by the unconscious recollection of the first 
months of life and affectional bonds with one’s mother or mother figure.71 Honneth uses 
his interpretation of psychoanalytic theory in terms of mutual recognition to argue that the 
love relationship learned in childhood is a double recognition of mutual independence 
(self-assertion) and mutual care (symbiosis) that is the genetically primary self-relation of 
self-confidence on which other practical relations-to-self and forms of recognition 
depend.72 He further argues from this that the same logic of reciprocal recognition explains 
love relations and legal relations, claiming that the primary relations of love learned in 
early childhood form the basis of public ethical life,73 which ties back to his view of 
socialization in stages of recognition first learned within the family sphere. 
However, and seemingly in contradiction, Honneth leaves love relations as separate 
from other human relations. Honneth sees the goals and desires of love relationships as 
“necessarily enclosed within the narrow boundaries of a primary relationship”74 and thus 
unable to be extended to the wider social world. As we shall see later in chapter 2.4, this 
limitation on love creates problems for Honneth in viewing what motivates struggles for 
recognition. His attempts to place love relations within the Hegelian tripartite structure 
forces him to simplify the wide varieties of love theoretically to the primary bonds of the 
family, which he defends as a private sphere of affectionate bonds. This sets up, as alluded 
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to in the earlier discussion of Kramer vs. Kramer, a moral conflict between the private 
family sphere and the public spheres of legal and esteem relations where two different sets 
of moral orientations collide.75 If a legal moral orientation is imposed on a relationship of 
strong emotional attachments, it makes sense to describe those conflicts as being between 
the private family sphere and the public legal sphere; however, this is an external 
theoretical characterization that does not reflect how the individuals involved perceive and 
think about these conflicts.  
Many conflicts within social interactions lie in tensions obscured by Honneth’s 
separation of recognition relations into institutional spheres. We can reveal these other 
tensions through understanding that many interpersonal conflicts lie not in private versus 
public or family versus legal spheres, but in terms of two types of recognition relations: 
with norms and with individuals. Honneth’s account of recognition as respect for others’ 
moral autonomy helps explain the distinction I am making. Recognition requires that I 
respect others as having their own moral capabilities and accountabilities. If I only follow 
norms but do not see that these norms are important because of their connections with an 
individual, I am not fully respecting either the individual or the norms. I need to see the 
other person as a moral actor who is the reason why I am acting according to moral norms, 
and this respect for others’ moral autonomy underlies an engagement with other 
individuals. I can interact with others in terms of formalities and legalities, in terms of 
personal affectional bonds, or in terms of both. For example, I can assert my legal rights in 
a way that places me in a position better than a friend’s, and perhaps to my friend’s 
detriment, and in so doing I damage my relation of recognition with my friend. But if my 
friend is emotionally hurt by my exercising my legal rights, what is the conflict between 
us? If my friend objects, it is not an objection against legal norms or a claim that I do not 
have legal rights but that I have placed priority in those rights over our friendship. Our 
conflict is not between a legal sphere and a friendship (love) sphere but between the 
practical choices of relations of recognition that are possible between my friend and me. I 
have engaged with the norms at the expense of my engagement with my friend, and this 
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has caused hurt feelings. My prioritization of norms may be defensible, but my friend may 
want our relation of personal recognition to take priority over the recognition of norms.  
Friendship is a relationship that has different expectations from workplace or 
economic relationships in which others will expect me to prioritize relating to the norms 
that guide our work and economic interactions. Nevertheless, the difference I am pointing 
out is not clear in Honneth’s account because he places both economic transactions and 
solidarity (including friendship) in the public sphere of civil society, separate from the 
private sphere of family and love relations. Solidarity for Honneth occurs in a community 
of subjects sharing a value horizon of a collective conception of a good life and engaging 
as a community to realize it.76 He also holds that self-esteem comes from solidarity with 
and approval from a community “organized along corporative lines.”77 Honneth also 
associates self-esteem with the economic sphere because he sees social esteem as bound up 
with opportunities to pursue economically rewarding occupations.78 It seems reasonable to 
conclude that an emblematic example of Honneth’s conception of a community with which 
one has solidarity and from which one receives esteem is the working class sharing a 
collective interest and engaging as a community to realize their shared economic goals.79 
Meanwhile, Honneth distinguishes the recognition received in friendship from the 
recognition received in solidarity,80 thus separating the love recognition of friendship from 
the esteem recognition of solidarity. Honneth’s overly narrow definition of self-esteem as 
coming from large communities in the economic sphere misses the reality that we gain our 
sense of self-esteem far more from friends than from strangers. It is from the particular and 
personal mutual recognition of friendship that much of our positive self-relations come.  
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Throughout my social interactions, I can behave formally and comport myself 
toward someone in a legalistic and impersonal manner. I can do this even to my spouse. 
Here, being formal differs from intimacy—I can, by my behavior, remove the intimacy 
from my relationship. This lack of intimacy is different from a violation of another’s legal 
rights. Honneth is correct that within a family, individual subjects need to be able to claim 
principles of universal justice if their legal dignity is violated, such as in sexual or physical 
abuse, where obviously recognition is absent. But there is an area of misrecognition in our 
personal relationships that is not covered by Honneth’s division between the legal and the 
family. To be inconsiderate to our spouse or friend is not a violation of their legal rights, 
but it is a violation of our affectional relationship. Respect is expected not just in legal 
terms but throughout personal relations. Lack of engagement with another individual I will 
explore in depth later in chapter 1.3. 
Honneth’s overinstitutionalization of the family sphere creates difficulties for him 
when he tries to address the affectional bonds of friendship, and a critique of his 
conceptions of friendship is necessary to correct its inadequacies. Friendship can be 
described in terms of recognition, but it does not map to Honneth’s three spheres. Also, 
despite the fact that there are social norms for friendship, it does not qualify as a social 
institution because it is not as norm governed as Honneth assumes. Throughout his 
writings, Honneth groups friendship with marriage and parent-child relationships under the 
term “love relationships” in the family sphere.81 In Freedom’s Right, he groups family with 
friendship and intimate relationships under “personal relationships,” a sphere that he 
continues to place alongside the civil sphere (now called “the we of the market economy”) 
and the legal sphere (now called “the we of democratic will-formation”). His discussion of 
personal relationships in Freedom’s Right amends his previous discussion of family and 
friendship, but in Freedom’s Right he is mostly concerned with how structural reforms of 
social institutions can ensure the socioeconomic conditions for the institutions of family 
and friendship that contribute to the development of a democratic ethical life.82 This 
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macrosocial view does not provide much insight into the intersubjective experiences of 
friendship. 
Are friendships governed by social norms, or by the agreements of the individuals 
involved? There are social conventions to be sure, but individuals also bring distinct 
expectations to particular friendships. Any two individuals can make their own implicit or 
explicit agreements about their relationship, but as Honneth points out, we do consider that 
there is a difference between “true” friendship and “inauthentic” friendship. Although the 
norms of friendship may be vague, they can be drawn on as criteria to guide our 
relationships. Honneth considers the norm of friendship to be socially institutionalized as a 
shared body of knowledge about what practices constitute appropriate friendship.83 His 
definition of friendship84 considers “true” friendship to be similar to a legal contract with 
formal expectations and role obligations, which when violated allow a party to end the 
contract. This idealized view may portray some instances (mostly in the past) of personal 
relationships but cannot be seen as a definition with broad application today. Honneth 
mentions that in the past personal relations were controlled with class distinctions that must 
be strictly obeyed and alliances that required a common interest but that since the economic 
prosperity and accompanying social class relaxation following World War II friendship has 
been transformed to include private relationships of friendship in which personal concerns 
and private matters could be shared. Although Honneth sees friendship now as being 
cultivated at all levels of society and gender barriers being at least partially broken, he still 
seems to see friendship in the character of a rule-governed transaction that individuals must 
learn to master. There is certainly truth in this—one must learn how to become a good 
friend, learn how to trust a friend, care about a friend’s well-being and concerns, and keep a 
friend’s secrets. Each of these identifiable traits of “true” friendship is governed by 
normative expectations. Honneth takes this idea to a high level, saying that “friendship 
constitutes an institutionalized form of pre-reflexive commonalities marked by the implicit 
desire to reveal our own feelings and attitudes without reservation.”85 It is not an overly 
romantic sentiment to think that for most people in most situations, this does not fully 
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describe the friendships lived by individuals. Individuals do practice friendships aware of 
unofficial rules that they violate at risk of disapproval, but the question remains as to what 
expectations individuals bring to their friendships beyond cultural normative expectations. 
Honneth seems to be aware of these complexities when he paraphrases Derrida’s 
conception of friendship as having the two dimensions of moral responsibility: generality 
and particularity. A friend can appeal to the general moral norms that apply to all people, 
plus a friend can appeal to the bonds of sympathy and affection particular to him or her as 
an individual friend. Derrida finds that in this conception is a fundamental opposition in 
which the demand of affection is an asymmetrical obligation—one must give preferential 
affection to one’s friends—whereas the normative moral demand is symmetrical—one is 
equally morally obligated to all individuals.86 The legal obligations we have for another 
may be in opposition to our obligation to support our friends even if they violate legal 
norms.  
It seems to me that there is much more to the phenomena of friendship than is being 
captured by Honneth’s institutionalized discussion. What are the sources of these 
expectations for friendship? Surely, the norms of friendship are not legal authorizations but 
customs. Each culture, and subculture within a culture, would have particular customs 
attached to the concept of friendship that contain a loose set of normative expectations and 
complementary role obligations, yet the practice of friendship is so variable and reflective 
of circumstances that cultural norms do not penetrate and regulate to a controlling degree. 
Individuals choose friendships for various reasons, and friendships serve the desires and 
involvements of the individuals involved. Instead of trying to provide formal definitions 
about what “true” friendship is, we would do better to consider friendship as consisting of 
varieties that fall under family resemblances to which particular friendships are similar to 
varying degrees. There are numerous different kinds of friendship, which vary according to 
the individuals, settings, and other circumstances involved. We see different types of 
friendships with different expectations that develop organically in the intersubjective 
dynamics between children, teenagers, businessmen, mothers of small children, smokers, 
sports fans, hobbyists, activists, and so on. We see that the norms for friendship differ 
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when the individuals involved are acquaintances, companions, close friends, or best 
friends.  
Understanding the complexity of friendship is important to understanding the vital 
importance of personal recognition to individuals. In intimate relationships, individuals 
have the potential for the strongest and most profound affirmations of (or harm to) their 
personal integrity and self-image. Mutual recognition is, Honneth says, the basis for a 
marriage,87 and the recognition one receives as a child is internalized and becomes a 
disposition for one’s future relationships. Throughout life, mutual recognition between 
significant others, between parents and children, and between friends provides the 
dispositions required for long-term attachments to other individuals.88 To reflect the broad 
and complex importance of intimate relationships, we cannot limit the conception of love 
recognition and the self-confidence it engenders to the institution of the child-raising 
family. Love recognition is connected to other aspects of intersubjective relations. Love in 
marriage, family, friendship, and solidarity is understood in everyday life to be a type of 
relationship in which one can freely express one’s thoughts and desires with the 
expectation one will be heard if not answered. Honneth is correct that love is a relation in 
which one can feel confidence that one’s needs are valued and can be met. I add that this 
love relationship can be found in any area of social life whether or not it was first found 
within the institution of a family. A healthy love relationship is signified by emotional 
security within that relationship. Such emotional security can engender greater self-
confidence in other personal relationships and social activities. The important point is that 
the love relationship is an interpersonal relationship of mutual care that can transcend the 
boundary of family. This has always been the case but has been brought into the open in 
recent years by the growth of nontraditional households. Marriage and childhood have been 
symbolic representations of love relationships, but individuals have always sought love 
recognition outside of these. Even the undeniably stilted bonding between men who are 
defined by patriarchal roles shows they are seeking recognition and solidarity in their 
friendships. These men can still feel free to express their thoughts and desires with the 
expectation they will be heard. That the range of thoughts and desires they are free to 
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express is limited by patriarchal and misogynist recognition norms does not negate that 
such male friendships involve a kind of mutual affection. Women have arguably been freer 
to form friendships with other women with greater potential for intimacy because 
recognition norms allow that. Men and women have long found it more difficult to form 
friendships because societal expectations of male-female relations restrict them to superior-
subordinate relations. Despite these norms, individual women and men can craft their own 
expectations in their friendships. 
Honneth mentions the occurrence of friendships for instrumental reasons—what he 
calls “friendship-like relations,” brought on by network capitalism and its pressure on 
employees to mobilize informal lifeworld skills in service of work-related goals.89 Similar 
pressures on individuals occur from numerous sources beyond the workplace and 
“friendship-like relations” are quite common, perhaps even more common than “true” 
friendship. We all have a tendency to instrumentalize some of our friendships in order to 
make advantageous connections and outcomes. That we take advantage in a 
nonmanipulative way does not necessarily detract from the friendship. Here, too, the 
variety of relations and circumstances involved mean that normative expectations vary as 
to how much we can push the advantage of a friendship. Friendship is not strictly a 
dynamic of mutual advantage. Love is a component of friendship—and it is similar to other 
relationships defined by love—but there are different kinds of love in different kinds of 
friendship. Friendship differs from marriage and parent-child relationships in that one 
cannot be married to or child of a large number of people. One probably cannot fruitfully 
be friends with a large number of people, but one’s circle of friendship can be larger than 
the tight circle of being a spouse or child, and this enables individuals to have a variety of 
types of friends. We care about our friends, and we will often act on their behalf out of 
love, perhaps with no expectations of receiving something in return. Each particular 
friendship will develop its own comfort level of reciprocal expectations. There are only 
some friends with whom you feel comfortable speaking about certain subjects and only 
some to whom you would feel comfortable lending money, and with each such friend, a 
certain difficult-to-define amount of money you are comfortable lending. This general 
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overview of friendship indicates its complexity. We need not have a romantic ideal of 
relationships to see that what individuals expect in relationships goes beyond strict 
normative categories and reflects the individuals and circumstances involved. We 
recognize someone as a friend in a particular, not a universal, way and Honneth’s tripartite 
structure does not adequately describe friendship.  
Honneth’s different modes of solidarity and love seem to separate recognition 
relations unnaturally among individuals. Unless we were to take an uncharitable reading of 
Honneth that solidarity is possible only within a feeling of group pride—a reading Honneth 
distances himself from90—there is a strong connection between solidarity and care. In the 
normative terms of recognition relations, solidarity among friends and love among family 
members are both emotional bonds of devotion, and Honneth does not make a compelling 
argument for them being different modes of recognition. It seems more likely that familial 
love, friendship, and camaraderie are different varieties of affection rather than different 
forms of recognition. Shifting to misrecognition, how would betrayal of a friend be of a 
different normative mode than betrayal of a family member? The betrayal committed by 
the individual is at core the same violation of norms of trust and loyalty that transcends any 
formal boundary between social and familial relations. We could say truthfully that the 
likely expectations between friends and between family members are different, but then we 
should further say that the particular expectations in any relationship depend on the 
particular understandings of the individuals involved. There is, for example, a basic norm 
within a culture of what loyalty means, and perhaps more particular norms about the 
meaning of loyalty within a friendship and within a family, but still, the individuals 
involved need to interpret and apply their culture’s norms to their particular situation. 
Whether the particular personal relationship we are looking at is between friends or 
between family members is relevant, but it is not definitive. This example of betrayal 
suggests that Honneth’s formal mapping of recognition and misrecognition to spheres of 
social levels is inadequate to portray everyday intersubjective relations. It would seem that 
particular recognition and misrecognition behaviors, rather than falling neatly into three 
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modes, reflect a dynamic of combined engagement with norms and engagement with 
individuals.  
 
What this brief discussion indicates is that recognition is not simply a matter of 
separate social spheres of family, state, and civil society. It is a matter of different types of 
intersubjective relations. Instead of thinking of recognition in terms of three social spheres, 
we can think of recognition as two modes of relations that nonabsolutely reflect two types 
of engagements—engagement with norms and engagement with individuals. Christopher 
Zurn observes that love is particularistic, whereas respect is universalistic.91 I argue that 
this is the real distinction between love and legality and is a better description than linking 
differentiation with esteem recognition and universalizing with legal recognition. To love 
someone means to separate that person out from others in terms of our considerations and 
engage with that person as an individual. We care more about our loved one’s needs and 
desires than we do for others’, even though we do not willfully disregard the needs and 
desires of others. The distinction is better described by the type of recognition relation 
involved and what is being valued in that relationship. Love is definitely a personal 
engagement. When there is no longer an engagement with the other individual, the love 
relationship is diminished and is in danger of fracturing. Seeing love as engagement with 
another individual fits with Honneth’s concern about familial recognition becoming 
subordinated to the sphere of legal recognition, such as in his example of the couple in the 
film Kramer vs. Kramer. When two individuals in their interactions engage only in terms 
of norms and not with each other, then they definitely have blocked out their lifeworld of 
caring family communication and dependencies. We can better describe the recognition 
dynamic of a dysfunctional marriage in terms of engagements than in terms of spheres of 
recognition. Legal recognition requires a lack of personal recognition and, as Honneth’s 
Kramer vs. Kramer example shows, personal recognition demands relations isolated from 
legal concerns. Honneth points to how appeals to reciprocal love are different from appeals 
to reciprocal legal justice—they are appeals not to rational insight but to the existence of 
commonly held affections between individuals. Appeals to love require the individuals 
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involved to have a mutual preference for each other that corresponds to giving and 
receiving from each other to benefit their individual needs.92  
This distinction based on type of recognitional engagement also describes the 
difference between love and esteem. Love is a personal relation of recognition in which 
there is mutual personal engagement. Esteem is an engagement with an individual but is 
not necessarily a personal engagement. Love has an unconditional character, whereas 
esteem depends on whether certain conditions are met. In love, what is valued is the other 
person, not what he or she does, whereas esteem values what another does as measured by 
social norms. What this distinction also shows is that there are two different esteem 
recognitions: We engage with norms in terms of deciding whether to esteem someone's 
accomplishments, and we engage with the other individual in loving him or her. We can 
esteem someone with whom we have no personal relationship; we can esteem a quality in 
someone even if we do not like him or her as a person. For example, we can esteem 
someone as intelligent but not want to be friends with him or her.  
Using the two engagements, we can unpack what is going on in the recognition 
relations related to tenure and other social positions of status. With an office or position 
come certain rights and responsibilities that require certain responses from others, all of 
which are prescribed by norms. A head of a department is due a certain amount of respect, 
but that could be more a respect for the office than for the individual holding it. We have 
heard such sentiments when people say they respect the office of the president or prime 
minister but deeply dislike the individual holding that office. In such cases, one is engaging 
with norms but not fully engaging with the individual who holds the position. One can 
demand fair consideration for tenure based on having fulfilled the normative requirements. 
One can demand respect for one’s position on the basis of an appeal to recognition norms, 
but one cannot demand to be liked. There is a difference between social esteem, as in an 
award, and personal esteem, as in being held in high regard. If someone is given the 
institutional esteem of a promotion, it does not necessarily mean that other individuals will 
follow suit by feeling more personal esteem for that person. We respect our bosses whether 
we like them or not (certainly such respect also comes from self-interest to protect our own 
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position), but whether we like them is different from their position as boss. Similarly, 
supervisors can respect their subordinates in following the law and company policies, 
which is engaging with norms. Whether they are friendly and kind to their subordinates—
engaging with them as individuals—is a different matter. Conversely, supervisors can show 
favoritism to subordinates and break rules in ways that benefit the subordinates. In this 
case, supervisors are engaging with those individuals but not engaging with norms. This is 
the case even if we can point to a cultural norm against nepotism. Such a prohibition 
against nepotism would be an attempt to stop excessive engagement with individuals that 
subverts engagement with norms. An important conclusion we can draw from this 
discussion is that we can recognize another in one way while at the same time 
misrecognizing him or her in another, a possibility I will pursue in chapter 1.3.  
The operative question in recognition is the recognition relations involved and the 
object of recognition behavior. When any individual or social institution is respecting 
someone’s legal rights, the object of recognition must be the applicable legal norms. A 
human right does not exist separate from a human being, but a human right is not attached 
to a specific human individual. Legal rights are to be recognized and respected regardless 
of the specific person with whom you are interacting. A judge should recuse him- or herself 
from a case if he or she has a personal relationship with the plaintiff or defendant. The 
aphorism “justice is blind” hints at how applying legal norms properly means not seeing 
the individual—that is, not engaging with someone individually and not differentiating 
someone in the sense of favoritism, but universalizing the law to apply equally to all. Legal 
issues of all kinds are issues of engaging with legal norms universally without engaging 
with individuals and their circumstances. Laws against theft are universally applied and do 
not take into account individual needs. Laws banning women wearing the veil is an 
engagement with a general norm rather than with an individual’s desire to wear one, 
subjugating that desire under the universal norm. Obviously, not all individual desires are 
of the same character, such as the desire to eat in order to survive versus the desire to wear 
an item of clothing, but the character of legal norms is the same.  
The advantage of thinking of recognition in terms of engagements can be illustrated 
with a practical example. When I have the task of making (or grading) a student’s essay, I 
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am engaging in two different forms of relations of recognition. One relation is with the 
rules of proper conduct for marking all student essays, which include standards on judging 
the essays and moral requirements such as impartiality. The other relation is with the 
achievement of the student—in this case, with the content and quality of the essay. To give 
students their due rights, I must engage in both relations: respecting the rules and standards 
by applying them impartially regardless of who has submitted the essay, and according 
proper esteem to the student on the basis of the particular student’s achievements in the 
essay. I am engaging with the normative standards regulating the task, and I am engaging 
with the student through his or her essay. To do my task well and give proper recognition, I 
must involve myself in my task with both engagements. If I fail to involve with both 
engagements, I have not given proper respect and/or esteem recognition to the student. 
 
To summarize this chapter, the shift I propose is to see recognition in terms of the 
relations between the individuals involved and what is being valued in that relationship 
rather than how the form of recognition can be mapped theoretically to a social sphere. 
Rather than viewing recognition in terms of the tripartite social structure, I propose viewing 
it in terms of relations with norms and relations with individuals. Seeing respect and 
esteem as different relations of recognition reveals that they are not tied to spheres of 
recognition as specified in Honneth’s typology. An individual engages with norms and 
other individuals in all aspects of social life, and the varying degrees of those engagements 
tells us more about whether recognition is happening or not than does mapping the social 
situation to a social sphere. The example of marking or grading essays is one of many 
common tasks that do not map directly to Honneth’s spheres. Marking essays is a task that 
has formal rules that must be respected, so is it in the legal sphere? It is not related to the 
state though, so must it be in the civil sphere? In a sense, yes, but the task is not strictly 
about esteem as Honneth implies with the civil sphere. A student can appeal to a just 
application of the rules that govern academic marking, and that appeal does not go to the 
state but to individuals within the nonstate academic institution, but this is not an appeal to 
esteem or solidarity.  
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Respect for norms and for their just application occurs throughout social interactions; 
they do not occur only in the legal sphere. Respect recognition is not simply legal 
recognition but is a behavior that is continually in the background of, and is a condition for, 
any recognition relationship. While marking essays, I have to treat students with respect 
(fairly); in working with others, I must observe the rules of the workplace; in loving my 
wife, I have to respect her rights, and so on. This shows that there is no distinct social 
sphere for respect recognition; at most, there could be a sphere that is only about respect 
(i.e., the political sphere), but even this is debatable. A lack of respect for rules leads to 
misrecognition of individuals. Similarly, a myopic, legalistic approach to norms runs the 
danger of injustice when the individuals involved and their circumstances are not engaged. 
The idea that gun ownership is a universal right has caused problems in the United States 
because the universal norm does not take into account different circumstances. Guns in an 
urban setting differ from guns in a rural setting, different types of guns pose different 
dangers, and so on. If the particularities of situations and individuals are not taken into 
account, legal recognition may not be achieved. Successful legal or esteem recognition 
requires engagement with both applicable norms and involved individuals. Honneth surely 
would not disagree with this. My argument is not that Honneth is incorrect in what he says 
but that an increased focus on the object of engagement in recognition behavior will 
improve our understanding of recognition relations and how they can go wrong. 
1.2 – Rethinking Honneth’s contrarian account of misrecognition  
In this chapter, I take issue with Honneth’s account of misrecognition, deeming it 
inadequate to describe individuals’ experiences of misrecognition and, by extension, 
inadequate to be a basis for an account of struggles for recognition that are in response to 
misrecognition. In Honneth’s theory, the significant importance of recognition for 
individual well-being and social cohesion is clear. Honneth holds that individuals can 
construct and maintain a positive self-relation only with the help of affirmative reactions 
from others.93 This reliance on others is the reason why a violation of the principles of 
reciprocal recognition results in a moral injury to a subject.94 If Honneth is correct, even to 
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a degree, then a lack of recognition is a significant problem for society that critical theory 
must address. It is easy to understand how oppressive laws and economic deprivation are 
harmful to individuals. Honneth expands the scope of injustice by arguing that subjects 
learn conceptions of justice through processes of socialization and come to expect that 
society will recognize them in accordance with social recognition norms. The 
disappointment of these normative expectations by actions contrary to recognition is 
experienced by subjects as violence to their identity claims.95 In many cases, 
misrecognition is an active withholding of recognition such as denying rights or refusing 
social inclusion. Receiving exclusion, insult, or degradation violates and damages a 
subject’s self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. Because subjects rely on social 
recognition for their human identity, its denial is necessarily accompanied by the sense of a 
threatening loss of personality.96 These injuries to one’s integrity, honor, or dignity, 
Honneth argues, represent the normative core of the experience of injustice.97 Individuals 
are vulnerable to misrecognition because of their need for recognition, and the experience 
of misrecognition is deeply important in an individual’s life. 
 To describe behaviors that violate recognition norms, Honneth often uses the term 
“disrespect” rather than “misrecognition,” but it is clear that by “disrespect” he means 
attitudes and actions that are the contrary of recognition. By “disrespect,” Honneth means 
acts that deny subjects recognition for their particular claims to identity—disruptions or 
injuries to a subject’s practical relation-to-self potentially severe enough to bring the 
subject’s identity to the point of collapse.98 Honneth also consistently links acts of 
recognition with social justice and acts of misrecognition or disrespect with social injustice. 
Although Honneth uses the term “disrespect” to refer to the denial of all types of 
recognition, because he uses the terms “respect” and “self-respect” to refer to a specific 
type of recognition (the legal), to avoid confusion I will use the term “misrecognition” to 
refer to all types of denial of recognition. 
In “Recognition and Moral Obligation” and Disrespect, Honneth speaks of 
misrecognition in terms of moral injuries to affected subjects who are disregarded and 
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denied recognition. He distinguishes between the experiences of a moral misdeed and of ill 
luck or constraint. In a moral misdeed, unlike in an amoral happening, one can easily show 
that an aspect of recognition was withheld by another person or persons. For Honneth, 
then, behaviors that transgress recognition norms are behaviors with moral significance. It 
is easy to understand that acts such as physical assault, fraud, theft, or humiliation are 
misrecognition behaviors that violate an individual’s body or property. Honneth adds that 
in experiencing such misrecognition behaviors, the affected individual experiences not only 
a material injury to his or her body or property but also moral injury—“the accompanying 
consciousness of not being recognized in one’s own self-understanding.”99 The affected 
individual’s personal integrity is disregarded by acts of physical assault, fraud, theft, or 
humiliation, and this has significant repercussions for an individual’s positive relations-to-
self. Misrecognition undermines the preconditions of individuals’ self-realization. This 
follows logically from the insight that recognition is a precondition for individuals’ self-
realization, and, thus, recognition and misrecognition are contrary behaviors. Because 
recognition is so vital to an individual’s well-being, a lack of adequate recognition 
effectively damages an individual. 
In The Fragmented World of the Social, The Struggle for Recognition, and 
Disrespect, Honneth offers a systematic typology of three forms of misrecognition that 
parallel three levels of moral injuries and map directly to his three modes of recognition. 
The first form is forcibly depriving an individual of autonomous control over his or her 
own body; the second, structurally excluding an individual from certain legal rights; and 
the third, the denigration of individual or collective lifestyles.100 Each of these forms of 
misrecognition excludes the individual from mutual recognition.  
Honneth’s examples for the first form of misrecognition are acts of physical 
humiliation such as physical abuse, rape, or torture.101 These are examples of, Honneth 
says, the most fundamental type of human degradation because such acts of misrecognition 
strip an individual of physical autonomy. Being deprived of autonomous control of one’s 
body is an injury far greater than the physical pain it causes; it also causes the individual to 
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feel defenseless and violated. Individuals experiencing this physical humiliation form of 
misrecognition are deprived of that form of recognition that enables body-related self-
confidence in their interactions with their environment. They are less capable of forming 
emotional attachments with others and maybe even with themselves—experiencing a form 
of psychological death. This type of misrecognition causes lasting damage to one’s sense of 
self, rendering one less capable of expressing one’s needs and feelings. Although Honneth 
does not specifically include it, we should add physical and verbal bullying as less severe, 
but still powerful, incidents of physical humiliation. The resulting feelings of violation and 
loss of body-related self-confidence are similar, albeit less severe than from rape or torture. 
Honneth describes the second form of misrecognition as associated with one’s 
awareness of being a morally accountable subject.102 Honneth links this form of 
misrecognition with the legal sphere, though it seems apparent that legal discrimination is 
only one way in which one’s self-responsibility is misrecognized. The second form’s 
combination of the restriction of personal autonomy and the denial of equal moral rights 
fits with all forms of discrimination whether at the individual or macrosocial level and 
whether based on sex, race, religion, or something else. Being excluded not only has 
practical social consequences for an individual but also signifies to the individual that he or 
she is considered to be lacking full moral status in society and is deemed to be not on the 
same level as other individuals. This means that in practical and normative senses, the 
individual is socially ostracized as not being a worthy partner for mutual recognition. A 
woman or a member of a racial minority denigrated in this manner is not only denied full 
access to the society’s institutional legal order but also denied full access to the society’s 
normative moral expectations. This form of misrecognition will be witnessed by other 
individuals who will become disinclined to offer recognition to socially ostracized 
individuals and even may be encouraged actively to misrecognize those individuals. 
Individuals who experience this form of misrecognition are deprived of that form of 
recognition that enables self-respect for their own moral accountability. They are rendered 
less capable of considering themselves as persons worthy of receiving moral consideration 
and recognition. They lose their self-respect and their ability to relate to themselves as 
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social partners on par with others—experiencing social incapacity or social death. As 
socially ostracized individuals, they are deprived of valuable socialization and become less 
capable of internalizing the moral norms of society and thus less capable of giving 
recognition to others.103 
Honneth places the third form of misrecognition, related to one’s social value, along 
a spectrum—from being rude to someone in not greeting him or her to stigmatizing and 
denigrating individual or collective lifestyles.104 From his comment that this form of 
misrecognition occurs when the hierarchy of social values “downgrade[s] individual forms 
of life and convictions as being inferior or deficient,”105 we can guess that he is thinking 
that this form of misrecognition is directed toward people considered to be from the lower 
classes in a society. This would make sense in that working class people often experience 
their work and lives as being devalued. Honneth also links this form of misrecognition to 
“unconventional lifestyles,”106 “individual forms of life,”107 and conflicting lifestyles,108 
which seems to suggest not the working class but countercultures or people deemed by the 
majority to be deviant, such as homosexuals.109 Honneth is unclear about what attributes of 
these “lifestyles” are being downgraded. Regardless, he states that these patterns of 
denigrative evaluation of individual or collective forms of life rob those misrecognized of 
being able to take a positive view of their abilities. Individuals experiencing this form of 
misrecognition are deprived of that form of recognition that enables an individual to feel 
positive toward him- or herself and to develop self-esteem. These individuals are rendered 
less capable of self-realization of themselves as individuals worthy of esteem. Such 
degradation disconnects individuals from the cultural traditions of their society, and they 
are cut off from group solidarity. The individual’s identity and his or her place in society 
are diminished, resulting in a loss of self-esteem.110 
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Honneth’s typology shows how misrecognition has significant long-term 
consequences for individuals who experience it: “The experience of [misrecognition] poses 
the risk of an injury which can cause the identity of the entire person to collapse.”111 Just as 
individuals can learn self-respect and self-confidence, they can also learn to have a lack of 
self-respect and self-confidence and even to develop self-loathing. Experiencing 
misrecognition, one lacks the confidence and security to express one’s thoughts and 
desires. One becomes less able to make positive healthy connections with other people, 
further diminishing one’s ability to receive recognition and affirmation from others. The 
individual learns to see his or her self as one without equal worth and rights. When mutual 
recognition is absent, Honneth says, individuals can fall into perceiving themselves and 
each other as objects and are indifferent to those aspects of individuals that are valuable.112 
The importance of recognition means that misrecognition is an issue of major 
importance. However, although Honneth spends considerable effort discussing the concept 
of recognition and its usefulness for critical theory, his discussion of misrecognition is 
limited to distinguishing three kinds of misrecognition and the question of how those moral 
experiences motivate struggles for recognition. What explanations of misrecognition he 
provides, as summarized above, rest on seeing misrecognition as the contrary of a related 
form of recognition, mostly as its absence. I contend that Honneth’s conception of 
misrecognition is oversimplified, resulting in a serious deficit for his critical theory. If we 
are concerned about misrecognition, we want to know more about the forms of 
misrecognition. One could argue that critical theory, including Honneth, has identified 
capitalism as a primary cause of misrecognition. Such a diagnosis, despite capitalism’s 
pernicious influences on society and individuals, is insufficient at illuminating the moral 
experiences of individuals. Honneth is correct that critical theory needs to give attention to 
the moral experiences of individuals, but no critical theory to date, including his, gives us 
sufficient insights on misrecognition. I will take up the problems with Honneth’s account 
of the motivations for struggles for recognition in Part Two. In the remainder of this 
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chapter, I will discuss how Honneth’s account of misrecognition is incomplete; then, in the 
following chapter, I will respond with an alternative account of misrecognition that 
answers the shortfalls in Honneth’s account. 
Honneth places misrecognition within the tripartite structure of recognition, 
classifying different aspects of socially caused injuries according to their recognition 
claims in the related sphere of recognition.113 All individuals are morally vulnerable 
because their identity depends on affirmation from others. According to Honneth, because 
one’s self-image and identity depends on the particular intersubjective relationships in 
which one receives love, respect, and esteem, experiencing misrecognition is a moral injury 
to particular relations-to-self that can be mapped directly to the tripartite structure that was 
diagrammed in Table 1. The three modes of recognition and three practical relations-to-self 
are love to self-confidence, respect/equal rights to self-respect, and esteem/solidarity to 
self-esteem. It logically proceeds, for Honneth, that a lack of recognition in one of the three 
modes results in an injury to a subject in that subject’s related level of relation-to-self. 
Methodologically, “the number of modes of recognition is to correspond to the number of 
forms of moral injuries.”114 The more fundamental the level of self-relation that is 
misrecognized, the more serious is the individual’s experience of a moral injury. Honneth 
distinguishes three levels of self-relation subject to moral injury: the genetically primary 
level of one’s relation to one’s physical and emotional needs, one’s self-respect in being a 
morally accountable subject, and the awareness of having good or valuable capabilities.115 
One’s physical self-relation is disregarded by acts of physical and emotional abuse and 
violence, one’s moral self-relation is disregarded by acts of fraud or discrimination, and 
one’s capability for self-relation is disregarded by acts of disdain and stigmatization.116  
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As with Honneth’s typology of recognition in Table 1, we can demonstrate 
Honneth’s typology of misrecognition in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Honneth’s Topology of Misrecognition 
Spheres of 
Recognition 
(D 131-133) 117 
(RR 138-142) 
 
Modes of 
Recognition 
(GR 501, 506) 
(RR 143) 
(SR 129) 
Forms of 
Misrecognition  
(FWS 252-256) 
(SR 129, 131-134) 
 
What Is Devalued  
(SR 129, 131-134) 
Relation–to-Self 
That Is Injured 
(D 133-137)  
(RMO 23-27) 
(SR 129) 
Family - 
intimate 
relationships 
Love  Physical and 
emotional 
humiliation, abuse, 
and neglect 
Individual needs 
and bodily integrity 
Self-confidence: 
Loss of trust and 
bodily related self-
confidence 
The state -  
legal 
Respect/ equal 
rights 
 
Denial of rights or 
moral status, social 
ostracism 
Moral capacities 
and social integrity  
Self-respect:  
Loss of fundamental 
self-respect as a 
member of a social 
community 
Civil society - 
economic  
Esteem/ 
solidarity 
Downgrading of 
one’s social value 
or the value of 
one’s contributions 
Productive 
capacities and 
social honor 
Self-esteem: 
Loss of self-esteem 
 
Honneth sees misrecognition in terms of the tripartite structure, and his account of 
misrecognition is fundamentally that it is the contrary of recognition, or, as Van Den Brink, 
calls it, an inverted image of the basic forms of recognition.118 Honneth’s viewpoint is 
related to his institutional focus, and his discussion of misrecognition is focused on class 
structure and how theory can use individuals’ moral experiences to overcome capitalism’s 
façade of integration.119 For example, Honneth speaks of the working class becoming 
aware of its role in the drama of class struggle. Honneth stresses that “the lower classes” do 
not reach this awareness through theory but through moral experiences—subjects do not 
experience the theory; they experience the misrecognition. This is a good insight, but 
Honneth does not adequately pursue this line of inquiry deeper than the level of social 
class.120 Instead, Honneth keeps the focus of his inquiry into recognition and 
misrecognition on social groups. His brief mention of the problem that women’s 
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housework is unpaid is a functionalist description that does not delve into the moral 
experiences of individual women.121 He argues instead that because the organization of 
societal labor ranks certain tasks as lower than others, determining the amount of social 
esteem possible for an individual, “the chances of forming an individual identity through 
the experience of recognition are directly related to the societal institutionalization and 
distribution of labor.”122 This is certainly true insofar as it goes, but the individual woman 
is as absent in Honneth’s analysis as she is in the societal ranking of the value of labor. In 
addition to the necessary critique of the organization and evaluation of societal labor, we 
must consider a critique of the failure to evaluate and acknowledge the contributions of 
individuals. Honneth’s analysis is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. By not giving more 
significance to the moral experiences of the individual in his analysis of the moral 
experiences of social class, he misses out on a fuller view of misrecognition and struggles 
against injustice. 
To be fair, Honneth gives more consideration to individuals’ moral experiences in 
his discussion of misrecognition in one sphere of recognition. Honneth associates the 
sphere of intimate relations with Hegel’s social sphere of the family. When discussing 
misrecognition, Honneth refers to this as the “genetically primary level” of “physical needs 
and desires”123 and “the level of physical integrity”; his examples of misrecognition at this 
level are physical abuse such as rape and torture.124 This association accentuates the 
problems with his tripartite structure of misrecognition. He wants to argue, on the one 
hand, that the family is the source of a subject’s self-confidence, but, on the other hand, he 
discusses the moral injuries from physical abuse without tying that abuse to the family. I 
am trying to not oversimplify Honneth’s position but merely point out that both his 
discussion of the morality of love125 and his discussion of moral injuries show that 
misrecognition that damages self-confidence can occur outside of the Hegelian sphere of 
the family that Honneth has adopted. What this means is that the moral experiences of an 
individual and violations of an individual’s physical integrity extend beyond the family 
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sphere, and even the sphere of intimate relations if we expand the concept of the family 
sphere. Being raped violates not only one’s bodily and psychological integrity but also 
harms one’s capability to make decisions for oneself and lead a life of one’s own choosing 
in all relations with the world, not just in family or intimate relations. Honneth is correct 
that physical abuse such as rape or torture damages feelings of self-confidence and trust in 
the reliability of the social world. This truth is not dependent on the theoretical conception 
of the tripartite structure but on individuals’ experiences within the social lifeworld. 
Regardless of the source of the misrecognition and the social setting of its occurrence, it is 
the individual’s distinct experience that informs us about the misrecognition and his or her 
response to it.  
One problem in Honneth’s account of misrecognition is his strictly positive account 
of recognition in that recognition norms are affirming of individuals’ valuable properties 
and that if recognition norms are followed, other individuals will gain self-realization and 
autonomy through recognition. Jonathan Lear gives us two analogies that show us there is 
more going on in recognition beyond Honneth’s positive account. Lear observes that the 
lion does not have a neutral stance toward a lamb but a recognitional stance that respects 
the lamb as a lamb. The lamb matters to the lion and the lion tracks the positive traits of the 
lamb, most notably the lamb’s trait of being edible. Similarly, Lear says, a human narcissist 
cares about other individuals, taking an affirmative recognitional stance in which “the 
desires, intentions, motives, and projects of others really do matter to him … It's just that 
they don't matter to him in the way we feel they ought to matter.”126 Lear’s example of 
“respecting the lamb as a lamb”—that is, as food—is not a perfect analogy to Honneth’s 
conception of recognition as mutual respect that leads to socialization into a shared 
lifeworld (clearly the lamb and lion are not socialized with each other). Still, Lear’s point is 
sound that recognition is not necessarily a positive behavior that affirms the recipient—it 
may only affirm the one who is applying recognition norms. Lear’s example of the 
narcissist is also an imperfect analogy because it illustrates the idea of tracking traits in a 
way that is contrary to moral sensibilities: The reason that someone’s desires should matter 
to us should not be because we want to exploit that individual. Honneth would 
                                                 
126
 Jonathan Lear in Honneth, Reification, 136. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 52 of 226 
understandably reply that the narcissist is not engaging in proper recognition behavior that 
affirms and socializes the other. The question that Lear’s example of the narcissist raises is 
to what extent recognition and other moral norms can be perverted or exploited. The 
narcissist is engaging with recognition norms, even if that engagement is perverted and 
results in a violation of our sense of moral standards and this dimension of recognition 
behavior needs to be considered.  
Judith Butler claims Honneth oversimplifies the recognition relation, characterizing 
his view of recognition as a caring participation with others and his view of misrecognition 
as detached observations of them.127 Participation, in Butler’s reading of Honneth, means to 
take up the position of the other; failing to do so leaves the other reified, and we maintain a 
set of distant and reified relations to the other in which the other is merely an instrument of 
our own aims. Butler questions Honneth’s position of an either/or between taking up the 
position of the other or being in a reifying relation to the other. Butler’s response is similar 
to Lear’s in that it is possible that we can participate with others while still failing to take 
up the position of the other. Hateful or sadistic impulses toward others, she says, are not 
distanced and detached but are invested and involved; a view akin to Lear’s comment about 
the narcissist. Butler points out the complexity of the recognition stance toward the other in 
which there are modes of engagement with the other that does not affirm the other, such as 
rage that seeks to eradicate the other. 
Butler’s response, like Lear’s, speaks to the incompleteness of Honneth’s account of 
misrecognition. Butler is correct that affective involvement is not a sign of recognition. 
Recognition for the victims of the lion, the narcissist, or the sadist is not mutual, but that 
does not mean that a kind of recognition-like behavior is not happening. The picture of 
recognition is more complex than Honneth’s positive account that focuses on care and 
reciprocity. We also need to look at what a recognitional stance means and how it 
contributes to outcomes that we can call “recognition” and “misrecognition.” The possible 
relations between recognitional stances that engage with recognition norms but result in 
injustice are what I will explore in the next chapter.  
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Given the positive picture of recognition drawn by Honneth, one is left to wonder 
why misrecognition occurs at all. Honneth is focused on the necessity of recognition for 
self-realization and, therefore, concentrates on the effects of recognition and 
misrecognition. As a result, Honneth has no substantive account of the phenomena of 
misrecognition or why misrecognition occurs. More problematic is that several aspects of 
his account of recognition make it difficult for him to construct any view of how 
misrecognition can arise. Given that recognition is so integral to human social life, and that 
we are socialized into recognition spheres, it is not surprising that Honneth considers 
recognition to be effortless: “[Recognition] means an effortless mutual acknowledgement 
of certain aspects of the other’s personality, connected to the prevailing mode of social 
interaction.”128 The claim that recognition is effortless is a particularly interesting aspect of 
Honneth’s conception of recognition that is pervasive, implicitly if not explicitly, 
throughout his work. In Reification, he proposes that there is a form of recognition that is a 
precognitive stance toward another individual, a comportment of being oriented toward 
another rather than an epistemic taking on of a perspective toward another. Honneth calls 
this precognitive, nonepistemic stance “antecedent” or “elementary” recognition that 
precedes the three modes of recognition—love, respect, and esteem. Elementary 
recognition, he says, is a necessary condition for our capacity to appropriate moral values 
in the light of which we orient ourselves toward others and recognize them in a normative 
manner.129 If recognition is elementary and precognitive, then that adds even more pressure 
for an explanation of how misrecognition can occur, especially given how pervasive 
misrecognition is. Honneth could respond that macrosocial structures such as capitalism 
suppress elementary recognition, as he argues in Reification. Certainly, macrosocial 
structures and institutional misrecognition can suppress and obscure individuals’ 
intersubjective relations. The problem with that theory is that not only does it accord 
macrosocial structures tremendous power but it also implies an idyllic presocialization state 
in which individuals had mutual recognition before capitalist society interferes. What is 
more, if one conceives, like Honneth, of society as recognition orders, then we just move 
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the question to the next level. How do macrosocial misrecognition orders like capitalism 
come about, and how are they able to entrench themselves? 
If recognition is, as Honneth argues, effortless and precognitive, a vital part of being 
a human being, central to the normative fabric of society, part of the normative 
expectations held by all individuals, and so beneficially necessary to all individuals, why is 
mutual recognition not almost universally practiced? Recognition norms are, after all, 
norms—part of the normative tradition and practice of a culture loaded with the weight of 
expectations on individuals. Why would misrecognition ever occur if such attitudes and 
actions are so contrary to social norms and self-destructive to a society and its members? 
Any critical theory, especially one involving a theory of recognition, must provide an 
explanation for the widespread occurrence of misrecognition in human societies. Honneth’s 
theory of recognition picks up the story at social reactions to misrecognition, not what 
contributes to the occurrences of misrecognitions. For example, Honneth stresses that his 
theoretical interest is the conceptual understanding of the normative and motivational 
sources of social discontent.130 What he provides is a thought-provoking account of the 
core of normative expectations that individuals have of the social order, the value of which 
I in no way question. My contention is that we would do well to add to Honneth’s “theory 
of recognition that locates the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of 
social recognition”131 a robust theory of what the withdrawal of social recognition is and 
how it could occur. I share Honneth’s program of seeking access to everyday experiences 
of injustice and the pathologies of social life, but my concern is that his analysis of social 
injustice focuses more on the symptoms than on the disease. My intention is to push 
Honneth’s theory of recognition further into the question of what misrecognition is and 
how it is experienced by both individuals who receive and inflict misrecognition. My hope 
is that a fuller picture of misrecognition will lead to insight into how it arises and persists in 
society despite the harm it creates and into what brings individuals to deny others social 
recognition. 
Returning to Honneth’s characterization of misrecognition, his principal definition of 
misrecognition is that it is the contrary of recognition and, as my tables attempt to 
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illustrate, his typology of misrecognition maps directly onto recognition.132 Honneth often 
describes misrecognition in terms of a deprivation or denial of recognition rather than a 
behavior of its own kind. His characterization in Disrespect is one of a denial of 
recognition—the denying of one’s social value and contributions or the denying of one’s 
bodily and psychological integrity. His characterization in Reification, similarly, is one of a 
denial of recognition—specifically, a forgetfulness of recognition that he terms 
“reification,” a cognitive mistake in which we perceive other individuals “as mere insensate 
objects.”133 Honneth considers the norms of recognition to be the basis of community, in 
which children are socialized and through which they become socially accepted members 
of the community.134 Honneth considers mutual recognition to be already affirmed prior to 
interpersonal interaction through the internalization of the norms of recognition.135 This 
consideration commits him to the position that within any social community a violation of 
the norms of recognition would be an instance of misrecognition; therefore, misrecognition 
is contrary to recognition.  
Honneth’s view of misrecognition as the contrary of recognition leaves a binary 
picture in which, if an individual is engaging with recognition norms in his or her actions, 
then recognition is happening, whereas the lack of such engagement means 
misrecognition—as a lack of recognition—is happening. This reasoning is internally 
consistent, but does it adequately explain misrecognition behavior? Honneth’s picture of 
recognition norms invites two questions: one, does the engagement with and application of 
recognition norms always mean that recognition is occurring; and two, is misrecognition 
only a lack of the engagement with and application of recognition norms? I answer in the 
negative to both questions because some forms of misrecognition occur in which an 
individual is engaging in the tracking and application of recognition norms in such a 
manner that misrecognition rather than recognition results. The difference between 
recognition and misrecognition cannot be simplified to a question of engagement with 
recognition norms, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter. 
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To close this chapter, Honneth’s spheres and related modes of recognition are formal 
distinctions that do not do justice to the dynamics of intersubjective relations. Honneth’s 
formal distinctions are valuable in helping us understand recognition and misrecognition, 
but the complexity of intersubjective experiences and identity formation calls for a more 
robust picture that reflects the complex and dynamic experiences of individuals in their 
social relations. Honneth’s philosophy remains trapped in the Hegelian model of an 
institutional ethical life. Honneth’s philosophy is a detailed analysis of the external 
structure of the house but without the needed analysis of the occupants of the house. An 
individual experiences recognition and misrecognition not in terms of theoretical categories 
but as specific instances of behavior in which he or she is involved. An individual’s 
experiences of recognition and misrecognition are not general but specific to that individual 
and his or her specific life. Our theory needs to reflect that though the intersubjective 
relations of recognition and misrecognition occur according to social norms, these relations 
have an essential individual-centered nature. I do not suggest that Honneth denies the 
individual-centered nature of recognition but that more needs to be said about it to 
understand recognition and misrecognition. More fruitful than Honneth’s typological 
strategy of mapping recognition onto Hegel’s formal social spheres is to approach 
interpersonal recognition relations as they are experienced by the individuals involved. 
With such a phenomenological methodology, I will explore recognition relations and how 
they go wrong, and this approach will identify types of misrecognition that are left 
unrevealed by the formal divisions of state, civil society, and family. This 
phenomenological approach may also call into question Honneth’s account of struggles for 
recognition, a question I will explore in Part Two after a clearer picture of misrecognition 
has been gained.  
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 57 of 226 
1.3 – Supplementing an account of misrecognition with a 
multidimensional approach  
This chapter will sketch the basic parameters of a view of misrecognition that 
replaces Honneth’s binary account of misrecognition by looking at how individuals act 
within the normative structure of their social environment. My approach is first to show 
how Nancy Fraser’s critique of Honneth and Honneth’s reply in Redistribution or 
Recognition? shows how discussions of justice and recognition are intertwined and related 
to social status and intersubjective relations. I argue that Honneth’s actual and possible 
responses to Fraser’s criticisms point to the importance of intersubjective relations in 
questions of recognition and misrecognition. The distinction uncovered in the first chapter 
between engaging with norms and engaging with individuals points to the need for both 
engagements to satisfy the demands of justice in recognition relations. The remainder of 
this chapter explores the various ways that lack of engagement with either norms or 
individuals leads to injustices of misrecognition and how understanding behaviors in terms 
of the engagement with norms, engagement with individuals, and engagement with action 
illuminates misrecognition behaviors. 
 
I agree with Nancy Fraser’s argument136 that recognition should be conceived of as a 
matter of justice and treated as an issue of social status—a position, however, that I think is 
valuable in a different way than she uses it. Her objection to Honneth is not that 
recognition is not an issue but that the recognition order is an issue separate from and 
secondary to the distributive mechanisms of society. Fraser proposes a perspectival dualism 
whereby class and status (cultural identity) are analytic, but not substantive, distinctions, 
and maldistribution that is rooted in the economic structure is a substantive distinction; 
thus, there are two analytically distinct types of injustice—economic (maldistribution) and 
cultural (misrecognition). The problem with her proposal is that there is no way to 
disentangle the links between recognition and distribution and no good theoretical reason 
for attempting to do so. Individuals’ actions and social relations are shaped by recognition 
norms, and Honneth’s conception of a recognition order is relevant. Inherent in the 
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distribution of labor is the distribution of social status. Whatever the technological 
developments that contributed to the emergence of capitalism, the social structure of 
capitalism was going to reflect the established recognition order, including the hierarchies 
of class, race, and gender.137 The division of labor and recognition are inextricably linked. 
Issues of distribution are deeply influenced by, if not dependent on, issues of recognition. 
A social group is denied its just share of distribution because its members are denied equal 
status, and that denial of social status is a matter of recognition. For Fraser to try to create 
separate issues of economic class and social status is to miss the fundamental issue of what 
status means—a value judgment about a person’s worth. Maldistribution is a question of 
misrecognition, and misrecognition is a matter of injustice.  
Fraser also denounces Honneth’s position that the hurt feelings of misrecognition are 
the motivation for struggles for recognition because she wants to decouple the normativity 
of recognition from the psychological effects of misrecognition in order to strengthen the 
analysis of injustice. To this end, she argues that misrecognition is not a psychical 
deformation but an institutionalized relation of subordination that is morally indefensible 
whether the subjectivity of the oppressed is impaired or not.138 In this, she seems to 
misunderstand what Honneth is doing in his project, something Honneth alludes to in 
Redistribution or Recognition?139 Honneth’s purpose is to understand social conflicts by 
uncovering the motivations for struggles for recognition. Honneth is focused on the effects 
of institutionalized patterns of cultural values and subordination that create in their victims 
the moral injuries of distorted identity and impaired subjectivity that he believes motivate 
struggles for recognition. That he focuses on this to the neglect of the question of what 
misrecognition is opens his theory up to misunderstandings such as Fraser’s. Nevertheless, 
Honneth is correct to place impaired subjectivity alongside economic maldistribution as 
injustices and as motivations for social conflict. As Nicholas Smith observes, the psychical 
injuries from misrecognition “are not even notionally separable from the sufferer's place in 
the economic order.”140 
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Related to the maldistribution issue, in the essay “The Fabric of Justice,”141 Honneth 
argues that justice is not to be equated with the just distribution of basic goods but is 
instead a matter of intersubjective relations. His argument can be briefly summarized as 
follows. What we call social justice is measured in terms of individual autonomy, but the 
distribution of goods cannot on their own enable individuals to achieve autonomy. This can 
be seen, Honneth says, when we consider that we cannot understand goods such as 
financial resources as chances for freedom by considering the meaning of these goods 
themselves, but only by understanding our relation to them. To be able to perceive their 
relation to financial resources, individuals must already have a conception of what life aims 
are worth pursuing and realizing by using financial resources. Conceptions of life aims are 
not “things” that can be distributed like a material good—individuals acquire them through 
their own efforts within their interpersonal relationships. Honneth is correct that instead of 
speaking strictly about the distribution of goods we should speak of relations of recognition 
and patterns of granting justice (though distribution of goods is strongly related to relations 
of recognition).142 Honneth considers the material of justice to be a “special class of 
intersubjective relations in which citizens accord to each other normative worth.”143 To 
“accord to each other normative worth” is a description of reciprocal recognition, and 
Honneth’s conception of justice is that it results from the intersubjective relations of 
reciprocal recognition. The importance of recognition to an individual’s well-being means 
that recognition is a moral issue: The presence of reciprocal recognition is justice, and its 
absence is injustice.  
Honneth provides us with the valuable insight that justice requires mutual 
recognition. Honneth’s emphasis is on the role of social institutions to defend recognition 
norms, and one could infer from Honneth’s account that recognition is a system of norms 
that informs us what conduct is proper when we encounter certain types of people in certain 
types of situations. This gives the impression, intended or not, that if recognition norms are 
in place and engaged with, then there is justice in recognition relations. For two reasons, I 
think there is more to recognition. First is that the norms themselves may be unjust, so 
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following them would lead to injustice. Second is that engaging with the norms themselves 
is not always sufficient to achieve justice. We need to take these two aspects of recognition 
into account and extend Honneth’s insights into the importance of recognition in justice by 
clearly indicating all that is required in recognition relations to achieve justice.  
The idea that justice has varied demands and applications is mentioned by 
Honneth,144 but he does not adequately develop this idea. More recently, Honneth said, 
embedded within a discussion of individuals’ socialization into their society’s recognition 
order, that 
subjects acquire the capacity to move about within the normative structures 
of their social network by treating each other in accordance with the 
specific kind of recognitional relationship they maintain with each other.145  
I think this points to a core aspect of recognition—that it is a behavior within the 
constellation of relationships between individuals that must be constantly maintained by 
the individuals involved. I do not think that this is a radically new thought for Honneth but 
that it opens up a new emphasis on recognition relations that I wish to expand. Unlike 
Honneth, I do not think that “a just society requires no more than that subjects learn the 
various patterns of mutual recognition ‘well enough.’”146 I certainly understand his point—
that we need not place a moral burden on individuals to excel at the “art” of recognition. 
However, injustice occurs when recognition relations are dysfunctional, and recognition 
relations can be dysfunctional in ways beyond individuals not learning the patterns of 
mutual recognition—in other words, misrecognition is more than recognition norms not 
being applied.  
To recognize another is to see him or her as deserving of moral consideration and to 
acknowledge his or her experiences as real and worthy of consideration. As Zurn observes, 
only other recognizing agents can engage in the mutual interactions of recognition and 
participate in our claims of normative behavior expectations.147 We can have expectations 
of nonhuman entities, but we cannot make normative claims on those entities, nor can we 
recognize them or expect recognition from them. Mutual recognition and normative 
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behavior require intersubjective involvement with other human beings as human beings. 
Because recognition is related to certain aspects of another individual, it is a specific 
response to a specific individual. Because recognition is by someone of someone, 
recognition is a relation between individuals. It is reasonable then to consider 
misrecognition as a dimension of social interaction in which recognition relations between 
individuals are unhealthy. Recognition relations are complex, and we need to delve into 
what is involved in occurrences of misrecognition to craft a more expanded and finer-
grained account than Honneth’s underdeveloped account of misrecognition as the contrary 
of recognition. We need to clarify the relations of recognition norms to injustice and 
identify which norms contribute to injustice, and we also need to clarify the nature of our 
relations with individuals who are the recipients of our recognition. 
Heikki Ikäheimo provides a helpful way of conceiving of differences in recognition 
relations.148 He first distinguishes between vertical and horizontal recognition—“vertical” 
meaning recognition between individuals and norms and institutions, and “horizontal” 
meaning recognition between individuals. He further distinguishes two forms of horizontal 
recognition: normatively mediated and purely intersubjective. The first is recognizing 
another individual as a bearer of rights or entitlements stipulated by norms for which the 
recognition is obligatory; the second is a recognitional response to another individual as an 
individual person independently of his or her rights and entitlements. Ikäheimo further 
identifies two modes of purely intersubjective horizontal recognition: conditional, in which 
concern for the other individual is instrumentally calculated in terms of one’s own interests, 
and unconditional, in which concern for the other individual is unconditioned by prudential 
considerations. Only unconditional purely intersubjective horizontal recognition can be 
called “love” and “respect.”149  
How I interpret and apply Ikäheimo’s conceptions is to understand that though we 
must vertically recognize that norms govern our social lives, there is more to applying a 
recognition norm than an awareness that applying it in one’s interaction with another 
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individual is the right thing to do. Recognition requires a set of norms and social 
institutions to guide recognition, but it also requires that we actively engage in 
intersubjective recognition relations. In many circumstances, only a particular way of 
engagement with the individual in his or her distinct circumstances is proper recognition of 
that individual. I need to tailor my response to the individual in front of me; my 
recognizing a particular individual is conditioned by his or her individuality. Justice 
demands that we consider what norms apply to the current situation, plus it demands that 
the application of those norms be tailored to suit the individuals involved.  
Justice requires engagements with recognition in two dimensions, one vertical with 
recognition norms, and one horizontal with individuals, meaning that nonengagement with 
either norms or individuals is misrecognition that can lead to injustice. This is a demand 
that we do not find in Honneth whose theory provides a necessary but insufficient structure 
of recognition. The demands of recognition, aside from a narrow set of legal relations, go 
beyond the conventionality of applying norms to groups of people. Justice requires that 
some forms of legal recognition apply equally to all individuals and, therefore, requires 
nonengagement with other individuals in their particularities. Basic human rights are 
invariant, but nearly everything else in social interactions is variant. Even a judge needs to 
apply the norms according to the individual circumstances. We need to modulate norms 
according to individual circumstances and a range of interpretations dependent on the 
individual. Within the need for engagement with other individuals, there are public 
interactions in which engaging with the individual is necessary but in which we do not 
need to engage the person as an individual. For example, in commercial transactions, we 
are polite to those who serve us or to the individuals we serve, but we do not always need 
to know them personally. We can engage with individuals in ways that do not take into 
account their individuality, though we are still recognizing them as human beings 
deserving of moral consideration. There are other interactions in which recognition requires 
engaging with another individual in a way that recognizes the individual as an individual. 
In personal relations such as between family and friends, and in mentoring or other care 
relationships, only unconditional personal engagement meets the needs of recognition and 
justice. Unconditional purely intersubjective horizontal recognition should not appear only 
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in the most intimate relationships, however, because intersubjective recognition relations 
that are based on sincere care for others are sincere expressions of our humanity and are 
what, more than any other social activity, cultivates self-realization and autonomy, and, 
thus, justice. As Ikäheimo concludes, “social relations imbued with mutual unconditional 
or ‘genuinely personifying’ recognition are the ideally free relations for norm-governed 
beings like us.”150 
The importance of horizontal or personifying recognition raises the question of 
whether recognition is a behavior of perceiving positive qualities within another individual 
or an attribution of those positive qualities to the individual. Honneth identifies two 
possible models that try to characterize the nature of recognition: 
the model of attributions as a result of which the other subject acquires a 
new, positive property, or … the model of perception, according to which 
an already-present property of a person is, as a secondary matter, merely 
strengthened or publicly manifested. In the first case, what we call 
‘recognition’ would award or supplement the affected subject with 
something she had not had before; in the second case, by contrast, it would 
be a matter of a certain kind of perception of an already independently 
existing status.151  
Honneth reasons that if we adopt the attributive model, then that means recognition 
behavior would not be in response to the individual and his or her internal properties but 
would be creating those properties in the individual. If this is the case, we must hold that 
recognition does not assist an individual toward autonomy but is actually creating 
autonomy in the individual. If instead we adopt the response model (Honneth’s other term 
for the perception model, which I think is the more descriptive term in that recognition is 
more than just passive perception), then we can hold that we are indeed recognizing 
potentials and properties in an individual that are independent of the act of recognition and 
that recognition is not wishful or mistaken thinking unrelated to actual properties that are 
the object of recognition.152 The response model of recognition shows us how recognition 
happens when individuals identify positive potentialities present in others.153 This meshes 
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with McBride’s interactive account of recognition that links social norms, individual 
agency, and our sensitivity to recognition of others.154 In McBride’s account, recognition 
relations are the mechanism of orienting ourselves to the social world, and our sensitivity 
to recognition is an essential part of our individual agency. We respond to the normative 
demands of our culture and to the properties of others while we struggle for recognition 
from others. It stands to reason that to identify, reinforce, and make manifest the positive 
potentialities in others requires an engagement with other individuals.  
The response model leads to a problem identified by Honneth. If we are perceiving 
and responding to something within others, then they must possess the qualities we are 
recognizing. But if they already possess those qualities, then why do they need affirmation 
from others to develop a healthy relation-to-self? Honneth’s answer is to forge a middle 
ground between the attributive and perceptual/response models: 
although we make manifest, in our acts of recognition, only those 
evaluative qualities that are already present in the relevant individual, it is 
only as a result of our reactions that he comes to be in a position to be truly 
autonomous, because he is then able to identify with his capabilities.155 
Or, as Arto Laitinen puts it, there must be both adequate insight on the part of the 
recognizer and mutual insight on the part of the recognized to acknowledge and internalize 
the recognition.156 Thus, both the recognizer and the recognized have crucial roles to play 
in recognition, and neither can do it alone. Recognition is a relation between individuals in 
which both must be engaged with the recognition norms of their culture and with each 
other for recognition to be successful. When both the recognizer and the recognized are 
engaged with the norms and with each other, recognition enables the properties or qualities 
internal to the individual to be made intersubjective and public. The individual is affirmed 
as a valued part of the community, which lets others know something about the individual 
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and lets the individual know his or her qualities are publicly valued. Prior to recognition, an 
individual may feel she has positive qualities—for example, she could feel she is a good 
artist—but it is only in the act of being recognized that positive qualities become affirmed 
for both the individual and others. Without recognition, any positive feelings the individual 
has about herself are precarious because they are internal and unaffirmed.157 This is why 
individuals desire recognition—to solidify their feelings about themselves and to learn 
about new qualities they did not realize they had. 
Engagement is at the heart of recognition because recognition always takes an object. 
This is because recognition is an intersubjective relation between individuals and is not 
detached from individuals. The recognition norms are universal within a culture, but to be 
operative, the norms must be applied to an individual. Because recognition is related to 
“certain aspects” of another individual, it is a specific response to the way a specific 
individual is. Recognition is recognition only if it has intention in it. As Honneth says,  
[Recognition is] not to be understood as a side-effect of an other-directed 
action but rather as the expression of a free-standing intention; whether we 
are talking of gestures, speech acts, or institutional measures, these 
expressions and procedures are cases of ‘recognition’ only if their primary 
purpose is directed in some positive manner towards the existence of 
another person or group.158 
Recognition is a relation that is the expression of a purposeful intention, not incidental or 
accidental, but directed and specific. As Honneth says, reciprocally granted entitlement to a 
certain level of consideration provides the background against which subjects learn to 
experience themselves as deserving respect, promoting their self-determination.159 The 
norms that make up this background must be brought to bear on an individual, the process 
of which Honneth did not delve into but that I think is critical for understanding 
recognition and misrecognition. Recognition norms are nonspecific and need to be made 
specific through an expression of intention. General recognition norms point to possible 
recognition behaviors, but this potential behavior must be made manifest through an 
individual expression directed at another individual. 
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To describe the intentional linking of recognition norms to a specific individual, I 
will borrow the concept of deseverance. An act of deseverance is an act of bringing 
something into salience160 or making it significant to one’s actions. Social norms are 
present in the cultural background. Norms exert a constant influence on individuals, and 
the following of norms can be a nonreflective and unconscious action. Recognition is 
different because it requires an intention—an unconscious following of the norms is not a 
recognition of another. Therefore, recognition norms, though also present in the cultural 
background, become active and part of recognition only when an individual desevers a 
norm from the cultural background and brings it into salience in his or her interaction with 
another—bringing it from the background of possibilities into the foreground of action. 
Without this deseverance, following a recognition norm is accidental and is not 
recognition, and it is less likely to be beneficial to the other individual. An engagement 
with the recognition norms is required. Similarly, to respect another individual is to 
deserver that individual from the background and give him or her our attention. As 
Honneth says, “We care only about those events and are affected only by those occurrences 
that are of direct and unmediated relevance for the way we understand our lives.”161 This 
may sound harsh, but I think he is correct to say that this is what we mean by “sympathy” 
and “care”—that something affects us. For example, when we hear of a natural disaster on 
other side of the world, we understand that people have suffered, but we understand in an 
abstract way. If we are aware that someone we know was at the location of the natural 
disaster, our perception significantly changes. If someone with whom we are on intimate 
terms is involved, then our reaction to the disaster changes even more significantly. Only if 
we are involved with the region or an individual who is involved will we respond to a 
natural disaster with intersubjective recognition. A more general recognition is still 
possible, but it will be different in character—general and not intersubjective, though still 
laudable, and perhaps even more laudable if we value acting beyond self-interest. As an 
expression of our humanity, we care in the abstract about the suffering of others, and can 
take tangible action such as donating to a relief cause helping those affected by the disaster, 
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but it will lack the same care and engagement we feel from being directly involved with 
those affected. We will usually care much more and do much more when we are directly 
involved with other individuals who are involved in events. Going beyond personal 
involvements into political action is another dimension of recognition that I will discuss in 
chapter 2.4. 
Recognition is a matter of caring about others in terms of significance, if not 
fondness. Human interaction that is without care for another’s needs and well-being is itself 
a kind of misrecognition. The mutual nature of recognition calls for an intersubjective 
engagement between individuals of mutual valuing if not mutual affection. Because 
recognition is a relation, recognition comes more easily within a personal relationship. The 
more relations of recognition one has, the easier it is to add more relations of recognition. 
According to Stanley Cavell, maintaining social relations requires engaging with another 
individual such that one is existentially involved in the emotional world of the other 
individual. The involvement Cavell describes need not be intimate but does need to be a 
“stance of acknowledgement” of the other individual that is emotional rather than 
cognitive. This involvement is a recognitional stance of mutual sympathy through which 
we come to understand that we have a moral responsibility to react to the other individual 
in specific ways.162 Honneth’s interpretation of Cavell focuses on Cavell’s prioritization of 
empathetic over cognitive engagement, which Honneth uses in service of his argument for 
what he calls “antecedent acts of recognition.”163 Honneth’s question of how it is possible 
for us to lose sight of our recognitional practices is predicated on his assumption that 
recognition is antecedent to our social practices. The problems with Honneth’s concept of 
antecedent or elementary recognition are discussed elsewhere by other scholars.164 I will 
leave that aside and turn instead to how Honneth seems to miss the implications of Cavell’s 
position that a stance of acknowledgment is an existential involvement in interpersonal 
communication. Honneth tries to force Cavell’s idea into his own concept of antecedent 
recognition.165 Rather than argue that a forgotten antecedent recognition of others is the 
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cornerstone of reification of others, I will explore possible reasons why an individual 
would not engage with other individuals in their interactions with them. Honneth offers 
some good insights on this, but these insights bear more fruit by moving the discussion 
from Honneth’s cognitive considerations into the intersubjective engagement to which 
Cavell refers. 
The conscious intention of recognition within an intersubjective engagement needs to 
be defined in more detail than saying it is a caring participation with others. I define the 
intersubjective engagement necessary for recognition as a comportment toward others of 
sincere and concrete openness and responsiveness to others as being individuals with their 
own capabilities and desires. Intersubjective engagement is a manner of interpersonal 
relations that is both considerate of the needs and status of the other individual and requires 
awareness that one has effects on other individuals. It does not seek to define, reduce, 
control, or dominate others. Intersubjective engagement is a recognition that “supposes that 
I cannot see right though you”166 and that it is my responsibility to see you and listen to 
you. I can recognize the positive properties of another individual only if I have the 
freestanding conscious intention of perceiving that person and interacting with him or her 
in a positive manner.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will explore ways in which recognition relations have 
gone wrong and lead to misrecognition. First I will discuss misrecognitions in which the 
problem is in vertical recognition, either disengagement from norms or engagement with 
problematic norms, and then I will discuss misrecognitions in which the problem is in 
horizontal recognition in which there is insufficient or improper engagement with other 
individuals. 
1.3.1 - Disengagement from norms  
Engaging with recognition norms is part of our acceptance of our moral 
responsibility, and lack of a sense of moral responsibility is a significant factor in 
misrecognition. By Honneth’s definition, recognition behavior is a tracking of specific 
positive properties in others as measured by means of social recognition norms. For 
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example, my society’s recognition norms teach me that I should respect honesty and that 
when I know someone who is honest in his dealings, I recognize that individual as honest 
and treat him accordingly. Given Honneth’s picture of misrecognition as the contrary of 
recognition, it would seem that misrecognition behavior can be defined as occurrences in 
which recognition norms are not engaged, not applied, or both. If, to continue the example, 
I meet someone who is honest, but I either do not care about honesty or do not recognize 
the other’s honesty, I am not valuing the other appropriately. This type of misrecognition is 
most easily seen in legal areas such that if I do not consider a right to be important or do 
not acknowledge an individual’s entitlement to that right, I will not behave as required by 
that right toward the individual, and that is misrecognition. But is it always the case that 
engagement with norms means recognition is happening, or is the connection between 
recognition norms and misrecognition not a binary one? A closer analysis of that 
relationship of recognition norms and misrecognition behavior reveals a complex 
relationship. First, I will look at the ways that individuals do not engage with norms (a lack 
of vertical recognition), and then I will explore ways in which individuals can engage with 
norms that, in practice, perpetrate misrecognition on others. It is counterintuitive to think 
that misrecognition behavior could maintain engagement with recognition norms, much 
less possess a sense of moral responsibility toward those misrecognized, but it is the case in 
some misrecognition behaviors.  
If an individual or social institution is not engaging with norms, then misrecognition 
is a likely consequence. If, for example, we ignore the recognition norm that says that 
productive labor should be rewarded, then we will not respect those who provide 
productive labor, which is a misrecognition. Individuals are socialized into social norms 
and learn their value, so broad general disregard for recognition norms would be rare. It is 
possible that someone can consciously and willfully disregard all norms, taking herself out 
of mutual recognition relations despite the cost of becoming a pariah in her community. 
However, given the essentialness of recognition for social functioning, it is far more likely 
that nonengagement with norms is a specific disregard within a specific situation. Such a 
specific disregard can be related to a specific other individual, but I will take up that 
possibility later. Here, I speak of a nonengagement with norms within a specific but 
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temporary situation in which moral responsibility for recognition norms is forgotten or 
obscured but not entirely abandoned. At times, we become oblivious to others in our 
everyday tasks and morally injure others in our inattention, but we can be prodded into 
awareness at any moment by seeing how we are not treating another appropriately. The 
mistake in this type of misrecognition is procedural, not in the sense of a formal procedure 
but in that we are, within a specific timeframe, caught up in processes in which norms are 
forgotten and recognition behavior thus becomes absent. An example would be being so 
focused on one’s current activity, such as driving or walking in a crowded area, that one 
forgets the rules regarding behavior, being either rude or otherwise negligent in our moral 
obligations to others. This type of misrecognition is not a cognitive mistake because its 
behavior is prereflective and is resolvable by reflection on our actions. 
There can also be a more deliberate nonengagement with norms when individuals 
believe that certain norms are not appealing or convenient within a specific social 
environment. Disengagement from norms is compartmentalized to suit one’s own interests 
without a rejection of moral responsibility in general. Individuals can rationalize away their 
responsibility to follow specific norms in specific situations, such as in their workplace. 
Business owners, for example, can neglect the health and safety of their employees to 
preserve profits while at the same time being honest in their accounting practices. A 
supervisor could think that recognizing his employees’ needs is unimportant because they 
are his subordinates but still treat friends and family justly. Workers, perhaps in response to 
their employers’ actions, could believe that norms do not apply, or apply differently, in 
specific situations on the job. A worker could see dishonesty on the job as acceptable if it 
increases her productivity. Another could rationalize that his theft of company property is 
acceptable. Another could feel that she does not owe politeness or camaraderie to fellow 
workers because it is “just a job.” Security and police forces who do not consider respect 
for civilians a part of their job is another example. By suspending the application of 
recognition norms in particular aspects of one’s life, one is perpetrating misrecognition by 
cutting off recognition within that aspect of life.  
The compartmentalizing of recognition relations is common in modern life. In 
various areas of our lives, we neglect norms to varying degrees, such as when the pressures 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 71 of 226 
of social demands encourage one to take expedient ways out of the burdens of 
responsibilities. This dereliction of responsibility to act in accordance with recognition 
norms is similar in form to, but is normatively different from, a responsible restriction of 
recognition. An example of the responsible form is when teachers close off options of 
friendship with students out of responsibility to their students not out of disregard for them. 
Recognizing another’s role as a student includes avoiding crossing boundaries of intimacy 
that potentially would harm the student. However, a teacher who thinks he does not owe 
any students basic courtesies such as timely responses to their e-mails is deliberately not 
engaging with recognition norms concerning students, and this disregarding of the moral 
responsibilities of being a teacher is misrecognizing students. Understanding an 
individual’s level of awareness of and engagement with recognition norms will help us to 
understand what may be going on in misrecognition behavior.  
We must also acknowledge that misrecognition can occur when the recognition 
norms are engaged with but misapplied. Instances of misapplied recognition norms are 
when an individual is aware of the recognition norms and intends to apply them properly 
but is, for whatever reason, not succeeding. This could result from an individual not 
understanding the recognition norms or how to apply them or not understanding that his or 
her current situation calls for recognition. This inadequate application of recognition norms 
is a cognitive mistake on the part of an individual that is most likely an unintentional 
mistake and free of antagonism. Young individuals are especially prone to not understand 
how to act in certain situations because of their lack of life experience, and, despite good 
intentions, they can fail to recognize others properly. Misapplied recognition also describes 
any breach of customary protocol because of inexperience rather than malice.  
In the above examples of nonengagement, the norms themselves are not causing 
misrecognition and injustice. It is also possible that engagement with norms leads to 
misrecognition if the norms themselves are misrecognitions. I identify two types of 
recognition norms that are misrecognitions, differentiated by whether the norms are 
tracking putative negatives, which I call “normative discrimination,” or putative positives, 
which I call “pathological recognition.” I will discuss each in turn. 
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1.3.2 - Normative discrimination  
What I call “normative discrimination” is the use of recognition-like norms that 
designate particular social groups as having negative traits that characterize those groups as 
deficient and inferior. These norms are a form of negative recognition that mediates our 
interactions with certain groups, dictating that the appropriate response is to deny these 
groups positive recognition and moral consideration. Because the discrimination is guided 
by recognition-like norms, individuals perpetrate it believing they are behaving properly. 
The normative character of normative discrimination discourages questioning whether the 
traits it attributes to targeted groups are actually present in individual members of that 
group. The negative recognition of normative discrimination differs from a negative 
response to violations of norms such as disapproving of dishonesty or theft. There, the 
negative response recognizes the rights of those who have been wronged, and a negative 
response to wrongdoers is an appropriate upholding of norms. When we punish someone 
who has been convicted of a crime with imprisonment or fines, we are upholding general 
norms that recognize the rights of victims of the crime, even if we are denying recognition 
to the convicted individual’s freedom and desire to not be punished. In contrast, a 
normative discrimination is when a trait that should be neutral to moral norms, such as skin 
color, ethnicity, or religion, is taken as a negative and all who hold that trait are regarded as 
less worthy than others. Normative discrimination is directed predominantly at social 
groups separated by race, gender, class, and so on. Additional illusionary negatives are 
often attributed to a social group, such as labeling all Muslims as violent, all Jews as 
dishonest, all gays as promiscuous, all who live in poverty deserving their poverty because 
they are lazy or ignorant, and so on. How the targets of normative discrimination actually 
are is irrelevant to the negative stereotypes because the perpetrators unreflectively follow 
the norms that dictate behavior toward the targeted groups. Bader’s “criteria of ascription,” 
by which he categorizes structural asymmetries of power and practices of discrimination, 
oppression, and exclusion as being socially defined and ascribed characteristics of targeted 
groups, are examples of normative discrimination.167 
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Normative discrimination can be taken to the extreme of a group being attributed to 
being not deserving of any moral consideration. This misrecognition is beyond a lack of 
awareness of the moral standing of others and is a conscious antagonism toward others. An 
individual engaged in this comportment considers the appropriate response to other groups 
of human beings is to deprive the other actively of recognition as a human being. The 
extreme hostility toward a number of historically marginalized groups such as Gypsies and 
Jews in Europe, Dalits in India, and Burakumin in Japan are examples of this extreme 
normative discrimination. Someone born into one of these groups is condemned for life to 
misrecognition. The stigma attached to certain diseases or conditions also fits into 
normative discrimination. Those afflicted with leprosy were outcast from society as 
unclean.168 More recently, those afflicted with AIDS have suffered similar pariah status. In 
both cases, the ostracizing was accompanied by moral rebuke, the victims condemned as 
immoral simply for having a disease. One could say these people are rendered invisible, but 
it is more accurate to say they are condemned as unfit to be included and are dispossessed 
of rights and status. 
Slavery, in particular the institution of slavery in the United States, is another 
historical example of normative discrimination. Slavery shows that normative 
discrimination precedes a denial of recognition relations. Slavery is a relationship defined 
by a malicious use of power, but slavery in the Americas did not result from taking away 
an existing recognition relation from members of a community and enslaving them. 
Indentured servitude and debtors’ prisons could be construed as a destruction of an existing 
recognition relation. An impoverished European (already suffering from normative 
discrimination because of his or her class) was condemned to a debtors’ prison because he 
or she allegedly violated his or her responsibilities as a member of society. The social 
institution of debtors’ prisons operates as a social relation that can be used properly or 
improperly. An individual wrongly accused or condemned to debtors’ prison would be 
suffering an injustice according to society’s norms. Slavery operates under a very different 
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set of assumptions because the normative discrimination based on race denied the 
possibility of recognition relations. Rather than a rupture of a recognition relation of social 
inclusion, the slave is, as Orlando Patterson observes, natally alienated.169 As Frantz Fanon 
observed, racism reduces others to nothing more than skin, a skin to which they are chained 
and determined. The recognition norms of the dominant culture are imposed onto the 
oppressed who are represented through normative discrimination as mere animal bodies 
unable to think, reason, or speak properly.170 The Native Americans and Africans enslaved 
by Europeans were always outsiders to the European slavers and had never been afforded 
recognition other than normative discrimination. The recognition order of European culture 
negatively recognized non-Europeans as inferior and uncivilized, and this normative 
assumption framed European encounters with indigenous people throughout the world. 
Africans and Native Americans had never been included, so enslaving them was ethically 
possible in a way that enslaving Europeans was not.  
Slavery was more than being excluded from the community and denied rights 
because the enslaved human beings were considered property. Indentured servants were 
also treated as property to be bought, used, and sold. What is different between slaves and 
indentured servants is the type of recognition relations involved. The indentured servants’ 
status as property was defined by contracts for set terms, and their recognition as free 
beings was held in abeyance, under the assumption that the servant willingly entered into 
the contract. Similarly, the prisoner, whether debtor or criminal, has a status with a limited 
time frame. Indentured servants were subordinated, deprived of freedom, and often 
exploited, yet they retained a recognition relation to society with the hope of improvement 
of their social standing, however limited that potential may have been. Slaves, being natally 
alienated, had a very different recognition relation. Questions about slaves’ integrity, 
honor, autonomy, or self-respect were nonsensical to anyone who engaged with the norms 
that specified what the slaves were—property. Slaves were, as Patterson observes, annulled 
of rights and identity, without ties to past or future, unrecognizable as human beings, at 
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best shadow members of society.171 Slavery was not an act like flogging, rape, torture, or 
social ostracizing. Slavery was enforced through violence, but the violence stemmed from a 
systemic misrecognition attitude of normative discrimination. The attitude of impossibility 
of the slaves’ social inclusion preceded the enslavement because the normative 
discrimination framed the recognition relations with the slave whether the slave was 
captured or born into slavery. Before the violent act of enslavement occurred, the target, 
reduced to skin as Fanon said, had been deemed to be compatible with enslavement. 
Whether the assessment was that the slaves were undeserving of freedom or deserving of 
enslavement, the misrecognition was a normative discrimination against those who 
possessed the trait of dark skin and, therefore, lacked humanity, dignity, and rationality. It 
is not so much that the slave was objectified as a tool as much as it was that the slave was 
tracked as being of no value beyond menial labor. The slave master did not seek 
recognition from the slaves—the slave master sought work and obedience from them no 
different than from his other beasts of burden. The normative discrimination against those 
of dark skin precluded the possibility of human recognition in any direction. Here, I say 
“human recognition” because a slave could be prized and praised in the same way a good 
horse could be.  
Our contemporary society does not have slavery per se, though a Marxist theorist 
could point to low wages as a form of slavery. Our society retains the normative 
discrimination of what Andrew Sayer calls “contributive injustice”—the social 
misrecognition that restricts what members of social classes are allowed to contribute, 
particularly in terms of occupations.172 The lottery of birth restricts most individuals to an 
inheritance of class distinction that limits their economic opportunities, whereas members 
of the lucky sperm club173 inherit wealth either directly or through privileged opportunities 
for education, jobs, and careers. As Sayer observes,174 public attitudes support the idea that 
greater contributions to society deserve greater compensation, but the public attributes the 
value of contributions on the basis of class and an unequal distribution of labor. The social 
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structure produces unequal opportunities, with jobs with higher social status and 
compensation going to a privileged class. Most of the problems of distributive injustice 
stem from this contributive injustice because low-value jobs are given low-value 
compensation. Sayer correctly observes that what individuals are allowed to contribute is at 
least as important as what they receive in terms of resources.175 This misrecognition is 
centered on jobs and occupations, but it extends to educational and cultural opportunities, 
the health hazards and health care one encounters, where one can afford to live, and all of 
the lifestyle opportunities that go with these. Contributive injustice is a normative 
discrimination against others who are not allowed to contribute and not allowed to use their 
talents and explore their possibilities. A wide range of social groups are negatively tracked 
and restricted as to the occupations they can enter. Women being occupationally restricted 
is connected to pathological recognition, as I will discuss next, but the normative 
discrimination against women as weaker and less rational also restricts their occupational 
opportunities and leads to the glass ceiling within occupations. Minorities of race, 
ethnicity, and religion are also negatively discriminated against and restricted to low-value 
occupations. Mostly though, contributive injustice is tied to class, with labor divided 
between blue-collar and white-collar, and individual workers are subsumed under the 
norms that designate as inferior their social contributions and status.  
Despite the fact that contributive injustice damages not only the afflicted individuals 
but also the whole of society that misses out on the potential contributions of so many, its 
injustice persists because the normative discrimination is seen as a proper response to how 
things are. Sayer observes that one of the most common contemporary misrecognitions is 
underestimating the extent to which structural inequalities give only some individuals 
preferential access to practices that are socially recognized.176 Sayer argues that the cause 
of this unequal distribution of occupations—society’s structural inequalities—is likely to 
be misrecognized as being the deserved product of effort and intelligence. Furthermore, 
specific individuals’ contributions are evaluated according to the unequal distribution of 
labor, misrecognizing their contributions and qualities. The combination of these two 
misrecognitions means that regardless of individual traits and efforts, the economically 
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privileged are seen as having earned their wealth, and the economically disadvantaged are 
seen as deserving of their lack of wealth. This denial of recognition for the economically 
disadvantaged is a normative discrimination that sees them as inferior: The poor deserve to 
be poor because they are lazy and incompetent. The companion misrecognition is assuming 
that any wealthy person, especially white men, has wealth because of earning it through 
hard work and superior ability. These misrecognitions hide and reinforce contemporary 
society’s structures that created class inequality, contributive and distributional injustices, 
and their accompanying pathological recognition and normative discrimination norms. 
All forms of normative discrimination reduce individuals to a negative preconception 
without individuality and perhaps without humanity. The negative preconception, not the 
other individual, is being seen, and the other is being viewed through the negative 
preconception and treated with hostility on the basis of it. The mistake in normative 
discrimination is that the perpetrator is guided by his or her own preconceptions (though 
these preconceptions are usually learned from the culture’s recognition norms) rather than 
the attributes actually possessed of the other individual. The perpetrator assumes, if not 
insists, that the oppressed others conform to those preconceptions, and the perpetrator is 
resistant to contrary information. Negative recognition norms are a denial, often with 
malice, of the positive values and contributions of others who hold particular traits and, 
thus, are misrecognition. Oppressed individuals are reduced to objects and rendered 
without voice or will, and their experiences, words, and actions are suspected and 
delegitimized. Today, for example, Muslims are tracked (literally and figuratively) as 
terrorists; their every word and action is treated as suspect, and their claims for recognition 
as human beings are delegitimized. 
In today’s pluralistic society, malice in normative discrimination often reflects social 
insecurity by dominant groups against minority groups. Racists, sexists, homophobes, 
jingoists, and antireligious bigots of all stripes imagine themselves harmed by the social 
inclusion of hated and feared groups. To see those one thinks inferior being treated equally 
by society is perceived as a moral insult. Normative discrimination also arises in the midst 
of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. When tensions exist between social groups, all sides can 
become paranoid and overly sensitive to what the other groups are doing. Actions by the 
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other groups are negatively tracked and perceived as threatening, and the success and well-
being of other groups may be perceived as a matter of the others receiving greater and 
unfair advantages, thus diminishing one’s own perceived social position. There is no good 
in a Montague in the eyes of a Capulet. 
Common targets of negative stereotyping are subcultures and countercultural 
movements, such as religious sects and youth movements. As Stanley Cohen observed, the 
behavior of subcultures, such as the violence between mods and rockers in the United 
Kingdom in the 1960s, is exaggerated by the mainstream culture to hysterical proportions, 
generating unwarranted hostility against those subcultures.177 Members of the subculture 
are stigmatized as moral outsiders or, as Cohen calls them, “folk devils,” who are defined 
as a threat to the mainstream social order, values, and interests. The perceived threat 
becomes a moral panic,178 rousing normative discrimination against the members of the 
subculture. Members of a subculture are labeled as deviants, and “once a person is thus 
type cast, his acts are interpreted in terms of the status to which he has been assigned.”179 I 
will explore ways that members of subcultures respond to misrecognition in chapter 2.4.5. 
The morality of normative discrimination is easily compartmentalized by 
perpetrators. Those who deny equal rights to women, minorities, immigrants, or other 
groups often do not see themselves as being against rights and equality. They would see 
their exclusion of particular groups not as a double standard but as consistent with and 
upholding of moral norms. They would justify their disparate treatment with an interpretive 
narrative of why targeted groups are deserving of exclusion. Superficially rational 
arguments are used to justify the misrecognition as a case of the victims deserving it and 
even that there is an ethical demand to misrecognize these individuals because of their 
traits. The presence of normative discrimination reinforces an environment in which 
mistreatment of others is defensible. Normative discrimination is essentially what Honneth 
describes as social ostracizing. Instances of normative discrimination will be witnessed by 
other individuals who will become disinclined to offer recognition to socially ostracized 
individuals, even encouraged actively to misrecognize those individuals. Powerful 
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individuals and institutions can use arguments and persuasion to convince others to engage 
in normative discrimination against targeted groups or individuals. Similarly, individuals 
can appeal to interpretive narratives to provide post hoc validity for misrecognition 
motivated by personal reasons. Often, rational arguments are not needed to tap into fear 
and hatred of others who are different.  
 
The misrecognitions discussed above are behaviors in which individuals believe they 
are acting appropriately. Even the victims of misrecognition may come to believe their 
treatment is appropriate. Individuals in groups targeted by normative discrimination can 
identify with the definitions ascribed to them but at the cost of their social and personal 
value without receiving any compensatory positive self-affirmation. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of a social field can help us understand this.180 A culture generates a social field of 
objective structures and relations within which individuals perceive, interpret, and act. The 
rules of the field that structure intersubjective relations include recognition norms, which, 
through socialization, become part of individuals’ habitus—their dispositions and 
embodied agency within the social field. How individuals perceive, assess, and interact 
with each other is structured by their position within the social field and the recognition 
norms that structure interactions. When recognition norms are discriminatory, they distort 
individuals’ conceptions of what appropriate recognition behaviors are. These distortions 
can become engrained in individuals’ habitus and thus part of their daily attitudes and 
behaviors beneath reflective awareness. The distortions are part of  
the set of fundamental, pre-reflexive assumptions that social agents engage 
by … accepting the world as it is, and of finding it natural because their 
mind is constructed according to cognitive structures that are issued out of 
the very structures of the world.181 
Conversely, McBride argues that the socially disadvantaged can still maintain a sense of 
subjective well-being. One can opt to identify with one’s lowly social position by seeing 
one’s status as part of a larger purpose and can boost one’s self-esteem through taking this 
perspective.182 I would argue that such a psychological adaptation is a self-misrecognizing 
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in which the misrecognition received from others is internalized into one’s habitus. The 
structures of the social field and the interactions between individuals mediate but do not 
determine the exact behaviors of individuals. As we will see in chapter 2.2, the concept of 
habitus also helps describe how individuals can resist misrecognition.  
1.3.3 - Pathological recognition  
Recognition norms that purport to recognize groups of individuals positively but in 
practice misrecognize them I label “pathological recognition.” The term “pathology” refers 
to the study of disease not the disease itself,183 so the term “pathology” is used incorrectly 
if it designates a social structure of a system a “social pathology” despite its widespread 
adoption in critical theory. The term “pathological” means related to or caused by a 
disease.184 It is in this sense that I mean pathological recognition—recognition norms that 
cause injustice. In pathological recognition, social relations are structured by a recognition 
order that designates social groups, such as women, as having particular traits that should 
be positively recognized. Within this recognition order, individuals recognize others by 
engaging with and applying their culture’s seemingly positive recognition norms. This type 
of misrecognition behavior conforms to a recognition-like structure that socializes 
individuals into behaviors that emulate recognition, but the norms are pathological in that 
the cultural recognition norms are concealed misrecognitions, the application of which does 
not support others’ self-realization and autonomy. Pathological recognition norms erode 
others’ autonomy by subsuming them under recognition norms that define them and limit 
their possibility for recognition—for example, the traditional characterization of the traits 
and contributions of women. Unlike normative discrimination, the recognition norms of 
pathological recognition provide an affirmation of the value of targeted individuals. Both 
forms normatively restrict individuals and their possibilities, but pathological recognition 
deals with norms that focus on alleged positives that exclude other positives, whereas 
normative discrimination focuses on alleged negatives.  
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What I am calling “pathological recognition” encompasses portrayals of negative 
recognition as domination, as advanced by, for example, Althusser,185 Butler,186 Markell,187 
and McNay.188 These theorists address how recognition is used to maintain social 
domination by motivating subjects to serve the interests of power. Individuals are 
recognized for adhering to their responsibilities and duties to society, and their recognized 
compliance gives them a social identity. These theorists tend to reject recognition as 
irredeemable. Althusser rejects recognition as the central mechanism of ideology, and 
McNay rejects recognition as a model for emancipatory critique. Butler sees recognition as 
intertwined with domination and enforced conformism and considers the idea that freedom 
can be realized through recognition as part of an ideology that contributes to the dominant 
recognition order. Similarly, Markell sees the pursuit of recognition of our identity from 
social institutions as unobtainable, contributing to injustice rather than emancipating us 
from it. What these negative conceptions of recognition tend to overlook is the fact that the 
forces of domination succeed because they are exploiting a positive social mechanism. 
Recognition can be distorted and used to dominate people because recognition can have a 
positive influence on individuals but can be difficult for individuals to discern. As Honneth 
says, we need to distinguish the false forms of recognition from its correct morally positive 
forms, even though identifying “correct and morally required” recognition is even more 
difficult than Honneth assumes.189 
Honneth’s concept of ideological forms of recognition is similar to pathological 
recognition in that it acknowledges the positive aspect of a false form of recognition. I 
argue that Honneth’s ideological recognition is a subset of pathological recognition, and 
the features of ideological recognition will appear in my phenomenologically fuller account 
of pathological recognition. Honneth characterizes social recognition as ideological when it 
merely evokes a self-conception that motivates a subject to accept tasks and obligations 
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willingly and conform to a social role despite there being no prospect of positive material 
change that lives up to its evaluative promise.190 There are three problems with that 
definition, a definition that seems to be contradicted by Honneth himself throughout his 
paper. First, recognition’s normative character means that it always motivates individuals 
to conform to a social role and accept tasks and obligations willingly, so this cannot be a 
feature of what distinguishes ideological recognition from healthy recognition. Second, the 
evaluative promises of any form of recognition are not easily materially measured, and this 
is especially the case with pathological recognition that promises a sense of meaning and 
belonging more than material progress. Looking at fulfillment only in material terms 
misses that ideological recognition could, and often does, provide an identity benefit. 
Third, these negative forms of recognition actually promise very little material change—
they offer only promises of inferior recognition that are largely kept because what is 
promised is only a milder experience of subordination. An example Honneth gives of 
ideological recognition is the promise to employees of their greater freedom, individuality, 
and self-fulfillment if they become “entrepreneurs” of their own labor power and skills. 
This vague promise encourages employees to adopt a certain set of attitudes and actions; 
however, the employer’s promise is not recognition at all but a ploy that shifts 
responsibility for inadequate compensation for labor away from employers and onto 
employees, which is a type of selective misrecognition I will describe later.  
If we broaden Honneth’s conception of ideological recognition while focusing on the 
idea of socialization into a motivating self-conception, we can see that pathological 
recognition is less about material promises than it is about appealing to individuals’ sense 
of practical identity, even though the identity that is being affirmed limits those individuals. 
Elsewhere in his paper, Honneth refers to the repeated praise of Uncle Tom’s submissive 
virtues as an example of ideological recognition,191 but the master who praises Tom never 
promises much to Tom, and certainly there is never any real improvement in Tom’s 
material circumstances. What Tom does receive is affirmation of his identity as a compliant 
servant. That the putative identities of pathological recognition give individuals a sense of 
meaning and value is why it is appealing to those being limited by it, despite its limiting 
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assessments. Pathological recognition can exploit two positive aspects of recognition: its 
importance for individual development and relations-to-self and its normative role as a 
guide for proper conduct. Pathological recognition can make people believe they are 
affirming themselves be applying the pathological recognition norms, and in doing so they 
are affirmed by others as behaving properly. Pathological recognition remains influential as 
long as the targeted recipients do not come to realize fully both that they are not receiving 
equal recognition and that this inequity is unfair. This is why pathological recognition is 
accompanied by narratives that justify and maintain the recognition order and its norms. 
Social norms provide objective criteria for knowing what is expected of us and for 
assessing our own actions.192 We are socialized into the habit of relying on norms to guide 
our behavior. By distorting recognition norms to give the appearance that following the 
norms either affirms individuals and/or exemplifies proper conduct, the recognition order 
can influence people into misrecognition behavior that could advance a conformist 
ideological agenda. Critique of this ideological structure is necessary to reveal its 
assumptions and influences in order to open the possibility of individuals’ awareness of the 
structure and motivate them to struggle against misrecognition. 
What I argue separates false forms of recognition from positive ones is that the 
former attribute to individuals stereotypical traits and value judgments that are used to 
subsume individuals under a group definition. These attributed recognition norms hinder 
those individuals’ possibilities for self-realization and receiving recognition for their actual 
qualities and contributions. Because pathological recognition norms appear to be positive 
recognition but in practice perpetrate misrecognition, they are false, dis-ease-causing forms 
of recognition. Pathological recognition is not purely negative in that at the same time that 
it misrecognizes and harms people, it socially affirms them. This is the case even though 
the positive affirmations are deceptions that mislead individuals into accepting affirmations 
that limits them. Honneth gives the example of the idea of the heroic soldier, which grants 
to men who suffer social insignificance and a lack of prospects a type of recognition by 
becoming part of the military subculture.193 This example is well worth exploring to 
illustrate one way that pathological recognition works. In the military subculture, 
                                                 
192
 By “objective” here I mean in terms of one’s culture. 
193
 Honneth, “Recognition as Ideology,” 326-327. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 84 of 226 
individuals gain a measure of prestige and honor while at the same time being treated as 
nonautonomous servants of the state, if not used as canon fodder to achieve aims in which 
they have little or no involvement or from which they do not benefit. It is, at its core, a 
pathological recognition that lionizes war and honors “Our Glorious Dead” while 
downplaying the reality that they are, indeed, now dead. We should not doubt that many 
served honorably, and whether they acted for king and country, for their families, or for 
their comrades in arms, they did their jobs properly and are worthy of our esteem. We also 
should not doubt that the esteem many individuals give to military veterans is sincere and 
with cause. Many of those who adopt the pathological recognition norms are not 
deliberately misrecognizing others but are following social norms, so they believe they are 
behaving properly. Individual soldiers accept the pathological recognition of military glory 
because for many who served, it provided them with a place to belong, a role to fulfill, and 
a sense of purpose, even if it denied them other options for self-relation and social 
affirmation. Maybe they had no better options, because of their social position and 
society’s contributive injustice, to achieve social status. This is why pathological 
recognition cannot be reduced to ideological machinations of the power structure. Instead, 
we need to see how recognition relations develop a life of their own, becoming part of the 
social fabric of normative expectations. Pathological recognition works because there is 
reason for individuals to accept the narrative that distorts individuals and their possibilities, 
and with time this distortion becomes the accepted normal. Often, we find pathological 
recognition in cultural traditions, largely unthought and unseen, part of a culture’s system 
of beliefs. Our theoretical approach to pathological recognition is best served by 
understanding it as a largely prereflective form of recognition whose normative 
conceptions of individuals appears to value their traits and status positively but has lost 
touch with its tangible effects on individuals.  
A prime example of pathological recognition is the traditional classification of 
women as caregivers—the normative evaluation of a “good” woman as a wife and mother. 
The traditional social definition of womanhood tracks positive qualities, such as being 
caring and nurturing. Such a classification of women has the appearance of recognizing 
women, but it does so in a limiting way. The norms assigning women caregiver roles place 
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women into restrictive gender roles that, among other effects, define women’s care work as 
part of a woman’s natural disposition and thus not real labor warranting compensation.194 
The pathological recognition norms defining women’s nature as being caring and nurturing 
beings assumes that women should pursue caregiving as their life’s work—either as a wife 
and mother or in caregiving professions such as nursing or teaching. The pathological 
norms defining women in this way preclude other possibilities for recognition—if one is 
recognized as being a caregiver, then one cannot easily also be recognized as powerful, 
creative, or intellectually gifted. Also, women’s caregiver role is recognized as a less 
valuable contribution compared with the contributions made by men. No matter how good 
a wife and mother a woman is, she still would not be esteemed highly compared with men. 
This pathological recognition does not empower women or engender their self-realization. 
In practice, it limits women’s autonomy and self-image by socializing them into accepting 
a seemingly positive self-image as a caregiver.195 What is recognized and honored excludes 
women as individuals with particular traits or behaviors but is instead an impersonal, 
stereotypical perception of women, and this identity is attributed to women as a group. The 
side effect of this pathological recognition is that other possible roles for women that do 
not include the recognized traits are discouraged if not outright denied to women.  
This suppression of women’s choices is not necessarily practiced by individuals 
maliciously—even though it often can be—and may actually be considered by its 
practitioners as a form of compassion toward women by keeping them “safe” within the 
boundaries of their presumed nature. They may, with sincerity, believe that they are being 
benevolent toward women by recognizing their putatively positive character. They would 
be affirmed in that assessment by society, which is telling them they are honoring and 
supporting others, while at the same time hiding the damage that is being inflicted by the 
pathological recognition norms and associated behaviors. The traditional characterization 
of women recognizes them through a biased filter. Traditional paternalistic and 
misogynistic attitudes toward women misrecognize women as the weaker sex while at the 
same time instituting as a norm the moral need to protect supposedly weak women from 
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potential dangers. This pathological recognition erodes women’s autonomy under the 
pretext of taking moral responsibility for women. That the norm of “protecting” women 
from physically demanding activities and occupations is restrictive, sexist misrecognition 
does not negate the fact that those engaging with the recognition norms could consider 
themselves as being morally responsible toward women. This does not excuse the sexism 
and ignorance involved, but acknowledging the moral element of the misrecognition allows 
us to understand better the persistence of such pathological cultural norms.  
The positive character of pathological recognition explains why women (and men) 
do not realize how deeply women are harmed by misogynistic gender roles and attitudes. 
Recognition obscures this damage by positively reinforcing the imaginary unity of gender 
and social attitudes about gender and helps constitute women’s and men’s identities. 
Women receive positive public recognition beneficial to their practical relations-to-self 
when they conform to the behaviors set down by the recognition order. Men also receive 
beneficial recognition when they conform to the recognition order and enforce gender roles 
and give or withhold recognition to women according to women’s conformity to the 
pathological norms. The point here is that there are positive recognition benefits received 
by both men and women for conforming to gender roles. The presence of recognition 
teaches women that subordinate behavior is good, and it teaches men that subordinating 
women is good. Importantly, men who reinforce gender roles are recognized as benefiting 
women. For example, a man is esteemed for supporting his wife and kids—but it is worth 
noting that this sentiment puts the wife and children on the same level of dependence on 
the man. McNay has observed that “the family perpetuates systemic relations of oppression 
as much as it reproduces values and cultural norms.”196 The recognition norm of the 
heterosexual nuclear family is inherently structured by asymmetrical relations of power and 
enforced by pathological recognition norms.  
Misogyny is a systemically generated subordination that is maintained by 
recognition. That gender roles are propagated in terms of recognition helps explain their 
persistence. By objective, external criteria, women are being subordinated and harmed by 
this “recognition,” yet women and men find it difficult to overcome misogyny because its 
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pathological recognition norms are embedded within society’s other, healthy recognition 
norms and, thus, are part of the fabric of cultural attitudes. Men and women are socialized 
into a society’s set of recognition norms, and they are reacting rationally to the recognition 
norms that are dominant in their culture. The pervasiveness of a culture’s pathological 
recognition norms gives individuals reason to believe that the norms are true and proper. 
Because men and women need mutual recognition and social acceptance, it is in their self-
interest to adopt recognition norms concerning women and behave accordingly in their 
interpersonal relationships. Thus, through recognition, women have a stake in their 
subordination. As John Stuart Mill said more than a century ago,197 it is rational for woman 
to serve the system as best she can. What is more, the normative content of recognition 
normalizes the expectation of the subordination of women. For men, women’s inferiority is 
naturalized, and their place as superior to women is affirmed. For women, their 
subordination feels natural in that it is familiar even when it feels wrong somehow. As 
McNay says, the objective structures of subordination are taken in by individuals and 
naturalized as subjective dispositions, undermining their capacity to do more than endure 
the current state of affairs.198 Both men and women are colonized by misogyny, and 
recognition is a mechanism of this colonization. The view that recognition perpetuates 
misogyny also explains why there is a backlash against women’s liberation and feminism. 
Western men have lost their symbolic status as heads of the family. Some, lacking 
socialized roles to accept these changes, react by clinging to the previous gender 
role distribution more fiercely.199 Social changes that disrupt recognition relations create 
tension and conflict to which not everyone has the inner strength to respond positively.  
Pathological recognition is the link between ideological structures and practices of 
subordination. Ideological forms of subordination cannot prevail without an adequate level 
of buy-in from all concerned. As Amy Allen says,  
Regulatory regimes cannot maintain and reproduce themselves; instead, 
they must be maintained and upheld by the individuals whom they regulate. 
The cultivation of an attachment to those regimes is an extremely effective 
and economical tool for getting individuals to maintain and uphold such 
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regimes; in that sense, the regime needs the attachment of the individuals it 
regulates in order to persist.200 
The way that power structures can achieve buy-in and attachment from individuals is 
through recognition norms. Recognition norms provide a moral grammar that individuals 
can use to gauge their own and others’ behavior. Recognition norms of all types are 
authoritative and normalizing—those following them see them as the basis for judging 
themselves and others. Generally, individuals want to do what is considered proper and 
help maintain social order, and they are given reason to believe that by complying with 
traditional gender attitudes they are doing good for themselves and others. When 
individuals respond to their socialization by adopting pathological recognition norms 
within their lives, those subordinating recognition norms persist and propagate through the 
generations. 
The pathological recognition model offers an advantage for efforts toward 
emancipation of individuals from the oppression of misrecognition and injustice. We could 
argue that the individual should understand the negative consequences on others of 
pathological recognition norms, but that is asking the individual to rise above the 
socialization of his or her culture and act in a way that is contrary to how social institutions 
tell them to act—a perhaps necessary effort, but difficult for any individual to attempt 
much less achieve. An example of this is the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) in 
some African, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian cultures. Within those cultures, the 
practice is considered normal and morally right as part of the norms that recognize girls in 
that culture. Those who carry out the practice probably believe the procedure will benefit 
the girl in the long term, including preserving her virginity, making her more desirable for 
marriage, and affirming her as a member of their culture. The practice has been viewed by 
other cultures as barbaric, misogynistic, and a form of child abuse that harms the girls 
being “recognized” in that it forces girls to undergo a painful and enduringly debilitating 
procedure. Those outsiders, recognizing girls’ right to bodily integrity, have pressured 
cultures practicing FGM to ban it, meeting with varying degrees of success. Condemning 
these cultures as backward or irrational will not be as productive in stopping this social 
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practice as will understanding FGM as a pathological recognition norm that those who 
practice it have reason to believe is proper conduct on their part. Understanding that FGM 
is sustained by being seen as a positive recognition norm moves the conflict over the 
practice to a question of recognition. More than simply criticizing FGM in moral terms, 
which comes off as paternalistic condescension, discussing the social practice of FGM as 
pathological recognition frames the discussion of FGM in terms of how best to value 
women. In so doing, we can appeal to cultures practicing FGM to change what they value 
and from that change their recognition norms and recognition relations with women. In this 
case, it would mean valuing women by recognizing the integrity of a woman’s body and 
her right to control her own body rather than pathologically recognizing the value of a 
woman’s body as a thing to be controlled and manipulated to serve male ideas of beauty 
and worth.  
Pathological recognition is widely prevalent, and the traditional view of women is 
only one example. The basic structure of pathological recognition—recognition norms that 
ascribe putative positive traits to individuals but that actually hinder the autonomy of those 
individuals—can be applied to any group. What unites all instances of pathological 
recognition are norms that designate only some attributes of a group as valuable while 
overlooking others. We can see that both pathological recognition and normative 
discrimination encourage a lack of engagement with other individuals because those 
individuals are subsumed under group identities and general norms, which limits 
recognition relations and the possibilities for individuals. The classification of women as 
caregivers recognizes women who are quiet, nurturing, and long-suffering, but it does not 
honor, perhaps does not even see, women who are bold, intelligent, and creative. 
Pathological recognition and normative discrimination limit individuals’ expression of 
talents and ideas and often actively silences targeted groups. If, for example, one has a 
limited view of East Asians as excelling in math and science, one can easily fail to 
recognize that they have talents and interests in the arts and humanities. If one has a limited 
view of African-Americans as physically talented in entertainment and athletics, one can 
easily not recognize their cognitive talents in academia or leadership roles. These 
stereotypes limit possibilities for recognition relations and opportunities for the individuals 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 90 of 226 
being stereotyped, failing to recognize them as human individuals who possess unique 
talents and personalities. Such stereotyping is common in human societies across race, 
ethnicity, gender, religion, and other group traits.  
Pathological recognition can target a whole culture. For example, in a culture 
dominated by patriotic zeal, expressions of loyalty to the state and the state’s preferred 
narrative are recognized, allegedly for the good of all citizens, whether the citizens actually 
benefit or not. A political regime can establish one version of the state’s history and image 
under the guise of patriotic loyalty, demanding and imposing one exclusive recognition of 
people and events while misrecognizing and silencing all other perspectives and voices. 
Patriotic loyalty mandates that certain recognition norms be maintained, and those who 
differ or dissent are denied recognition. This form of discrimination against free expression 
also targets members of subcultures, who are seen through a biased filter—the issue of 
subcultures I will take up in chapter 2.4.5. 
There is a tension between engaging with recognition norms and engaging with 
individuals that is reflected in the tension between egalitarianism and multiculturalism. I 
cannot hope to discuss the politics of recognition fully, but some brief comments are in 
order to show how these ideas match with the discussion of recognition norms of 
pathological recognition. Charles Taylor’s conception of the politics of recognition is the 
multicultural demand for recognition of the identity of subaltern groups, such as indigenous 
peoples, and distinct cultural groups, such as francophone Quebecers.201 An opposing view 
is offered by Kwame Appiah, who remarks on the confining nature of particular 
recognition—that demanding recognition as an African-American or homosexual may win 
recognition, but with it comes a set of particular normative expectations and demands that 
can be a tightly scripted identity that is as burdensome as being denied one’s identity.202 In 
such recognition, one is being seen only as a member of a particular group separate from 
the general populace. Being seen as a member of a group can impose ideological 
prejudices, either pathological recognition and normative discrimination or both, 
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subsuming individuals under a group identity blind to individual differences. Similarly, Iris 
Young has criticized the ideal of egalitarianism that has denied marginalized groups their 
particular identities, and she sees the antidote to it as particular recognition of those 
groups.203 The norms of egalitarian inclusion are molded by the dominant group, 
subsuming subcultures under universal norms that in practice control and oppress 
individuals. Subcultures have long been assimilated into the dominant culture, prime recent 
examples being the treatment of First Nations peoples in North and South America and 
Australia who were stripped of their heritage, language, and culture to fit into an ersatz idea 
of equality.  
 
The concepts of normative discrimination and pathological recognition do not in 
themselves explain how they emerge (which is a much larger discussion beyond the current 
scope), but they can help explain why ideologies persist despite the damage they inflict on 
society. The mistake in pathological recognition cannot be blamed on individual 
perpetrators because the mistake resides in traditional social norms or attitudes that 
permeate a culture, usually unseen in the fabric of cultural attitudes. The concept of a 
pathological recognition norm is significant for critical theory and could be more useful 
theoretically than the traditional one of a social pathology. It at least adds depth to theories 
such as those of Zurn, who argues that inegalitarian social structures persist because they 
naturalize the artificial way social power has structured society, which distorts second-
order processes of belief formation and the comprehension of them.204 Individuals fail to 
understand that social conditions are not natural but are the results of socially determined 
relations of power that contribute to deleterious social outcomes, leading them to conform 
their beliefs and behaviors voluntarily to contribute materially to their oppression. Zurn is 
essentially correct, but he does not sufficiently factor in the social reality that normative 
discrimination and pathological recognition provide the normative evaluation of 
individuals’ meaning and value and that these are appealing and even rewarding to men 
and women.  
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1.3.4 - Forgetting the other individual 
So far, we have discussed misrecognition behaviors that are shaped by engagements 
with problematic norms and seen briefly how they discourage engagements with 
individuals. Now, we begin to move to misrecognition behaviors that more directly stem 
from a disengagement from other individuals. The moral aspect of human interaction is that 
recognition is possible only at a level of engagement in which other individuals are seen as 
having a moral value. Intersubjective engagement means interaction with and awareness of 
other individuals as individual human beings with thoughts and desires similar to one’s 
own who deserve moral consideration. Recognition that is a rigid normalization of traits 
and contributions absent purely intersubjective horizontal recognition does not affirm 
individual self-realization or freedom. Therefore, intersubjective engagement is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for recognition behavior, and ambivalence about 
others is at the root of misrecognition. Given the importance of recognition relations in an 
individual’s development of self-realization, breakdowns in the intersubjective 
engagements that cultivate recognition can easily lead to moral injuries. I will describe four 
ways in which the other individual is forgotten and intersubjective engagement breaks 
down. 
 
Withdrawal from moral relations 
Withdrawal from moral relations is not a rejection of norms as much as a broad 
disinterest in recognition relations with others resulting in nonsocial or antisocial behavior. 
This withdrawal from meaningful interpersonal relations most likely occurs within certain 
social interactions rather than across an individual’s entire life. This type of misrecognition 
is not seeing others either positively or negatively because engagement is absent. The 
individual does not perceive his or her connections with the world and other individuals in 
it. In this type of misrecognition, one is possibly self-absorbed in anxiety, insecurity, or 
poor self-esteem, perhaps as a result of psychological trauma, with a diminished capacity 
for engagement with others; thus, what interaction there is is nonintersubjective and devoid 
of moral engagement. Ethical responsibility to others according to recognition norms is 
forsaken in the face of insecurities and alienation. One is no longer responsive to others, 
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and one no longer considers them in one’s behavior. Individuals who engage in this type of 
misrecognition behavior may not be at ethical fault because the mistake is often not a 
conscious, rational choice. The behavior of sociopaths would probably be placed in this 
category, but few individuals who engage in this type of recognition are sociopaths and are 
more likely victims of depression, trauma, or social oppression. In such behaviors, the 
withdrawal from intersubjective relations precludes possibilities for recognition relations. 
 
Structural lack of intersubjective engagement  
An unconscious unawareness of the moral standing of others could be the result of 
social forces that may predispose individuals to disregard the moral standing of others and 
thus be blind to recognizing their particular contributions. This kind of reduced 
attentiveness causes recognition to fall into the background and slip out of sight—what 
Honneth calls reification. In reification, we “lose sight of the recognitional prerequisites of 
social practices while carrying out these very practices.”205 Recognition is precluded 
because an individual is not engaging with others intersubjectively. Reification, Honneth 
says, is an annulment of recognition caused by cultural practices independent of 
individuals: “Subjects can forget or learn later to deny the elementary recognition that they 
generally grant to every other human being, if they continuously contribute to a highly one-
sided form of praxis that necessitates abstraction from the ‘qualitative’ characteristics of 
human beings.”206 An individual’s unconscious diminished moral responsibility is not the 
fault of the individual because the misrecognition behavior is an unreflective comportment 
caused by social forces, in particular, the forces of capitalism. The individual is subsumed 
in social processes in which recognition relations are forgotten and recognition behavior is 
absent.  
 
Temporary lack of intersubjective engagement 
Depending on how powerful the processes are that diminish a sense of moral 
responsibility, the misrecognition could be structurally entrenched in interpersonal 
interactions or could be a by-product of a temporal forgetfulness from which an individual 
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can recover. If it is the former, misrecognition behavior is entrenched and difficult for an 
individual to perceive, much less overcome. If it is the latter, then perhaps moral 
responsibility to others is only forgotten or obscured but not entirely abandoned. If we are 
not engaging with others intersubjectively, it precludes the possibility of adequately 
recognizing others, resulting in misrecognition such that we are oblivious and 
inconsiderate. These are behaviors in which we are no longer responsive to the other and 
we no longer recognize the other for who he or she is and how he or she is behaving. 
Within this type of misrecognition, the perpetrator would not see the other individual, 
resulting in blindness to the positive contributions and capacities of others, forestalling 
recognition. However, this is not to say that the individual who is not engaging 
intersubjectively is deliberately engaging in misrecognition behavior or is even aware of 
misrecognizing others. A perpetrator could be so engrossed in his or her activities, even 
while conducting them in a moral way, that he or she loses awareness of dealing with 
another human being. We go about our activities aware that others are present but not 
recognizing them as individuals, and this misrecognition is part of the self-absorption of 
everyday life. Honneth gives the example of a tennis player who is so focused on winning 
that she forgets her opponent is her best friend. Her goal has become independent of the 
context in which it originated, and “any attentiveness for the cooperating partner vanishes 
completely.”207 The tennis player has not forgotten the rules of the game but has forgotten 
her opponent’s humanness and is no longer engaging intersubjectively with her friend. 
Winning the match has become a single purpose independent of her other relations to the 
world. Such a forgetfulness of others is commonplace in everyday life when we are caught 
up in everyday tasks and fail to notice and appreciate others as individuals like ourselves—
such as Honneth’s example of not greeting someone because we are unaware of him or 
her.208 In such forgetful behavior, we reify other individuals—not seeing them as agents 
whose contributions and personal well-being should be taken into account. We perhaps 
remain polite, giving the appropriate gestures of civil behavior, but because we are 
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forgetting the other, our courtesy is cursory and cold. This unintentional disengagement 
from others is temporary and does not necessarily lead to the elimination of all 
intersubjective engagements. 
Important questions concerning this dimension of misrecognition include the nature 
and extent of the lack of intersubjective engagement and whether it is the result of a 
deliberate withdrawal from intersubjective engagements or an involuntary loss of the 
capacity for intersubjective engagements. Deliberate withdrawal from intersubjective 
relations is not a forgetting but a denial or defensiveness resulting in not considering the 
possibility of others’ contributions and personal well-being. A deliberate withdrawal is 
most likely isolated within certain social interactions rather than across an individual’s 
entire life—for example, an individual being inconsiderate of others while posting 
comments online—engaging in thoughtless or aggressive behaviors he or she would not 
engage in within other interpersonal interactions. Disengagement may also result from 
general insecurity and anxiety. We are, as McBride says, recognition-sensitive beings209 
because our well-being depends on receiving recognition, as Honneth says. We need 
recognition from others, and the potential lack of it is a threat. It is no surprise that with our 
social life comes anxiety about how others will judge us and our actions. Such anxiety can 
easily limit how much we are willing to risk exposure to negative judgments from others, 
resulting in our deliberately holding back from engaging with others. Tension in 
recognition relations explains a great deal of the social anxiety we all have, and it explains 
why some individuals protect a positive self-image by telling themselves they do not need 
others’ approval, which is another way intersubjective engagement can be cut off. Within 
our relationships, changes in circumstances or in other individuals change our recognition 
relations with them. We are creatures of habit, and we tend to resist change. The threat of 
changes in relations can be wearisome and troublesome, and the temptation to withdraw 
from intersubjective engagement is there.  
Involuntary disengagement from others may result from psychological trauma or 
deep anxiety. Survivors of abuse or trauma and children who did not receive sufficient 
emotional bonding may be less capable of intersubjective engagement as a result of their 
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abuse or neglect. We would be wrong to hold this emotional incapacity against them as a 
moral failing, but such individuals are prone to misrecognizing others. The mistake in this 
dimension is less cognitive than existential or psychological, by which I mean that though 
rational reflection can bring one to awareness of one’s lack of intersubjective engagement, 
it cannot compel one to engage with others in a personal manner.  
 
Objectification of others 
One could engage with specific other individuals but nonetheless take them to be the 
same as others who seem to possess similar traits and capacities. This generalization 
neglects the distinct traits and needs of the individual, objectifying or commoditizing him 
or her. In more benign forms, objectification is a general depersonalization, akin to the 
temporary lack of intersubjective engagement, in which only a general recognition of that 
individual is possible. We may be recognizing that individual as a human with rights and 
moral consideration, but because we are not engaging with that person as a specific 
individual, we are less open to recognition relations beyond acknowledging him or her as a 
human being. The other individual is perceived as only a member of a type and is 
objectified or commoditized. Objectification is often a more malevolent action engrained in 
the prevailing recognition order. Normative discrimination against groups easily leads to 
objectification of individuals whose particular traits and capacities are erased by an identity 
attributed to them, a status that opens up the objectified to abuse. Within patriarchy, 
women not only are treated in terms of pathological recognition but also are objectified as 
beings in service of male desires. Sexual objectification of women has multiple forms and 
degrees, but the common denominator is that women are the proper objects of male sexual 
desire, the proper purpose of women being that they are used in order to satisfy that desire. 
As Timo Jütten has argued, sexual objectification of women is more than 
instrumentalization of them; it is a social meaning imposed on them that undermines their 
autonomy and equal social standing even at times when they are not being used as an 
instrument to gratify male desire.210 Sexual objectification is a complexly pernicious issue, 
but what I find important for the current topic is the link between objectification and 
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oppression. To objectify another individual is to see that person as not worth engaging with 
intersubjectively. We know that we have more latitude in how we treat objects than in how 
we treat other human beings, and we can use objects as we see fit. When individuals are 
objectified, they are objects for our use. In sexual objectification, the woman is excluded 
from intersubjective engagement because her normative status is as a sexual object, and not 
even a particular sexual object, but a fungible one. She is a commodity to be bought, sold, 
and used. This, I argue, is because objectification, unlike pathological recognition or 
normative discrimination, sees the victim as having use value but not as an individual. The 
companion to pathological recognition’s putative positives of women’s gender roles is that 
women are portrayed as subordinate objects whose value is lessened by intersubjective 
engagement (and, of course, any intersubjective engagement reveals the woman is not an 
object). This normative status of women as sexual objects not to be engaged with as 
individuals enables human trafficking and sexual slavery. Attempts by women to exercise 
their autonomy in opposition to their imposed social meaning are met with stern and 
perhaps violent attempts to reassert their objectification. 
  
Misplaced care 
It would seem that if a lack of care is misrecognition, then recognition includes care. 
That is true, but the presence of care does not mean recognition. Care about another can be 
misguided and not intersubjective and, thus, a form of misrecognition. Recognition is an 
intersubjective relation, and we expect it to be so. We expect other humans to care about 
our rights and well-being, if not for us personally, at least in that they expect the same from 
us in return. A stance of normative expectations is involved in all of our everyday 
activities. Socialization teaches us normative expectations about how humans should act, 
but socialization is just one way that we learn to have normative expectations about our 
world. Objects behave with some degree of regularity, and we learn to have normative 
expectations about the behavior of objects. In dealing with both human beings and 
nonhuman objects, our expectations shape our intentional stances and behaviors, our 
experiences, and our interpretations. The significant difference between humans and 
nonhuman objects lies in our normative expectations that other individuals should consider 
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us in their behaviors that may affect us. If a tree branch breaks our window, we do not feel 
misrecognized that the tree did not take our property rights into account; but if a child of an 
appropriate age throws a ball through our window, we feel anger that the child did not 
recognize our expectation that our property be respected. We do not hold the tree morally 
responsible as we do the child because we expect recognition from other humans (i.e., we 
expect them to care about our rights), but we do not expect the same from nonhuman 
objects.211  
However, care and expectations can be separate from recognition, and it is possible 
to have normative expectations for other humans that are normally associated with 
nonhuman objects. This confusion is possible because nonhuman objects can be 
personified, with care becoming objectified, skewing normative expectations. A man could 
“love” his sports car and take time and effort to care for it, giving it everything it needs, but 
we would not say the man recognizes his car in the sense that we mean recognizing other 
people. When we care for a car, the car does seem to respond to our care for it with events 
or states that match our expectations—its paint gleams from polishing, the engine runs 
smoothly after a tune-up, and so on. It is incorrect to say that the car itself responded in the 
way a person would respond to our care, but our normative expectations about the effects 
of care are met. We learn to have expectations of objects, and those expectations are often 
confirmed, and this becomes part of our everyday understanding of the world and our 
orientation to it. The point I am trying to make is that we can interact with others in terms 
of the orientation we have toward nonhuman objects and treat other individuals like 
nonhuman objects in the way we care and have expectations about their responses to our 
actions but fail to care about them as human individuals. In so doing, we are showing care 
but not engaging with them intersubjectively. We think we are being kind and considerate, 
but because we are not intersubjectively engaging with them we are misrecognizing them. 
If other people seem to respond in ways we expect, then we think recognition relations with 
them are fine, and we do not look deeper into the relationship or our actions. An 
intersubjective engagement with the other individual is forgotten. Any relationship could 
fall into this pattern of a lack of intersubjective engagement. 
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1.3.5 - Self-absorbed disengagement from others 
Self-absorbed disengagement is the set of behaviors of misrecognition in which the 
disengagement is driven not by norms but either by a willful refusal to acknowledge or deal 
with another or by a moral judgment that the other individual is not worth engaging with as 
an equal. Perhaps the other is considered to have no qualities of value to the community or 
not having wants or needs worth considering. What interaction there is with others assumes 
how other individuals are, and one is resistant to contrary information. Self-absorbed 
disengagement is misrecognition in its denial of the other individual’s value. Various kinds 
of social ostracizing, shunning, and disregard are examples of self-absorbed 
disengagement. 
Instances of this misrecognition behavior involve restricting the granting of 
recognition to a select few, while disregarding or denying recognition to others. A line is 
drawn between those who are “us” and those who are “them,” and we engage with “us” but 
not with “them.” Honneth gives the example of a robber recognizing his companions while 
misrecognizing his victims.212 Similar divisions are drawn by almost all individuals who, 
wittingly or not, engage more with individuals within their group but less with those 
outside their group. This explains the tendency that all individuals have of according more 
recognition to those within their social circle than to those outside it. We each have our 
own lives and our own involvements and relationships, and it is no surprise that we tend to 
place more importance on individuals and relationships close to us. The human tendency to 
view those outside our own group through a lens of our own preconceptions is perhaps the 
most common form of misrecognition. This disengagement happens at all levels of society, 
from ignoring other individuals who are not our friends or family, to governments not 
seeing members of groups for who they are. Unlike normative discrimination and 
pathological recognition, this type of misrecognition is not driven by social norms as much 
as by individuals’ decision of inclusion and exclusion. It does not have the entrenched 
hostility and dehumanization of normative discrimination.  
Within self-absorbed disengagement, the engagement is with the preconceived 
notions of the situation and others and not how the situation and other individuals actually 
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are. This self-absorbed behavior hinders communication and intersubjective recognition. 
McBride describes an occurrence of self-absorbed disengagement by the British 
government in 1931: 
The Indian delegates had been organized into religious groups by the 
colonial power. Gandhi objected vehemently but colonial officials were 
immovable in their determination to view Indians primarily through the 
lens of sectarian division.213 
The British self-absorbed disengagement that saw Indians only in terms of British 
categorization had its most disastrous consequences in the shortsighted partition of the land 
into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. McBride quotes Patricia Williams on the attitudes 
of white tourists to local African-American churches, saying that for the whites, “no one 
existed for them who could not be governed by their intensions.”214 These condescending 
and patronizing attitudes are not seen by perpetrators as disrespectful, and it might not even 
occur to them that they are misrecognitions. We could count some of this as the 
manifestation of privilege, but in a broader sense it reveals a common human laziness to 
engage with others and be open to perceiving them as they are. 
Both of these examples show how self-absorbed disengagement takes the form of a 
dichotomy between oneself as subject and the other as object. Kelly Oliver observes that in 
this dichotomy, one imagines oneself as self-sovereign and imagines the others as unable to 
govern themselves.215 Oliver argues that the subject-object dichotomy results from the 
pathology of oppression, which explains the British colonial example, though in Williams’s 
example, the white tourists are not actively oppressing the African-American worshippers 
but are treating them as objects to be used by their self-sovereign selves. The subject-object 
attitude and its behaviors of condescension are choices individuals make, and individuals 
maintain the ability to engage with other individuals despite social norms. It seems easier 
to see that the subject-object attitude leads to disengagement and oppression and that a 
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general social environment of oppression maintains, but does not create, the subject-object 
dichotomy.  
 
So far, I have discussed the dimension of personal engagement only in its positive 
aspect—that because acknowledging another individual’s positive traits is recognition, the 
absence of this acknowledgment is misrecognition. There is another aspect in which 
personal engagement is perverse. Intersubjective engagement is perverse when it is 
perpetrated with intentions contrary to affirming the other positively. Perverse engagement 
with another differs from a lack of individual engagement such that the other individual is 
engaged with but the perpetrator is self-absorbed and thus the desires of the other 
individual are ignored and this perverse engagement is itself misrecognition behavior. 
Instead, in regard to the individual engaged with, recognition norms are willfully neglected 
because the needs and desires of the other are subsumed under the perpetrator’s desires. 
Unlike normative discrimination that targets a social group, in perverse engagement the 
perpetrator targets a specific individual, believing either that this specific individual does 
not deserve to be treated well or that this individual’s deservedness is unimportant in the 
context of the perpetrator’s larger concerns. Perverse engagement would range from selfish 
neglect to active manipulation of another to sadistic behavior. Examples of perverse 
engagement would be a bully who targets a specific individual to abuse or a boss who 
harasses a particular employee. Most bullying and harassment are targeted antagonism that 
can be understood as perverse engagement. Another example is a con artist who is 
engaging with an individual expressly to swindle him or her. The con artist may have 
selected a target on the basis of the target’s perceived vulnerability or gullibility, and the 
con artist ignores the norms against theft and dishonesty, specifically in terms of that 
individual, even if the con artist is honest with others. The con artist is engaging with the 
other, recognizing and acting in response to the individuals qualities, only in the service of 
his or her involvement in the successful swindle, but there is not necessarily a specific 
antagonism toward the target. 
The complexity of the negative aspect of personal engagement can be unpacked 
further. The misrecognition behavior of perverse individual engagement is characterized by 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 102 of 226 
the focus of the self-absorbed perpetrator being on a personal relation but not on 
recognition or moral norms. In other words, the character of perverse individual 
engagement is not “these norms are irrelevant” but “for this specific individual these norms 
are irrelevant.” A stalker is obsessed with a specific individual to the extent that norms of 
appropriate conduct, are subsumed under the stalker’s fantastic desires and that disregards 
how the other individual actually is. Stalkers often falsely believe the objects of their 
obsession return their interest and do not take in information to the contrary. If the stalker 
was engaging intersubjectively with the other individual, he or she would take into account 
the expressions of noninterest from the other person. But because the stalker is engaging 
not with the other but with his or her own attributed identity of the other, there is no 
intersubjective engagement. An individual seeking revenge on another is engaged with that 
individual but seeks to harm him or her, so the engagement is not intersubjective. The 
perpetrator considers that the other deserves to be harmed, not affirmed. A sociopath could 
be considered as an individual whose nonengagement is nearly universal—a depraved lack 
of concern for all other human beings and moral responsibility to others according to 
recognition norms is abandoned.216 
1.3.6 - Selective disengagement from others 
There is yet another consideration of engagement with others that illustrates the 
complexity of recognition relations. Withholding recognition can be a positive behavior 
that upholds moral norms. Our engagement with norms leads us to withhold recognition 
from someone who has failed to live up to those norms. Those who fall short of normative 
demands—from those who commit criminal acts to students who do poorly on an 
assignment—are not deserving of recognition in regard to particular norms. In response to 
this, we are morally obligated to withhold recognition from these individuals within the 
specific realm of their subnormative behavior. Their actions do not, of course, require or 
entitle us to withhold recognition in areas beyond that specific instance of subnormative 
behavior. This means that criminals do not entirely forfeit their membership in the moral 
community—they retain other rights even when they have forfeited their right to freedom if 
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the legal norms call for that. Likewise, a teacher is required to award a low mark to a 
student for the one assignment the student has done poorly on, but the teacher cannot 
justifiably withhold recognition to the student outside of that one assignment. If we are still 
engaged with the individual, then we will not commit any extracurricular withholding of 
recognition because our continued engagement with that person as an individual means that 
we continue to hold him or her as generally worthy of recognition. Individuals who 
capriciously misrecognize another beyond the specific normative wrongdoing are no longer 
engaging with the other individual even though they think they are still engaging with 
norms. It is common though for negative judgments to bleed into other areas in such cases. 
An individual deemed to be unworthy in one area can see that judgment extend into all 
areas of his or her life such that that person is no longer respected or trusted in any area and 
he or she becomes ostracized. 
The misrecognition of social ostracizing can be a case of engagement with norms but 
lack of engagement with individuals—an individual has committed a moral transgression 
and is held in contempt by others as a person rather than merely being reprimanded for the 
particular transgression. In some societies, the sins of the father are held against the 
children, which would be an example of engagement with norms but a lack of engagement 
with individuals because clearly the moral stigma that may be justifiable for the father but 
should not be transferred to the children being separate individuals. If we remain engaged 
with both norms and individuals, then we treat others justly by both doing justice to our 
social norms through withholding recognition in deserved instances and also doing justice 
to individuals by not going beyond letting the punishment fit the crime. This raises the 
question of how we should think about the damage done to an individual’s self-esteem 
when recognition is withheld from him or her with just cause. We could consider that such 
withholding is in the best interests of the individual. For example, we are not helping a 
student to learn and grow as a person if we are so protective of his or her self-esteem that 
we are unwilling to award deserved low marks. In this, we can see that withholding 
recognition is benevolent and that, in fact, we are actually recognizing the student as a 
student and responding to him or her as worthy of appropriate instruction, which includes 
awarding a low mark when warranted. Punishment by withholding of recognition may also 
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occur for reasons that could be considered unjust. A parent could withhold recognition 
from a child over the child’s choice of career or friends or if the child was homosexual. A 
father can insist that his child can be a daughter but not a student or physician. Such 
familial conflicts are struggles over recognition, a topic I will engage with in depth in Part 
Two. 
1.3.7 - The dimension of engaging in action  
Any misrecognition behavior will manifest in some degree of action. Some 
misrecognition behaviors are passive, such as the examples of everydayness that were 
mentioned in the dimensions of engagement with norms and engagement with individuals. 
Other misrecognition behaviors are active in that the individual is consciously and 
deliberately engaging in the behavior. We can map this dimension of action in terms of the 
time and intensity of the behavior. In terms of time, a misrecognition behavior could be 
temporary or enduring. In terms of intensity, misrecognition behaviors can range from 
mild, passive behaviors to strong antagonism. Looking at the combination of time and 
intensity, we can map a misrecognition behavior on the dimension of engagement with 
action. Not all misrecognitions have the same intensity and breadth of effect, and this 
dimension reflects that. Another aspect of the dimension of action is the scale of 
misrecognition behavior—it could occur at individual, community, or societal levels—one 
individual engaged in a behavior up to a widespread social practice. The dimension of 
engaging with action is a secondary dimension in that it does not occur independently of 
one or both of the other two dimensions of engagement with norms and engagement with 
other individuals 
Actions include decisions about which engagements to include within a particular 
situation. In a Kantian perspective of the type Honneth endorses, we must be capable of 
putting aside our personal interests and abstract from existing social norms a view of moral 
conduct within our particular situation. Such a view does not work when applied to 
Honneth’s example of a professor who notices an act of plagiarism on the part of a close 
colleague.217 Surely, Honneth suggests, the professor should not put aside moral demands 
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for the sake of a close colleague. Is this a case in which the professor needs to decide 
between engagement with a friend and engagement with the norms of academic integrity? 
On which side of the dilemma will the professor act? Such questions can be asked about a 
wide range of human moral decisions. 
Another aspect of the dimension of action is how misrecognition can be internalized. 
Misrecognition behaviors such as a lack of engagement usually are directed at others, but 
an individual’s disengagement may extend to her disengaging from herself, resulting in her 
misrecognizing herself. Any of the aforementioned types of misrecognition can apply to 
one’s attitude and actions toward oneself, including not engaging with oneself or engaging 
with or disengaging from social norms related to oneself. To continue with our example of 
the traditional attitudes toward women, if a woman applies those social norms to herself, 
she is engaging in misrecognition of herself as much as any other individual who applied 
those same norms to her. By engaging with the social norms about women, the woman 
disengages from herself as an autonomous individual. This relates directly to Honneth’s 
insight that recognition and self-realization are related—the woman “colonized” by the 
social norms is less capable of recognizing herself and developing her own self-realization, 
which would empower her to see the misrecognition of women present in the social norms. 
Misrecognition traps women in this way—misogynistic social forces using the power of 
recognition against women.  
1.3.8 - How the multidimensional view helps critical theory 
The change in approach I advocate is to replace a macrosocial top-down picture of 
misrecognition, such as Honneth’s typology or Renault’s institutional approach,218 with a 
fine-grained phenomenological picture of dimensions in misrecognition behaviors that 
offers greater explanatory power. The multidimensional view replaces Honneth’s binary 
view of misrecognition as the contrary to recognition without replacing Honneth’s 
conceptions of the value of recognition. The full implications of the phenomenological 
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approach offered here on the rest of Honneth’s oeuvre I will have to develop in the future. 
The multidimensional view illustrates how misrecognition can occur in multiple spheres of 
recognition—legal, economic, and personal—and across sphere boundaries. For example, 
rather than lump all physical humiliation and violence into one type of misrecognition as 
Honneth does, the new typology can better distinguish two types of physical abuse—
malicious acts that express personal reasons (starting a fight) and pathological recognitions 
that express social norms of behavior that justify physical degradation (violence against 
women and children).  
We can also use the multidimensional view to understand better the layers of 
comportment that structure misrecognition behaviors. For example, is an act of torture a 
product of a cultural environment that justifies torture of certain individuals? Or is it more 
accurate to see an act of torture as an individual lacking moral responsibility for another? 
Or is it some combination of both? Only by using a fine-grained analysis of the particular 
behavior and the comportments of the torturer can we fully understand it. Perhaps the 
torturer’s behavior can be explained simply by social forces or perhaps not. Only by means 
of a fine-grained approach that looks at the specific misrecognition behavior can we know. 
One criticism that can be raised to my description of analyzing an act of torture is that a full 
fine-grained phenomenological analysis of every single misrecognition behavior is 
impossible and that an extensive analysis of individuals and their behaviors would, in some 
instances, be more time-consuming than it would be worth in results. I acknowledge this, 
but I do not suggest that every misrecognition behavior be analyzed, only that we use the 
multidimensional view to examine exemplar cases that illuminate what may lead 
individuals to engage in misrecognition behaviors and how misrecognition is experienced 
by individuals. I think it is important to acknowledge that human behavior is complex and 
that a methodological approach must reflect that complexity. The dimensions of 
misrecognition are not binary either-ors but are present in varying degrees and with varying 
degrees of awareness within the individual engaging in the behavior. By looking at 
misrecognition through multiple dimensions, we can give individuals and their particular 
behaviors due consideration. 
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Analyzing misrecognition behaviors through the multidimensional view reveals that 
individuals encounter conflicts between recognition demands and that these conflicts must 
be resolved on the individual level. The structural recognition order alone cannot 
adequately explain what happens in recognition conflicts. There are two reasons for this. 
First, as Nancy Fraser has observed,219 the recognition order interacts with other modes of 
social order, and this interaction affects all aspects of interpersonal relations; thus, any 
interpersonal relationship is structured by social forces in addition to the recognition order. 
Second, personal relationships are varied, reflecting differences in the people involved and 
the circumstances in which they find themselves; thus, the recognition order is applied 
differently in different relationships and even within relationships when circumstances 
change. A binary view of recognition and misrecognition also cannot adequately explain 
recognition conflict. Perhaps some interpersonal situations can be easily delineated into a 
simple either-or decision whether to recognize another or not, but more likely, 
interpersonal situations are more complicated and so are the processes of finding the proper 
course of action. Within Honneth’s three spheres of recognition, we would have to try to 
understand recognition conflict in terms of a conflict between the spheres. For example, to 
understand why a man would or would not forbid his wife or daughter to work outside the 
home, we would have to postulate his conflict as being between his family sphere and the 
civil society sphere. This is not an unreasonable approach, and may describe some 
particular relationships, but a more fine-grained picture of recognition and misrecognition, 
which the multidimensional view provides, can yield deeper understanding.  
 We can delve deeper into this with the example of the fictional Tevye in Fiddler on 
the Roof. Tevye is a man deeply engaged with the norms—the tradition—of his culture. His 
personal struggle is between his engagement with his culture’s norms and his engagement 
with his daughters. For his oldest two daughters, Tzeitel and Hodel, he chooses to 
recognize their autonomy to decide whom to marry and blesses their marriages despite their 
behavior going against tradition. But for his daughter Chava, he withholds his recognition 
and his blessing of her choice of fiancé, choosing instead to engage with his culture’s 
tradition. For each daughter, his choices are deeply personal, reflecting his conflicting 
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engagement with his culture’s recognition norms, his engagement with his daughters, and 
his personal conscience. What, if any, misrecognition behavior Tevye is engaging in is a 
matter of interpretation. Was he misrecognizing Chava by not accepting her autonomous 
choice? But here he was following the recognition norms of his culture, so could we say 
that he was recognizing his culture’s tradition against mixed-faith marriage, which 
“should” take precedence over his young and inexperienced daughter’s autonomy? By that 
reasoning, was he actually misrecognizing Tzeitel and Hodel by not enforcing the wisdom 
of their culture against their personal choices? If we were to look at Tevye’s behavior only 
through Honneth’s typology of misrecognition, we would not be able easily to understand 
his actions or answer these questions about him. One could reply that the proper 
recognition norm for Tevye to follow is the autonomy of other individuals and that he was, 
therefore, correct to choose that recognition behavior with Tzeitel and Hodel and incorrect 
not to choose it with Chava. Although this answer sounds right to liberal minds, it creates a 
problem with the concept of social norms and the recognition order. If it is the institutions 
of culture that inform Tevye and other individuals about what qualities in others should be 
recognized, then why would they—indeed, how could they—choose to recognize another’s 
autonomy when the social institutions tell them not to recognize it? Only if we look at 
recognition and misrecognition beyond a recognition order maintained by social intuitions 
can we make sense of behaviors like Tevye’s. For Tevye and real-life individuals, 
recognition and misrecognition behaviors are intersubjective happenings in their daily lives 
in which they are involved. Misrecognition behaviors are informed and structured by, but 
not wholly determined by, social institutions and norms. 
The multidimensional view shows that misrecognition is not only a structure of 
social institutions but also an expression of individuals. Not all misrecognition can be 
blamed on institutional recognition norms because some forms of misrecognition stem 
from individuals’ disengagement from others. Whether quotidian forgetfulness or self-
absorbed disengagement, when our care about others and how our behaviors affect them is 
lacking, misrecognition and injustice are inevitable, and we cannot evade our personal 
responsibility, yet engagement with norms and with others is no guarantee of just behavior. 
Recognition and justice mean recognizing individuals as individuals who have personal 
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attributes and desires. Engagement requires listening to the testimony of others and valuing 
them and their experiences—seeing them as active agents, not objects. 
An example of the advantages of the multidimensional approach is the analysis of 
racism, which is usually thought of in terms of institutional racism, in which social 
institutions are structured to privilege one racial group over others. The power of 
institutional racism and its recognition norms based on racial preference is undeniable. 
Race is a cultural construct (as, of course, are gender and class), and cultures create social 
hierarchies and power relations between racial groups that are often unjust. All individuals 
are situated within these unjust power relations, living under a racially tagged group 
identity and social hierarchy. Racial group identities serve political and ideological 
functions by reducing individuals to a group-based identity. It is therefore sensible to focus, 
as philosophers have, on culturally constituted racial group identities situated within group 
power relations. As important and useful as is a macrosocial focus on interactions between 
racial groups, such a focus does not exhaustively explain the dynamics of racism. Also 
crucial to understanding racism is a view of how racial discrimination is perpetuated 
through individual misrecognition behaviors and the experiences of individuals both on the 
giving and receiving end of racist misrecognition behaviors. Methodologically, if we 
reduce our view of racism to group-on-group dynamics, then we run the risk of 
deindividualizing others similar to the way in which racism itself strips human beings of 
personal identity.  
The multidimensional view of misrecognition enhances our understanding of racism 
by providing a fine-grained view of racial discrimination as it is lived by individuals on 
both sides of racial oppression, which is particularly important when considering the post–
civil rights world. Critical race theorists argue that Western social institutions still function 
to maintain white privilege even though racial discrimination is outlawed. Charles Mills 
argues that despite advances in civil rights legislation, white supremacy has changed only 
from de jure to de facto.220 This change is described only partially by an analysis of social 
institutions. Mills is correct that the concept of race, though a social construct, is 
nevertheless real in that it materializes in social practices of its perpetrators and the “felt 
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phenomenologies” of its victims.221 Mills sees whites as being socialized into ethical codes 
of conduct that are structured by race. The pervasiveness of white supremacy, Mills argues, 
extends beyond the legal and political into the economic, cultural, cognitive, and bodily 
spheres of individuals’ lives, putting individuals into a certain relationship with social 
reality that almost metaphysically determines their being and consciousness.222 If there is 
merit to this conception of white supremacy, then an individual’s experience of social 
reality is highly racialized, but does that mean that one’s experience is determined wholly 
by the social structures of white supremacy? It is undeniable that the pathological 
recognition norms of racial stratification create an environment that encourages racism. If 
social norms specify racism as the proper structure for society, then does that mean that 
everyone in society is acting in a racist manner? Or is something beyond engagement with 
social norms going on in an individual’s racial misrecognition behavior? If so, and we need 
to find only one instance of an individual behaving without racism to prove it, then 
pathological norms are not determinative of racist behavior. A macrosocial view of 
structural racism will reveal only group-on-group dynamics, whereas the multidimensional 
view, incorporating a microsocial view, will show us both group and individual dynamics 
of racism.  
Despite the pressure of pathological norms that promote racism, we can also 
conceive of someone who is fully aware of the social norm of unequal power relations in 
his or her culture but chooses not to act on it. It would be incorrect to suggest that an 
individual could never disbelieve or act contrary to prevailing racist social norms, and we 
must ask what makes it possible for individuals to resist social pressures. An individual 
could believe that nonwhites are equal to whites and have a general comportment toward 
nonwhites of being open to them as individuals possessing moral agency and deserving of 
equal treatment, opening up the possibility for recognition. Recognition is specific to an 
individual, not to a race, and every individual retains the capability of recognizing another 
individual despite the power relations of his or her society. If racism is the reduction of an 
individual to a racial group identity, then the counterweight to the social norm of racial 
discrimination is engagement with another as an individual—to see him or her as 
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possessing his or her own distinct qualities and contributions. Engagement with another 
individual discloses him or her as a person in his or her own right beyond a mere member 
of a group.  
The multidimensional view of misrecognition can also reveal levels or varieties of 
misrecognition within racism. If we look at slavery, there is no question that the institution 
of slavery in any era is a structural injustice that misrecognizes groups and individuals. 
Within the structural misrecognition of slavery are complex interpersonal relations, 
collaborations, and rebellions that can be revealed with the multidimensional view of 
misrecognition. Anyone involved in a plantation that exploits the labor of slaves is 
undeniably actively and knowingly participating in the oppression of the slaves, 
misrecognizing their moral rights. Further to this though, we can ask how a particular white 
person working at the plantation is treating the slaves. One could be more cruel or less 
cruel to the slaves, and this would be a different level of misrecognition or recognition 
within the overarching injustice of slavery. Being a relatively kind master would not erase 
the injustice of slavery, but clearly a distinction must be made between levels of cruelty 
within the institution of slavery. It could be the case that a plantation foreman engages with 
individual slaves and believes they are human beings who should be treated well. Lacking 
the legal power to free the slaves, he tries to better their lives how he can. Also consider the 
example of a white person living in the American South during segregation. This person 
has engaged with individual African-Americans and does not agree with the laws and 
social norms that racially discriminate against African-Americans. The white individual 
lacks the power to change the laws and social attitudes of misrecognition against African-
Americans, but in personal dealings with African-Americans, this individual recognizes 
their moral agency, qualities, and needs. If this individual takes no political action to 
change the unjust laws and power relations of society, are we right to condemn this 
individual as perpetrating misrecognition? If we were to make such judgments only in 
terms of institutional actions, then we would have to condemn this inaction. However, not 
all action furthering justice is political action, and a simple act of recognizing another’s 
human dignity and according that individual kindness and respect is a move toward justice. 
It is through such individual engagements and actions that institutional injustices can be 
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fought, as I will describe in Part Two. Looking at individual interactions, we can uncover 
intersubjective engagements and recognitions within structural misrecognition. Within 
structures of misrecognition, recognition does not come effortlessly, but it can happen. In 
the other direction, we can identify some individuals who went beyond the prevailing 
norms of normative discrimination to greater action of misrecognition against nonwhites. 
Individuals in the Ku Klux Klan took misrecognition behavior beyond what the racist 
power structure society had set down; though oppression of African-Americans was a 
social norm, only a few individuals lynched African-Americans. The point of these 
examples is that within institutional racism are varieties of misrecognition behavior that are 
revealed by applying the multidimensional view to individual behaviors. The 
multidimensional view can be used similarly to explicate any of the other isms of any 
society. 
 
The preceding portrayal of the dimensions of misrecognition replaces Honneth’s 
typology as a better description of the diversity of individuals’ misrecognition behavior. 
The misrecognitions perpetrated by and experienced by individuals do not map onto 
Honneth’s typology of misrecognition that is essentially the contrary of his typology of 
recognition—a typology that is too narrowly construed to encompass the diversity of 
misrecognition behaviors. Rather than seeing misrecognition as simply a violation of 
recognition norms, the multidimensional view sees misrecognition as a complex response 
to everyday circumstances that involves engagements with various norms and with other 
individuals. A multidimensional view of misrecognition reflects the complexity and 
diversity of particular misrecognition behaviors. The multidimensional view illuminates 
that, though social institutions set the stage, misrecognition behaviors occur at the 
microsocial level of individual and small group interactions. Recognition is best viewed not 
in terms of spheres but in terms of a web of interpersonal relations. This realization adds 
complexity to our task of understanding misrecognition, but it gives our critical theory 
greater explanatory power.  
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Part Two: Rethinking struggles for recognition 
 
All the reflections I have so far presented converge in the thesis that  
the multifarious efforts of a struggle for recognition are what  
will enable critical theory to justify its normative claims. 
- Axel Honneth223 
 
2.1 - The importance of struggles for recognition 
Part One’s discussion on improving Honneth’s inadequate account of misrecognition 
is a precursor to a discussion of the possible responses to misrecognition—struggles for 
recognition. Honneth calls for the struggle for recognition to be “the guiding thread of a 
critical theory” and sees struggles for recognition as setting the pace of historical 
transformations because they are responsible for development and historical progress.224 I 
will reconstruct Honneth’s motives for going beyond the first and second generations of 
critical theorists, despite his sharing their aims. Then, I will outline my concerns about 
Honneth’s theories on struggles for recognition while agreeing with him about the 
importance of struggles for recognition in critical theory. 
Honneth resolves to move away from what he sees as an overemphasis within social 
theory, going back to Machiavelli, on the social struggles for self-preservation and material 
resources. Honneth sees that social struggles over resources or political power are at their 
heart struggles based on the moral concern that a society’s norms are not reflected in actual 
social relations. His emphasis within social theory is that social struggles are about the 
establishment of relations of mutual recognition—struggles that arise when normative 
expectations have been violated. By struggles for recognition, Honneth does not mean 
struggles for honor as Hobbes and Machiavelli theorized, but the struggles for the 
normative approval of others that Honneth considers to be the precondition for personal 
identity formation and human flourishing.  
Honneth sees his project as continuing the tradition of critical theory, and he adopts 
critical theory’s idea that historically effective rationality has been distorted, that the cause 
of the negative state of society is capitalism’s deficit in social rationality, and that the 
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pathology of capitalism can be overcome only through a process of enlightenment among 
those involved. Honneth’s reasons for adding recognition and struggles for recognition to 
critical theory can be seen in his critique of earlier critical theorists. Horkheimer stated that 
the goal of critical theory “is to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave 
them.”225 Critical theory’s aims have been to seek what will transform structures of social 
domination and bring about social emancipation from injustice. That includes explaining 
what motivates social protest movements and what is lacking when protest against 
injustices does not happen. However, Honneth criticizes the founders of the Frankfurt 
School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Honneth states: 
Horkheimer's early writings remained trapped within a Marxist philosophy 
of history that could tolerate a pre-theoretical interest in social 
emancipation only in one class, the proletariat. Early on, Adorno had 
founded the point of departure for his critique of society so decisively on 
Marx's critique of fetishism that he could no longer find any trace of an 
intramundane transcendence in the culture of everyday life.226 
On Adorno’s later work, Honneth is even harsher, saying that:  
critical theory's turn to Adorno's historico-philosophical negativism finally 
marked the historical point at which the endeavor to link critique back to 
social history failed completely.227 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s “one-sided and exaggerated” analysis of historical development 
only managed to replace nature with the large-scale purposive-rational organization of 
totalitarian systems.228 They saw totalitarianism as the culmination of a pathological 
process of rationalization—the pathological process of civilization. Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s approach  
excludes any factors that do not stand in a more or less direct relation to the 
process of technical rationalization in the historical process in which 
totalitarianism emerges. Thus as much as Horkheimer and Adorno take 
account of developments such as the mass media, and as much as they take 
pains to account for psychic dispositions, their analysis of these events is 
always limited to discovering only further forms of a totalitarian form of 
reason.229  
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There is, Honneth argues, little or no room in such a historical view to identify, much less 
solve, social misdevelopments that disrupt communication and reason. Theory that is too 
far removed from everyday experience and practice is not useful. Similarly, Honneth 
criticizes Foucault for conceiving of social change at the level of systems, presenting a one-
dimensional society in which social domination comes from a systematic disciplinary 
regime. This negative and totalizing theory, Honneth argues, leaves no room for the 
identities of social groups and their social struggles outside the institutionalization of 
disciplinary power.230 
Honneth is more accepting of Jürgen Habermas’s project, which located the 
instrumental activity that is suppressed by social pathologies of communicative activity. 
Linguistic rules govern communication and serve as a normative structure that defines what 
humans need to understand each other and be socially successful. When communicative 
activity is suppressed by domination, it impedes humans from applying those linguistic 
rules to understanding each other. The communicative paradigm has the potential to 
illuminate the effects of social pathology and the emancipation from it; however, Honneth 
sees the paradigm’s claim to universalizability as abstracted away from social reality and 
the willingness of subjects to adopt the goals of communicative rationalization. For this 
reason, Habermas’s theory creates a gap between normativity and the pretheoretical 
resources that can anchor critique in everyday intersubjective relations. Therefore, Honneth 
says, “The emancipatory process in which Habermas socially anchors the normative 
perspective of his Critical Theory in no way appears as an emancipatory process in the 
moral experiences of the subjects involved.”231 Honneth accepts the intersubjective, 
sociological presuppositions of Habermas’s theory but finds its linguistic, theoretic 
framework too limited to the structures of symmetry and reciprocity in language. 
Honneth extends Habermas’s communication paradigm beyond the structures of 
language into the structures of everyday intersubjective relations. Honneth calls for a 
realistic concept of emancipatory interest not in terms of linguistic conditions but centered 
on the idea of a core rational responsiveness from subjects to defects in social rationality.232 
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The expansion of morality depends on the struggles by subjects to have their identity 
claims recognized within everyday relations of mutual recognition.233 Honneth says that 
resistance to social injustice is not motivated by positively formulated moral principles but 
by subjects’ experiences of having their intuitive notions of justice violated.234 To reflect 
the moral experiences present in social life, he moves the focus of his inquiry from 
theoretic rationality to the moral experiences of subjects to uncover the normative 
perspective in which the emancipatory process appears. Honneth advances an 
intersubjective paradigm in terms of a theory of reciprocal recognition rather than a theory 
of communicative understanding, believing “that social recognition constitutes the 
normative expectations connected with our entering into communicative relationships.”235 
Feelings of injustice in response to misrecognition are “pre-theoretical facts,” meaning that 
a critique of relations of recognition identifies its own theoretical perspective in social 
reality.236 Honneth believes that through an intersubjective paradigm framed not as a 
conception of rational understanding, but as a conception of the conditions of recognition, 
we can indicate the degree of harm to the normative presuppositions of personal interaction 
that is directly reflected in the moral feelings of those involved. 
A theme in Hegel’s thought is the struggle of the individual toward joining with the 
social order, and Honneth adopts Hegel’s idea that recognition brings about an increase in 
social integration. Honneth agrees with Hegel that there must be some kind of basic mutual 
affirmation between subjects for any form of social cohesion to come into existence.237 
Honneth follows Hegel in seeing the striving of subjects for recognition as a productive 
force for social change and the development of legal relations. These relations, Honneth 
believes, are won through social struggles driven by moral indignation over rejection of 
claims to recognition. Honneth thus sees struggles for recognition as morally motivated 
conflicts over the expansion of recognition relations, which can become a structuring force 
in the moral development of society.238 
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Honneth believes that social theory needs to start from the concept that every 
collective act of social resistance against injustice can be traced to a set of moral 
experiences that can be interpreted in terms of recognition and misrecognition rather than 
pregiven interests.239 Rather than seeing social movements against injustice as conflicts of 
interests, high-minded ideals, or class struggle, Honneth says that “the collective interest 
behind a conflict [can be seen as being] constituted within a horizon of moral experience 
that admits of normative claims to recognition and respect.”240 Human actions cannot be 
reduced to the purposive, rational pursuit of material interests. Instead, the moral feelings 
of having been treated unjustly can lead to collective actions. Because that struggle is 
universal, it can motivate social action whenever the desire for recognition is thwarted.241 
The feelings of hurt and violation are reactions to what subjects consider to be the morally 
indefensible, which includes struggles over the just distribution material goods. It is 
difficult to state how many struggles for material goods are in actuality struggles for 
recognition, but it would be incorrect to leave out the importance of recognition relations in 
the discussion of maldistribution and the resistance to it. For critical theory, Honneth’s 
conception moves social conflict and development beyond conflict over material resources 
into struggles for morally justified social relations and structures, though he collapses 
struggles for recognition into political struggles. Honneth believes that academic theories 
have rarely considered the collective feelings of being misrecognized and, thus, have not 
understood social structures of domination as pathologies of recognition relations.242  
For Honneth, struggles over distribution are, in essence, struggles over recognition, 
aimed at changing the cultural interpretations of whose contributions are valued. Thus, 
Honneth is concerned about the “lasting inequality in the distribution of chances for social 
recognition.”243 Nancy Fraser, with some merit, accuses Honneth of viewing all social 
processes, including subordination, through the single lens of interpersonal recognition 
relations, reducing society to a recognition order that illegitimately totalizes society and 
social processes into a single mode of integration. Fraser acknowledges that some struggles 
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do challenge the prevailing cultural interpretations of the value of contributions 
(recognition) but says that Honneth’s focus on recognition misses the operation of 
impersonal system mechanisms unconnected to normative ideas of who is valued. Fraser 
calls for seeing struggles for recognition as struggles for egalitarian redistribution.244  
Honneth believes that Fraser has been unfair to his position245 and insists on the 
importance of critical theory considering that social reality is guided by normative criteria 
that give rise to moral experiences, moral injuries, and moral claims to justice. Honneth’s 
rejoinder to Fraser makes several valid points. It makes sense that resistance to injustice is 
an emotional reaction, not just a rational one. It also makes sense that unjust distribution 
occurs within processes laden with normative significance. Honneth rightly points out that 
Fraser’s concept of participatory parity is a particular idea of the good that, like 
recognition, seeks to increase individual autonomy246 and that arguably can be seen as a 
struggle for recognition. It is also the case that, if systemic distribution injustices are to be 
solved long term, the cultural norms and application of those norms must be transformed. 
Forcible material remedies for an unjust distribution of goods are unsatisfactory measures 
compared with a cultural paradigm that values fairness in distribution. Even if we were to 
say that an issue of injustice was solely a matter of material distribution, the struggle 
against it still requires the consideration of recognition. This is because Honneth is correct 
that social integration requires mutual recognition; in other words, others are not integrated 
if they are not first recognized as worthy of integration. Honneth’s view of recognition is 
overly simplistic at times, and Fraser is correct that Honneth reduces society to a 
recognition order, but his insight that people fight for recognition is an important addition 
to critical theory. 
Honneth correctly emphasizes the importance of struggles for recognition in social 
life and social change. I do not disagree at all with the importance of struggles for 
recognition. My contention, though, is that similar to Honneth’s incomplete account of 
misrecognition, his account of struggles for recognition is also incomplete and needs to be 
amended. Honneth’s account bases struggles for recognition on the moral experiences of 
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individuals whose identity claims have been denied, and he states that they are further 
motivated by collective social movements of political resistance. However, his account 
remains functionalist and does not fully capture the experiences and actions of individuals, 
and his account thus falls short of the goals he sets out for critical theory. Given the 
theoretical importance he places on struggles for recognition, a clear and robust account of 
struggles for recognition is very important, and this includes the questions of what brings 
an individual to engage actively in a struggle for recognition and what actions he or she 
takes. 
Honneth’s narrative of what motivates struggles for recognition can be summarized 
as follows. Subjects are socialized into their society’s recognition norms, which subjects 
internalize and thereby develop normative expectations about how they should be treated. 
If these normative expectations are disappointed, subjects’ relations-to-self are injured, and 
subjects feel the hurt of these moral injuries in a way similar to that of physical injuries, 
and subjects realize they are being illegitimately denied recognition. We could react with 
hurt, shame, or rage as a result of our normative expectations being disregarded. Anger is 
an informed response to the dissonance between the current situation and how we have 
learned things “should” be, and feelings of injustice are experiences of disappointments of 
well-founded claims of recognition. When we see others receiving rights that are denied to 
us, our resentment is a response informed by our having learned to believe we also deserve 
to receive those rights. In these emotional experiences, Honneth says, we come to realize 
that we depend on the recognition of others, and this motivates us to claim that 
recognition.247 The hurt feelings of anger and resentment in response to experiences of 
misrecognition can motivate an individual to struggle against those perceived to be the 
source of the misrecognition.  
Struggles for recognition are motivated not by just any emotional hurt but by those 
moral injuries that damage an individual’s sense of well-being that is developed through 
recognition and socialization. Subjects learn to have normative expectations of social 
recognition that positively regard their well-being. When those expectations are 
disappointed, Honneth says, we experience a moral crisis. Misrecognition strikes at our 
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sense of self; it devalues us and brings with it a loss of personal self-esteem and self-
confidence, resulting in the suffering of distortions of our sense of identity. Maintaining 
our positive relations–to-self depends on receiving recognition of the same from other 
subjects. When our positive self-relation is disregarded by others, we are injured by the 
misrecognition.248 Subjects engage in confrontation with others not purely over self-
preservation but because they believe their identity claims are being insufficiently 
recognized. Such confrontations are ethical moments within a collective social life that 
challenge an individual to defend his or her positive relations-to-self. The purpose of a 
struggle for recognition is to repair the damage done to one’s positive relations-to-self by 
moral injuries, and Honneth believes this damage can be repaired only by recognition. 
Struggles for recognition, then, seek to either restore previous recognition relations or find 
new recognition relations that will soothe the hurt feelings and establish positive ones.  
Hurt feelings from misrecognition make sense as a necessary prerequisite for 
struggles for recognition. Perhaps one could be aware of being treated unjustly without 
being affected by it, but it makes sense that one is motivated to struggle for recognition 
only if one is aware that one is not receiving recognition. But Honneth stresses that subjects 
will not know they are being treated unjustly unless they have some knowledge of a moral 
norm that is being violated in their case and that subjects will not be able to articulate their 
feelings of being misrecognized unless they have access to a moral language by which they 
can express their feelings.249 This narrative is plausible within Honneth’s theory of 
recognition. The socialization process leads us to have normative expectations of our 
community and others. The social norms of our community give us reason to believe that 
others will be and should be willing to respect us and treat us justly, and these social norms 
provide us with the moral language by which to interpret our feelings in response to how 
we are treated. This characterization of Honneth answers Bader’s criticism that feelings of 
being exploited, oppressed, excluded, or marginalized do not have to be linked to 
misrecognition to have motivational force.250 Bader’s criticism is based on his association 
of misrecognition with prestige hierarchies of social esteem, and he counters that the 
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exploitation of being forced to deliver surplus labor would not be interpreted by workers as 
misrecognition. I say, to the contrary, that workers’ awareness of their exploitation comes 
from the violation of their normative expectations that they should be treated justly, so their 
feelings of being exploited come from an awareness that moral norms have been violated in 
their case and that they are not being recognized. The workers may then feel motivated to 
struggle for the recognition that they should not be exploited. Exploitation, oppression, 
exclusion, and marginalization are misrecognition whether or not one’s self-esteem is 
damaged.  
 
As compelling as is Honneth’s story behind struggles for recognition, it is not 
without problems and inconsistencies. A significant problem in Honneth’s account of 
struggles for recognition is a lack of clarity about how an individual moves from a 
damaged relation-to-self to engaging in a struggle for recognition. Honneth seems content 
to state that the negative emotional reactions to misrecognition and humiliation constitute 
the psychological basis for realizing one is being misrecognized and that these moral 
experiences are the motivation for struggles for recognition.251 Honneth does not assume 
that every experience of misrecognition leads to a struggle for recognition, but his account 
is not fine grained as to the phenomena of struggles for recognition.  
Also problematic is the link Honneth makes between the moral crisis of experiencing 
misrecognition and political resistance. Honneth attempts to show how social struggles can 
be explained on the basis of the dynamics of subjects’ moral experiences.252 Basing social 
movements of political resistance on individuals’ moral experiences is good, but in the 
tradition of critical theory, he focuses on macrosocial movements, and in so doing he 
leaves out a large area of phenomena of struggles for recognition. I agree with Honneth’s 
contention that there is a connection between moral injuries and political resistance 
movements but think that this important insight is underdeveloped. Honneth does not 
preclude the possibility of an individual struggling for recognition outside of political 
resistance by a social movement, but he says very little about this possibility. Also 
problematic is Honneth’s apparent position that an individual will not be motivated to 
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political resistance without a preexisting social movement. This position calls into question 
how a social movement can begin if individuals engage in acts of political resistance only 
when they are motivated to do so by an existing social movement. 
Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition is incomplete. Left inadequately 
answered are two central questions. The first is this: How does one move from the 
realization that one is misrecognized to a motivation to struggle for recognition? The 
second is this: How do individuals express their motivation to struggle for recognition? To 
the first question, I argue that Honneth is missing something crucial from his account. I 
explore this in what I call the “agency problem,” which investigates the question of why 
not all individuals who experience misrecognition attempt to struggle for recognition. I 
argue that something more than the presence of hurt feelings is needed to explain 
individuals’ undertaking struggles for recognition—also needed is a sense of individual 
agency that an individual draws on to move beyond moral injuries into struggles for 
recognition. This sense of agency in the context of struggles for recognition informs my 
analysis of the second question, the discussion of which I term Honneth’s “political 
movements problem,” in which I will address several related issues regarding the weak 
connection Honneth makes between individuals and political movements. I will discuss 
each “problem” in turn and then show the relation of these two problems and how an 
account of struggles for recognition can be expanded to give it greater explanatory power 
of individuals’ experiences.  
2.2 - Honneth’s agency problem 
Honneth places considerable importance on understanding struggles for recognition, 
seeing them as “the guiding thread of a critical theory.”253 I agree with the importance of 
those struggles and agree with much of Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition. My 
contention, though, is that there is a dilemma in Honneth’s account of what motivates 
struggles for recognition. According to Honneth, to act autonomously, an individual first 
needs to receive recognition; however, he does not adequately explain how individuals can 
undertake a struggle for recognition without autonomy. I argue that to resolve Honneth’s 
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dilemma, we need to, in addition to hurt feelings from misrecognition, include some form 
of agency in the individual who, lacking the recognition necessary to be autonomous, and 
being damaged by misrecognition, nevertheless has some capacity actively to seek 
recognition. 
Honneth says that the negative emotional reactions to being misrecognized are the 
necessary psychological link to move an individual from mere suffering to action.254 
Honneth says that being treated unjustly hurts our sense of self; it devalues us and brings 
with it a loss of personal self-esteem and self-confidence. This triggers a moral crisis—we 
feel humiliation and shame, and in these emotions we realize that our sense of identity 
depends on the recognition of others. These hurt feelings motivate us to struggle for 
recognition to dispel this emotional tension and repair the damage done to our positive 
relations-to-self, which Honneth believes can be repaired only by recognition.255 Struggles 
for recognition then seek either to restore previous recognition relations or to find new 
recognition relations that will soothe the hurt feelings and establish positive ones.  
It makes sense that one is motivated to struggle for recognition only if one feels one 
has been hurt by not receiving recognition. However, tying struggles for recognition to hurt 
feelings is not unproblematic. Fraser256 criticizes Honneth’s account of misrecognition as 
vague and problematic in its reliance on internal psychological effects and states. Fraser 
proposes instead a theory based on classifying recognition as institutionalized patterns of 
status equality and classifying misrecognition as institutionalized patterns of status 
subordination. Fraser makes it clear that she sees misrecognition as relayed only through 
social institutions, not through deprecatory or freestanding discourse between individuals. 
Fraser categorizes misrecognition as institutionalized status subordination, believing we 
need to locate the wrong of injustice in social relations rather than in individual or 
interpersonal psychology, thus, she believes, escaping the problems of Honneth’s 
psychological model for explaining struggles for recognition. Fraser’s focus on institutions 
rather than individual emotions is valuable in adjudicating between genuine and false 
grievances, and it helps strengthen Honneth’s weakness on this point. But our ability to 
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judge that a social group has a legitimate claim of misrecognition does not help us answer 
what motivates a struggle for recognition. On this question, Honneth’s model of an 
emotional response to experiences of misrecognition may hold some promise. Fraser’s 
position is that injustices “impede parity of participation in social life,”257 claiming that 
injustices are not best interpreted as violations of personal identity.258 But Honneth does 
have a point. How can an injustice not threaten an individual’s personal identity? We can 
talk about degree of effect, but the threat and the effects on identity are real. 
Fraser says that her view of recognition and misrecognition is a matter of justice and 
that Honneth views them as a matter of self-realization. Fraser is correct to warn against 
grounding a normative framework on one privileged set of experiences, but her implication 
that this is what Honneth is doing is unfair. Fraser’s critique is that Honneth grounds his 
recognition theory in a moral psychology in which prepolitical suffering caused by denial 
of recognition is the single motivation underlying discontent.259 True, as Fraser says, 
motives underlying personal discontent come from a wide range of resentments, aversions, 
and antipathies other than suffering from one’s expectation that one’s personal identity be 
recognized; but Honneth is not saying that all discontent comes from a denial of personal 
identity. His position is that the motivation for discontent stems from, ironically, what 
Fraser suggests—the expectation that one be treated fairly. Understanding that Honneth’s 
idea of recognition is linked to our broad normative expectations of how we are treated 
rather than expectations of a specific personal identity dissolves Fraser’s objection.  
Fraser’s theory may be helpful in cases of unjust distribution of objective resources, 
but Honneth is correct that struggles for recognition are not only about addressing 
redistribution but also about experiences of misrecognition within social relations. The 
latter cases are better analyzed with models of conflict that start from the moral feelings 
over unmet normative expectations.260 As Zurn says, Honneth’s recognition theory has 
important advantages in that it provides a clear account of the motivational wellsprings 
behind struggles in which individuals sacrifice their personal interests to promote the 
general welfare beyond the abstract demands of morality. Individuals engage in these risky 
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struggles because there is an internal connection between social structures of moral regard 
and individuals’ practical sense-of-self.261 Connecting the moral feelings of violation with 
the need for personal integrity is, Zurn says, how recognition theory overcomes the 
problems of theoretical idealism and the impotence of abstract oughts. Although Fraser has 
valid concerns about the incompleteness of Honneth’s accounts of self-esteem and identity 
formation, Honneth’s point is still valid that the motives for social resistance against 
injustice are formed in the context of individuals’ moral experiences.262 
But if, as I do, we adopt Honneth’s idea that hurt feelings help motivate an individual 
to struggle for recognition, there are still problems. Honneth’s descriptions of hurt feelings 
from misrecognition reveal a dilemma for his theory. He lists three forms of 
misrecognition. One is when individuals are physically abused, such as rape or torture.263 
These individuals are deprived of autonomous control of their own bodies or personal 
space. Another form of misrecognition, typified by social ostracism and denial of legal 
rights, injures subjects’ self-respect, and they lose their ability to relate to themselves as an 
equal interaction partner with other individuals.264 A further form, degradation, robs 
subjects of opportunities to attribute social value to their abilities.265 For Honneth, 
individuals suffering from any of these forms of misrecognition are diminished in their 
capacity to act in ways that would allow them to realize their own needs and are diminished 
in their ability to interact with others. Honneth identifies the loss in individuals who have 
been deprived of autonomous control of their own body or personal space as the loss of 
confidence in themselves and the world.266 These individuals, he says, are severely 
diminished in their capacity to act in ways that would allow them to realize their own 
personality and in their ability to interact with their fellow humans as equals because the 
experience of misrecognition has injured their self-respect.267 These individuals have, by 
Honneth’s definition, impaired autonomy. Honneth’s argument assumes that individuals 
have a personal sense of self that can be suppressed by being abused. Honneth then 
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interestingly says that “the negative emotional reactions accompanying the experience of 
misrecognition could represent precisely the affective motivational basis in which the 
struggled-for recognition is anchored.”268 These are the hurt feelings that Honneth sees as 
the motivations for struggles for recognition. 
This leaves Honneth with the dilemma in which an individual, being damaged by 
misrecognition and lacking the recognition he says is necessary for one to be autonomous, 
nevertheless has some capacity to struggle for recognition. Honneth’s position is clear that 
individual autonomy comes only from recognition; he states that “social recognition 
represents the necessary condition for subjects being able to identify with their valuable 
qualities and, accordingly, develop genuine autonomy.”269 Autonomy requires the 
extension of individual possibilities through social cooperation, and individuals need to 
experience recognition from their social world if they are to develop a feeling of social 
inclusion and autonomy. An individual, Honneth argues, cannot fully develop his or her 
autonomy merely through possession of economic goods270 but also must receive three 
modes of recognition—love, legal rights, and esteem—from society to develop individual 
autonomy. If misrecognition damages one’s relations-to-self, as Honneth holds, and the 
recognition necessary for autonomy is lacking, how can one respond to misrecognition 
with a struggle for recognition? 
The other part of the dilemma is why it is that not all individuals who suffer hurt 
feelings from misrecognition are motivated to undertake struggles for recognition. As 
Honneth states, “The experience of being [misrecognized] can become the motivational 
impetus for a struggle for recognition,” but, as he also admits, this only can happen but 
does not have to happen.271 The question is, how does one move from the realization that 
one is misrecognized to a motivation to struggle for recognition? Honneth answers that it is 
necessary for the individual to have access to an existing social movement in his or her 
cultural-political environment through which that individual can articulate moral-political 
feeling.272 What exactly qualifies as a “social movement” Honneth does not entirely 
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specify, but he consistently links it to collective acts of political resistance.273 Certainly, an 
existing social movement engaged in political resistance against misrecognition would 
assist misrecognized individuals in understanding their hurt feelings and would give them 
an outlet for their need for recognition. That the addition of a social movement does not 
solve the dilemma is evidenced by the fact that not all misrecognized individuals who have 
access to an existing social movement of political resistance actually engage in a struggle 
for recognition. The addition of a social movement transfers the dilemma to the question of 
why and how an individual would accept the movement’s relevance to his or her life and 
join it in acts of political resistance. A social movement can provide an interpretive 
structure by which individuals can interpret their experiences of misrecognition, and it can 
encourage an individual to struggle for recognition; however, it cannot make the individual 
accept the notion of a struggle or decide for the individual whether to engage actively in a 
struggle. The dilemma remains even if we remove Honneth’s requirement of a social 
movement and adopt the plausible idea that individuals have access to a more generic 
normative surplus within recognition that depicts the way in which norms extend beyond 
the individuals to whom they are applied. That individuals have access to something does 
not mean that they will partake of it. Also, a social movement cannot be a necessary 
condition for struggles for recognition because we need to account for the coming into 
existence of any social movement that struggles for recognition. What motivates 
individuals to start movements of political resistance? Plus, why does Honneth assume that 
individuals’ hurt feelings from misrecognition can be articulated only within a social 
movement of political resistance? Those questions I will address in chapters 2.3 and 2.4 in 
which I discuss what forms struggles for recognition may take. First, there is still the issue 
of how an individual damaged by misrecognition could undertake a struggle for 
recognition.  
What is at work when an individual moves from hurt feelings to a struggle for 
recognition? For individuals damaged by misrecognition to undertake a struggle for 
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recognition, something must enable them to activate their potential to struggle. Does that 
something reside within the individual, the social environment, or both? Honneth and 
others would say that his account does not preclude individual actions, and this is true, but 
the issue is not a preclusion of individual agency; the issue is an underestimation of its 
importance for a theory of recognition. I agree with McBride that: “It would be a mistake to 
allow ourselves to be diverted from the deeper connection between individual agency and 
social recognition.”274 Discussion of misrecognition and struggles for recognition are 
incomplete without incorporating individual agency. The individual must be able to 
respond to misrecognition if he or she is to be able to undertake a struggle for recognition. 
Even if struggles are not possible without an existing social movement, the individual must 
be able to respond to the movement. Similarly, the positive effects of recognition are 
possible only if an individual is capable of responding to affirmation positively. Again, 
nothing in Honneth precludes individual agency, but he does not include it sufficiently. 
Honneth’s philosophy of recognition circles the concept of individual agency, but he does 
not engage it. His reluctance seems to stem from his oft-stated opposition to standard 
liberal accounts of human autonomy that he finds overly individualistic. Honneth feels a 
need to set his philosophy of recognition against the modern liberal notion of the isolated 
individual. If, instead, we take it as given that the old paradigm of the isolated subject is 
invalid, then we are freed to pursue expansion of recognition theory. I am content to stop 
beating the dead horse of the Cartesian subject and take as a given that individuals are 
embedded in a social world that affects all of their thoughts and actions.  
A theory of struggles for recognition needs to include that individuals have the 
potential to respond to their environment for their own sake, and such an account needs to 
be compatible with the need for individuals to receive recognition to be autonomous. What 
is needed is a view of struggles for recognition that includes an individual’s capacity to 
respond to both the negative and positive aspects of the social environment with a struggle 
for recognition. Having such a view only points to the possibility for an individual to 
respond to an unfavorable environment and still does not indicate that an individual 
actually would respond with a struggle for recognition. I am seeking, here, something akin 
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to what Bader refers to as a “general, minimalist capability of making experiences, of 
judgment, and agency without which human beings would be cultural dupes and not agents 
in any meaningful sense able to feel unjustly treated and complain/act against all different 
kinds of injustice.”275 It cannot be assumed in every case that a victim of misrecognition 
can draw on a previously achieved autonomy he or she received from recognition. 
Something is needed beyond hurt feelings to motivate an individual to struggle for 
recognition. The beginning of an answer can be found in Honneth’s own words, and I will 
endeavor to encapsulate those ideas in a way that Honneth does not. 
Honneth adopts the response model of recognition,276 which states that recognition 
responds to and brings forward potentials already possessed by individuals and that 
receiving recognition helps individuals develop their autonomous self-determination. 
Recognition, Honneth says, brings individuals into the social lifeworld, the normative 
recognition order that he calls a “second nature” into which individuals are socialized.277 
For the response model to work, though, there must be an inner personal component that is 
that to which recognition is responding and is that from which individuals respond to 
recognition. There must be something within an individual on which recognition can gain 
traction to assist that individual toward positive relations-to-self and autonomy, and it is 
from this inner something that an individual can respond to negative misrecognition with a 
positive struggle for recognition. 
Recognizing someone requires an action from the recognizer. Honneth describes it as 
“the expression of a freestanding intention,”278 and the individual’s conscious intentions are 
what drive the dynamic relations of recognition attitudes and actions. This formulation fits 
with Honneth’s agreement with Laitinen279 about the need to locate recognition in the 
individual’s space of reasons, in which recognition is motivated by moral reasons and 
evaluates another individual’s value.280 However, if we place the necessary conditions for 
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individuals to identify what is morally valuable exclusively within the norms of culture, we 
run into two problems; one Honneth addresses, but the other he does not. Fortunately, his 
answer to the first problem can also be used to address the second. The first problem is 
that, as Honneth is aware, placing the learning of moral norms within a social lifeworld 
means that the certitudes of the social norms are not immutable but can change over time. 
To counter the danger of relativism, he postulates a conception of historical progress 
wherein human values expand—we recognize new valuable properties that we perceive 
people as having. This developmental path, Honneth believes, allows for justified 
judgments regarding the transhistorical validity of a specific culture of recognition, solving 
the problem of relativism.281 Progress in social acts of recognition, Honneth believes, is 
indicated by increases in “individuality and social inclusion.”282 The social lifeworld can be 
understood as the emergence in the ongoing course of history of a “second nature” in which 
we are socialized and oriented into a changing space of reasons that allows us to evaluate 
changes in normative values over time. For example, Honneth sees capitalism as an 
improvement over estate-based social order in increasing the possibilities of individuation 
and recognition, without suggesting that capitalism is a perfect system.283 This notion of 
progress in the social lifeworld’s second nature, Honneth believes, answers the charge of 
value relativism. In our socialization into a normatively progressive second nature, we 
learn to recognize valuable qualities in others, the normative level of our recognition 
relations rises, and our opportunities for identifying our own abilities and autonomy 
grow.284  
This notion of a second nature helps solve, in part, what I see as the second problem 
that arises from Honneth placing what is morally valuable exclusively within the norms of 
culture, which links with the dilemma I identified earlier. This problem is that it is true that 
individuals cannot judge anything about themselves as a valuable quality unless they learn 
from their society what is considered valuable, but if we say that social content completely 
determines what and how people make judgments, then we may render the individual 
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incapable of possessing self-respect, self-realization, or autonomy. To maintain a concept 
of an individual’s general, minimalist capability of making experiences and judgments, we 
should look more closely at this notion of a second nature—a social lifeworld that 
gradually socializes individuals into normative values. Honneth states that this socialization 
embeds individuals in a network of social relations in which they recognize other people as 
“both autonomous and individuated, equal and particular persons.”285 However, such 
mutual recognition is not a given within a society but must be manifested by individuals 
through their purposefully intended attitudes and actions. The notion of a socialization into 
a second nature implies the existence of something within individuals that enables them to 
learn from society and orient themselves in the second nature’s space of reasons. Nothing 
is learned by an individual from the social lifeworld without the individual’s involvement. 
Individuals perhaps almost cannot help but conform to what is being imposed on them by 
the normative recognition order of the second nature, but even enculturation requires 
reciprocation from an individual’s own capabilities and choices. As McNay says, the 
individual’s self-realization is one of “inherence and mutual determination rather than a 
unidirectional causality” of society on the individual.286 
The idea of socialization into a second nature is more useful as an explanation for 
misrecognition and struggles for recognition than as an answer to relativism. Individuals 
are socialized to recognize valuable traits and contributions in themselves and others, but 
because of normative discrimination, an individual may not see him- or herself as having 
those properties. It becomes second nature for these individuals, and for others, not to see 
them as valuable. What critical theory needs to solve is the question of how the victim, 
despite being socialized into a negatively discriminatory second nature, is able somehow to 
make the connection that positive norms nevertheless should apply to him or her. Honneth 
is unclear about how we can get anyone to see that the victims of normative discrimination 
victims have valuable traits and contributions. There must be some capability for 
individuals to make the effort to overcome socialization and recognize the people whom 
society teaches them not to recognize. To make sense of struggles for recognition, we need 
to include a personal component that enables some people to respond to misrecognition 
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with a positive struggle for recognition. We need not immediately explain why some 
individuals respond to misrecognition with a struggle for recognition while others do not. 
First we need to show how such struggle is even possible if recognition is needed to act 
autonomously. I think this missing link is something similar to autonomy—individual 
agency. The concept of individual agency I am discussing here is only in the context of the 
current discussion of recognition theory, bearing in mind that the concept can have various 
uses and mean various things. For my purposes here, I am attempting to establish a concept 
of individual agency that strengthens an overall theory of recognition and struggles for 
recognition.  
Honneth considers autonomy but not individual agency. Yes, to achieve autonomy 
and self-realization, certain conditions external to the individual are prerequisite. 
Individuals need protections from injurious forces such as physical violence, but that 
protection is necessary because there is something internal to the individual that must be 
protected from these external forces. Honneth acknowledges that autonomy is 
intersubjective but neglects to include the individual’s contribution adequately. Honneth is 
correct that “the freedom associated with self-realization is dependent on prerequisites that 
human subjects do not have at their disposal, since they can only acquire this freedom with 
the help of their interaction partners”287; but this is only half of the story. Freedom also has 
the prerequisite that individuals possess agency and choose to use it. The power that 
recognition has is to assist an individual to achieve autonomy by directly recognizing that 
individual as a being possessing individual agency—a recognition that fits within the 
response model. It is not autonomy that we are recognizing, but the internal agency of an 
individual. To recognize an individual, we must acknowledge him or her as a person 
possessing individual agency and thereby being capable of autonomy and self-realization. 
Recognition of a person’s individual agency is part of the social recognition that enables a 
person to realize positive self-affirmation of his or her positive qualities. Therefore, 
recognition theory benefits from a greater emphasis on acknowledging individuals’ 
inherent capabilities to strive for recognition and autonomy.  
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I agree with Honneth that “we attribute to every human being an interest in being 
able to freely determine and realize his own desires and intentions.”288 I believe he fails to 
explicate adequately what this entails—the reality that humans are beings who make 
choices and act on those choices. He also speaks of “basic self-confidence [that] represents 
the basic prerequisite for every type of self-realization in the sense that it allows individuals 
to attain, for the first time, the inner freedom that enables them to articulate their own 
needs.”289 Such a statement is made sensible when paired with a concept of individual 
agency. To say that there is something within the individual that responds to recognition, 
and to which recognition is responding, is not falling back into an individualistic bias, nor 
does it preclude a social approach to human autonomy. Any view of individual agency that 
makes sense must include that the individual is embedded in a social world and that to 
navigate successfully in the social world, the individual needs to engage in mutual 
recognition with others. Acknowledging the synergy between individual agency and 
recognition relations in which both individual agency and social autonomy are affected by 
recognition and misrecognition strengthens our view of recognition. 
In a more recent work,290 Honneth, writing with Joel Anderson, has amended his 
earlier discussions of the damages from misrecognition by directly acknowledging that it 
also affects agency. However, he does not connect these ideas on agency to the question of 
struggles for recognition; his concern instead is arguing that agents’ dependency on 
recognitional infrastructure for their autonomy creates an obligation on society that must be 
included in standard liberal accounts of justice. Honneth could take his conceptions of 
damage to self-confidence and tie them to agency by arguing that the trauma of rape and 
torture causes a loss of individuals’ own perceptual capacities of their own feelings, 
desires, and convictions.291 Extreme misrecognition does damage individuals, and, as 
Honneth remarks, autonomy is vulnerable to anything that diminishes self-trust.292 That 
Honneth admits that individual agency, in addition to relational autonomy, is affected by 
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extreme misrecognition is a step toward a fuller view of how misrecognition affects 
individuals, but Honneth does not go further. Now we need a more robust picture of the 
role of individual agency in responses to misrecognition. The capability of undertaking 
struggles for recognition must lie within those individuals who resiliently respond to the 
suffering from misrecognition with a positive struggle for recognition. This resilience must 
stem from an individual’s agency because what has changed from the experience of 
misrecognition is not the external environment but the feelings of the individual toward 
him- or herself and the social environment. This is why it is proper for Honneth to base 
social movements on the moral feelings resulting from experiencing misrecognition. 
Violations from misrecognition can damage one’s relations-to-self, which, in turn, 
diminishes autonomy, but as long as an individual’s agency remains, so does the possibility 
of motivation to engage in a struggle for recognition. 
 
To craft a view of individual agency compatible with Honneth’s insights on the need 
for recognition, I will turn first to McNay’s interpretation of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
as an answer to Honneth. Like Fraser, McNay has problems with Honneth’s psychological 
story of struggles for recognition, claiming he has a “naïve, spontaneist account of 
action.”293 But McNay also rejects Fraser’s objectivist theory of recognition as lacking any 
orientation to the subjective dimensions of identity.294 McNay proposes habitus—the 
process through which power relations are incorporated into embodied agency—as a new 
ground for mediating between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of recognition. Habitus 
grounds “an analysis of subjectivity and agency in the possibilities and constraint of 
embodied existence” within a social world.295 Habitus shares Honneth’s insight that a 
phenomenological emphasis on experience is needed to understand the effects of 
misrecognition and resistance to it. But McNay says that Honneth’s model conflates 
experiences of suffering with the capability for the critical awareness of injustice, which he 
in turn conflates with agency, and she rejects Honneth’s position that suffering 
misrecognition leads to the formation of opposition to misrecognition. I think that this 
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criticism is correct, that critical agency is not the inevitable effect of misrecognition, and 
that Honneth’s account is unsatisfactory. 
For McNay, the question in struggles for recognition is what would bring an 
individual to oppositional consciousness. McNay is correct that suffering misrecognition 
does not necessarily lead an individual to political insight about injustice or resistance to it. 
McNay says that the symbolic resources with which to formulate agency are also needed 
and that critical and oppositional consciousness and agency are determined by the specific 
configuration of symbolic and material relations. For example, McNay credits the success 
of the women’s movements in the ‘60s and ‘70s to feminists drawing on symbolic and 
linguistic resources to transform gender consciousness.296 Because she holds that all 
experience is shaped by preconstituted discourses, she concludes that oppositional 
consciousness and agency are “determined by the specific configuration of symbolic and 
material relations—the space of possibles and structure of positions—in a given field of 
action.” 297 But McNay’s account does not explain how some individuals in the same field 
of action would develop an oppositional consciousness while others would not. If 
resistance to injustice were a matter of the presence of symbolic and material relations, then 
McNay’s theory exchanges Honneth’s cause—suffering—for another—symbolic and 
material relations. Why would an individual take in those symbolic resources and respond 
with a struggle for recognition?  
McNay’s criticism is correct that Honneth does not consider the importance of power 
structures and power inequalities in keeping individuals from undertaking struggles for 
recognition, but she does not offer a workable mechanism to explain individual motivation 
for struggles for recognition. In fact, her conception of power structures’ effects on 
individuals offers no sensible conception of how an individual could ever struggle against 
prevailing power structures. The problem is that if individuals’ identities are repressed and 
colonized by the power structure, then where is there room for resistance? McNay points to 
individual agency as a way out of this problem, but her view of agency is lacking, a deficit 
that also appears in Bourdieu’s conception of habitus. To say that opposition to 
misrecognition is “determined by the specific configuration of symbolic and material 
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relations”298 is no more reliable a predictor of individual motivation or action than is 
Honneth’s reliance on the cultural-political environment to catalyze hurt feelings from 
suffering moral injuries. Both accounts suppose that agency, despite being called internal to 
the individual, is a spontaneous effect of external forces. Such reductionism lacks the 
hoped-for explanatory power of why social resistance does or does not happen. The 
presence of symbolic resources is insufficient to cause an individual to engage in a struggle 
for recognition similar to the way in which the experience of suffering is insufficient. Even 
if we were to say that it is a combination of hurt feelings and symbolic resources that 
motivate an individual to a struggle for recognition, we could still point to individuals who 
have suffered misrecognition and have access to symbolic resources but acquiesce rather 
than struggle. Suffering and symbolic resources are both necessary components to motivate 
an individual to struggle for recognition, but there must still be something else operating in 
addition. 
Regardless of the shortcomings of McNay’s account, the notion of habitus can still 
be helpful. McNay is correct that habitus, because it views individual agency as embodied 
and embedded in a social world, mediates between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of 
recognition. I read habitus as how an individual is in the social world, is affected by the 
social world, and develops tendencies and dispositions in response to the social world 
through which the individual perceives and responds in deliberate reflective ways to the 
world. An individual’s habitus internalizes the society’s second nature and space of reasons 
from which the individual makes decisions, and, importantly, habitus responds to 
recognition and misrecognition. We still need to steer clear of a social determinism and not 
reduce habitus to rote mimesis but understand the role and capability to act of the 
individual from his or her habitus in the social world. It was, after all, not some abstract 
entity called “feminists” who developed opposition consciousness by drawing on symbolic 
and linguistic resources to transform gender consciousness. Individual women drew on 
those resources and transformed their own consciousness and their own habitus to 
overcome constraints and embrace possibilities in order to struggle for increased 
recognition for women’s rights. 
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For suffering and symbolic resources to help motivate a struggle, an individual must 
have the ability to respond to them with actions, and an account of individual agency must 
be added to habitus. Kelly Oliver correctly observes that critical theorists who discuss 
subjectivity in terms of recognition lack a full realization of the ability to respond to and 
address others, an ability she calls “response-ability.”299 Her contention is that discussing 
recognition in terms of a subject-object dichotomy that is fundamentally antagonistic 
undermines the intersubjective dialogue on which recognition theory places great emphasis. 
Oliver’s theory of response-ability separates subjectivity from subject positions. Our social 
interactions and cultural positions constitute our subject position, which varies as our 
relations and circumstances change. Subjectivity is our sense of agency and response-
ability in our encounters with our social environment. Our experience of ourselves is 
maintained in the tension between our subject position and our subjectivity, which are 
always profoundly interconnected. Our subject position is historically determined, but our 
subjectivity has (at least the appearance of) infinite response-ability. The issue here is the 
individual’s ability to respond, and, in particular, the individual’s sense of being able to 
respond. Oliver agrees with Honneth that being subordinated or oppressed affects an 
individual at the level of what Oliver calls his or her subjectivity, which is necessary for his 
or her sense of agency. Misrecognition compromises one’s sense of one’s agency. Victims 
can be rendered docile or speechless if their sense that they can respond to others is 
annihilated. We are by virtue of others, Oliver says, agreeing with Emmanuel Levinas that 
we are responsible for the other’s responsibility, for the other’s ability to respond, and for 
continually opening and reopening and not closing down possibilities for their responses.300  
I believe that Oliver’s concept of individuals having a response-ability that is 
enhanced and strengthened through positive dialogues of address and response is one way 
to add a concept of agency to habitus. The concepts of response-ability and habitus connect 
in that they both acknowledge the effects of power structures and the social environment on 
individuals. One’s subject position shapes one’s habitus, but one’s subjectivity and dialogic 
relationships with others are where an oppositional consciousness can arise. Individuals 
always bring to their interactions their dispositions and capital (Bourdieu’s economic, 
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cultural, and social capital) from their position in the social field, but they also bring their 
ability to respond. Interpersonal interactions are mediated by the social field and also by 
individuals and their responses. Response-ability refers to a conscious agency that can 
oppose misrecognition by connecting with and using symbolic resources. It acknowledges 
that individuals have the ability to respond to other individuals, to the suffering of 
misrecognition, and to symbolic resources with either dialogue or antagonism. That this 
ability to respond can be damaged by misrecognition but can still survive misrecognition 
highlights the individual’s capability while appreciating his or her social vulnerability. 
Oliver’s concept of response-ability has limited use, though, for two reasons. One is that 
she places it in opposition to her problematic depiction of recognition as a pathological 
antagonism generated by oppression.301 The other is that she places it within a broader 
concept she calls “witnessing” that depends heavily on her idiosyncratic interpretation of 
psychoanalysis. Those notions diminish the contribution that response-ability can make to a 
view of individuals being able to overcome misrecognition. 
Another possible theoretical resource we could add to habitus is Korsgaard’s concept 
of the self-constitution of individual agents. This concept gives us a way to think about 
individuals as being the authors of and responsible for their actions without making the 
mistake of thinking that there is a subject prior to or separate from socialization. 
Korsgaard’s view is that  
it is as the possessor of personal or practical identity that you are the author 
of your actions, and responsible for them. And yet at the same time it is in 
choosing your actions that you create that identity. What this means is that 
you constitute yourself as the author of your actions in the very act of 
choosing them.302  
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She acknowledges that this sounds paradoxical but says that this apparent paradox of self-
constitution is in fact no paradox because charges that self-constitution is voluntarism are 
false. “The picture here is not of a craftsman who is, mysteriously, his own product. The 
picture here is of the self-constitutive process that is the essence of life.”303 Life, Korsgaard 
says, does not create itself but in its biological processes is continually maintaining itself 
through its actions.304 For humans, this means that, in addition to the animal activity of 
continually making ourselves through processes like taking in nutrition, we also must 
continually maintain our social practical identity. There is no you prior to your choices and 
actions because your practical identity is constituted by your choices and actions in 
response to your environment. We also are capable of reflecting on our responses and of 
considering whether to do one thing or another, yet to say we are capable is the wrong 
emphasis. We are compelled to respond to our world—it is our plight; and we use our 
human rationality to respond.305 Our self-constitution is not a state that we achieve and then 
act from306; like breathing, it is continual motion, not a static condition. It is the plight of 
being human that we must continually choose and act and make ourselves the authors of 
our actions by the way that we act. 
Key to the concept of self-constitution, and its application to our problem of 
struggles for recognition, is to understand practical identity as a socialized identity under 
which one, as an individual, values oneself and finds one’s actions worth undertaking. 
One’s practical identity is, as Korsgaard understands, composed of one’s roles and 
relationships, membership in social groups, associations with causes, professions and 
positions held, and so on. We value our roles and relationships; therefore, our conceptions 
of our practical identity, in Korsgaard’s words, govern our choice of actions because to 
value ourselves in a certain role is at the same time to find it worthwhile to undertake 
certain actions for the sake of certain ends.307 An individual, as possessor of a practical 
identity, is the author of his or her actions, and in choosing those actions, creates his or her 
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identity by drawing on the normative resources in society.308 This deliberate practical 
choosing and acting is what makes us human. That humans constitute their practical 
identity is why it makes sense to hold them accountable for their actions. Although it 
should not have to be said, I will belabor the point that Korsgaard is not suggesting that 
humans make up their practical identities out of whole cloth or on their own. Our practical 
identities are contingent on experiences and the environment from which we learn them 
and acquire our practical identities. Some practical identities we are born to 
environmentally, and others we adopt, but our practical identities are made by our active 
experiences of them. If you continue to endorse the reasons the identity presents to you, 
and observe the obligations it imposes on you, then it is you.309  
Adopting the concept of self-constitution does not commit us to Korsgaard’s lengthy 
recitation on Aristotle and Plato in the rest of her book, Self-Constitution. She, in fact, all 
but ignores the concept in the last three-quarters of her book despite its title. Because the 
key to understanding self-constitution is the concept of one’s practical identities, we can 
instead place the concept of practical identity within Honneth’s conception of recognition 
relations and keep both concepts grounded in the social world. We can see how receiving 
recognition is important to one’s practical identity by affirming one’s roles and 
relationships. Receiving recognition gives individuals the social understanding and the self-
confidence that facilitate their practical identities. Korsgaard says that we learn many roles, 
each of which one might think of as a set of principles or dos and don’ts, the interpretation 
of which can be thought about and debated.310 Most of the roles within our practical 
identity are outcomes of circumstances—we are born to particular parents as citizens of a 
particular country, for example. With these roles or subidentities of child and citizen come 
responsibilities that I did not choose but that I endorse whenever I willingly act in 
accordance with them, and in endorsing them, I affirm that I am them. Acts performed 
under duress, physical or psychological, are probably not endorsements, but they still 
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contribute to what we are and affect our practical identity. We can combine this with 
Honneth’s insight that when we act in accordance with our responsibilities, we are 
affirmed—recognized—by others for doing so. Recognition socializes us into our roles, 
which form our practical identity. We can also see how when we act in accordance with our 
responsibilities, we are affirming our own self as a good example of the role we have 
learned. With each such action, we affirm our practical identity, and this makes us who we 
are. This is what I take self-constitution to be. 
Understanding the similarity of self-constitution to W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of 
double consciousness opens up a new understanding of what could motivate a struggle for 
recognition. Du Bois wrote that African-Americans developed the sense of always looking 
at themselves through the eyes of white Americans, of “measuring one’s soul by the tape of 
a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”311 These experiences of normative 
discrimination misrecognition that denies their identities inflict moral injuries and hurt 
feelings in African-Americans, yet as Du Bois wrote, African-Americans possessed a 
dogged strength to resist the strife of the normative discrimination and to attain self-
consciousness. This was because they developed a double consciousness—the 
consciousness of one’s self but also the consciousness of seeing one’s self through the 
misrecognizing eyes of the whites. In later writings, Du Bois moved away from the 
terminology of double consciousness but retained the awareness of the internal struggle of 
African-Americans in a society that deems them inferior, ugly, congenitally stupid, and 
naturally criminal. This normative discrimination creates a low cultural status that is 
African-Americans’ subject position in the social field of recognition relations, causing 
bitter inner criticism of themselves because it has become part of their habitus. Du Bois 
may have later despaired of the possibility of successful African-American resistance to 
racism, but he never lost the idea that despite the realities of white domination, the African-
American retains a sense of the dichotomy between the normative discrimination expressed 
by the oppressors and a love for oneself that is not defined by white domination. This 
dichotomy is not a psychic split in the individual, but it enables a different way of thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing—a “gifted second-sight” and a subjectivity with which one can 
                                                 
311
 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Dover Publications, 1999), 10. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 142 of 226 
see both sides of the veil of normative discrimination and strive to affirm one’s identity. 
The double consciousness of self and misrecognized self, with its accompanying double 
life and double duties, tempts the mind “to pretence or revolt, to hypocrisy or 
radicalism.”312 Du Bois rejects both of those paths as extreme and urges instead a merger of 
the double self into a better and truer self that does not deny historical and cultural realities 
but builds on them.  
The African-American, Du Bois says, “simply wishes to make it possible for a man 
to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, 
without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face.”313 Fortunately, in this 
struggle for recognition, the African-American has the gift of second sight, which is a 
persistent conscious sensation of self and life on this side of the veil of misrecognition. 
Members of an excluded racial minority can look at each other without the veil of the color 
line that obscures the vision whites and blacks have of each other. Thus, people of color 
can see both themselves as they are and the white depiction of them and discern the 
difference. As Maria Lugones put it, the outsider necessarily acquires the flexibility of 
shifting from how he or she was constructed as an outsider by the white/Anglo world to 
how his or her life is constructed where he or she is more or less at home among fellow 
people of color.314 This minority subjectivity has the potential to transform one’s practical 
identity and the broader society by motivating striving and struggle within the political 
dimension in which minority subjectivity is formed.315 Whichever path one takes—
hypocrisy, radicalism, or affirming one’s identity—one constitutes through one’s actions a 
practical identity and affirms that identity. 
How the concept of self-constitution helps us understand struggles for recognition 
lies within this issue of being affirmed in one’s actions, which helps us understand why 
misrecognition matters and why some but not all would respond with a struggle for 
recognition. When my affirming myself through my choices is not reciprocated by others, 
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this creates a dissonance that would create the hurt feelings Honneth describes. We can 
then expand the plight of having to choose and act identified by Korsgaard to include the 
plight of having to deal with the dissonance of being misrecognized. Placing these hurt 
feelings within the concept of self-constitution, we can see that a struggle for recognition is 
deliberately choosing an action that creates our sense of identity as one who struggles to 
affirm my self, my role, and my past choices. Our practical identity is the reason for the 
action of struggling for recognition, one reason among many reasons that make demands 
on individuals. In choosing the action of struggling for recognition, I constitute myself as 
one who affirms my self as worthy of recognition, and I demand that others reciprocate. 
Because being human means being constantly engaged in making who we are, a lack of 
recognition is a big deal. Misrecognition calls into question within ourselves our practical 
identity and our own choices to affirm that identity.  
Connecting Korsgaard’s concept of self-constitution with McNay’s concept of 
habitus gives us a conceptual basis for how an individual could come to undertake a 
struggle for recognition. The human capacity for self-constitution is how the individual is 
capable of responding with critical agency to experiences of suffering. As a possessor of a 
practical identity constituted by action, an individual relates to society with inherence and 
mutual determination rather than as causally determined by society’s norms. We all rely on 
recognition to come to a sense of our identity and to learn how to navigate the social world, 
but I agree with McBride that it is better for us to stress that we are recognition sensitive 
rather than recognition dependent because we always retain a degree of independence from 
the recognition claims made on us.316 Similarly, we also retain some autonomy in the face 
of experiences of misrecognition, and we have the power to resist judgments on us by 
others. McBride says:  
The common idea that the actions of others must directly affect one's 
relation to oneself, and directly extinguish one's self-respect, seems to 
misconceive the way in which respect recognition works. I can retain my 
self-respect in the face of public assaults upon my dignity because my self-
respect does not depend on others' reactions to me, but on my ability to 
recognize myself in light of the moral standards which I bring to bear upon 
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my own conduct. When I violate these, I cannot recognize myself as a 
member in good standing of the moral community.317 
McBride’s point is an important one that bears on the question of how we are to understand 
responses to misrecognition. Humiliation works when one can be convinced to 
misrecognize oneself. Humiliation is an attempt to convince people to think poorly of 
themselves by damaging their relation to themselves and their sense that they can respond 
to others, similar to Oliver’s idea of our sense of response-ability being harmed. However, 
an individual can resist humiliation and all forms of misrecognition. My self-respect, 
McBride reminds us, is my judgment that I am entitled to be respected, and this is distinct 
from the judgment of others about me. As long as I retain my sense that I am entitled to 
respect, then the judgments of others do not supplant my judgments about myself. This is 
why, McBride says, one can preserve one’s self-respect even in the face of the most 
appalling treatment by others. From this, McBride argues that: 
no matter how recognition sensitive we are, it is still possible to maintain a 
degree of independence from any particular set of recognitive relations. As 
such, we are not passive recipients of recognition.318 
McBride’s insights lend credence to the argument that misrecognition is not determinative 
of either submission to or rebellion against that misrecognition. This is not to suggest that 
misrecognition has no effect on individuals, only that misrecognition is not determinative.  
McBride introduces the idea of “virtual recognition,” the human ability to retain a 
sense of being entitled to recognition and of this entitlement being recognized by a virtual 
community even if a concrete community misrecognizes and mistreats one.319 McBride 
calls this a “virtual public” from which we are seeking recognition and to which we are 
appealing for recognition and from which we receive a “virtual recognition.” This is not an 
appeal to a fantasy because, as McBride says, self-respect is my judgment that I deserve to 
be respected. Interestingly, Honneth has a similar concept that he calls the “generalized 
other.” The idea is that in forming one’s identity, one takes on the perspective of a 
generalized other in which one identifies a relationship of mutual recognition in which one 
can know oneself to be confirmed as an individual in one’s particular traits and abilities.320 
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Honneth does not connect this idea with motivations for struggles for recognition, but 
McBride’s formulation shows that it can be, and McBride links it to Kant’s kingdom of 
ends and Adam Smith’s impartial observer. We can, McBride says, appeal “over the heads” 
of those who refuse to recognize our claims to the authority of a virtual public. We deem 
those who reject us as not competent to judge our claims (which very well might be true), 
and we think that another, unbiased audience would be. Obviously, McBride says, this 
could be wishful thinking, and we must be careful not to mislead ourselves. But, McBride 
stresses, an appeal to a virtual public for virtual recognition is not a retreat into 
subjectivism but is critical thinking about what reasonable people would accept.321 The 
virtual public is vital for our understanding of the reasons that others could present against 
recognizing our recognition claims. We cannot help but be guided by this sort of virtual 
recognition to help us make sense of the feedback we receive from actual experiences of 
social recognition and misrecognition.322 This virtual public serves an important function 
within recognition relations as a necessary response to the very real possibility that the 
actual public we deal with is for one reason or another too incompetent to judge our 
recognition claims correctly. Others are not unbiased in their judgments of our claims to 
recognition because they too have a lot at stake in recognition claims. Through an inner 
dialogue with a virtual public, we can judge the responses of others to our recognition 
claims.  
Dori Laub and Shoshana Felman offer a similar idea that they call an “inner witness” 
that makes subjectivity and agency possible. Individuals develop an inner witness through 
internalizing their dialogues with others in which they learn a sense of self as an agent, a 
process similar to that of mutual recognition described by Honneth. Laub and Felman say 
that if the inner witness is annihilated, such as by torture or extreme subordination, 
subjectivity and the possibility of addressing another is lost.323 Individuals can be colonized 
by misrecognition and come to believe that they are not entitled to be treated well. 
Individuals can come to internalize the misrecognition and side with it. There must be 
something within an individual that is the source of resistance to conforming to societal 
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pressure to form one’s identity in a particular way. Mutual recognition enables dialogue 
with others and makes dialogue with oneself possible, which makes dialogue with others 
more possible. Relations of reciprocity are possible because the interpersonal dialogue is 
internalized. Misrecognition damages both interpersonal and internal dialogues, but the 
inner witness gives one the perspective to be both outside and inside one’s oppression and 
begin to overcome the moral injuries from misrecognition.324 
An important part of our struggles for recognition is our assertions of our sense of 
identity. Even if we were to adopt the position that individual identity is wholly shaped by 
external forces, it would still be the case that individuals are interacting with their culture 
with the expectation that their sense of identity is accurate. When the views others have of 
them are in conflict with their sense of identity, their natural reaction will be to assert what 
they think is correct. Such disparate treatment motivates a struggle for recognition to 
reassert one’s sense of identity. A struggle for honor is “based not on a violation of an 
individual assertion of rights, but rather on a violation of the integrity of the person as a 
whole”; it is an appeal for the recognition of one’s integrity.325 When an individual 
struggles for honor, an appeal is being made on two levels. One is to the idea that all 
individuals have an integrity that should be respected; but it is also an appeal to something 
personal and immediate to the individual—my integrity should be respected—I have value, 
and I have a right to say so. Each of these declarations takes place within a social 
environment. They are expressions of power, or desire for power, made within an existing 
power structure. Struggles for recognition emerge not just from specific misrecognitions 
but also from the basic idea in our self-constitution of being deserving of respect—that 
even if no one does, someone should recognize me. 
Habitus fleshes out the concept of self-constitution by placing individuals’ practical 
identities fully within the preconstituted discourses that permeate all social experiences. 
With habitus and self-constitution, struggles for recognition can be seen as expressions of 
an individual deciding what sort of person he or she will be by incorporating symbolic and 
linguistic resources to transform his or her consciousness into oppositional consciousness 
to the preconstituted discourses and then taking action. We can then see that what 
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motivates a struggle for recognition is not “I have hurt feelings from being misrecognized”; 
it is “I wish my actions to be an expression of someone who can be more than one who 
suffers hurt feelings.” A struggle for recognition is a purposeful movement with cognitive 
content that claims available symbolic resources to struggle toward receiving the 
recognition that enables the individual to constitute his or her self as an autonomous 
individual. It would be morally wrong and factually incorrect to say that individuals cannot 
undertake this purposeful movement.  
Zurn makes the astute observation that individuals can develop a degree of relevant 
practical relations-to-self even in the absence of full social recognition by tapping into the 
normative potential within society’s unequal recognition order. Similar to McBride, Zurn 
says that individuals can anticipate full recognition from the community even in the face of 
misrecognition from the broader society.326 The capability of individuals to tap into 
society’s normative surplus and potential, anticipate full recognition, and then act toward 
that end can motivate struggles for recognition. This is the role I take individual agency to 
have in moving an individual to a struggle for recognition. To be human is to be a living 
being who authors actions. It is the human ability to act intersubjectively in a conscious and 
well-directed manner that constitutes one’s practical identity. Agency is the means by 
which one engages with one’s particular recognition relations, realizes that these current 
recognition relations are misrecognitions that cause one to suffer and that this suffering 
goes against moral norms, imagines the potential for recognition and the end of suffering, 
and acts in accordance with this alternative social reality by engaging in a struggle for 
recognition. Therefore, recognition theory benefits from acknowledging individuals’ 
inherent capabilities to strive for recognition and autonomy.  
The issue of the individual’s perspective has an important role in struggles for 
recognition that is largely absent from Honneth’s account. Honneth is correct that 
experiences of misrecognition are interpreted according to the prevailing recognition 
norms. Therefore, misrecognition is experienced in terms of objective social norms. 
However, it is also the case that experiences of misrecognition are interpreted by the 
individuals who experience them by personally comparing their experiences to the norms 
                                                 
326
 Zurn, Axel Honneth, Kindle locations 1883-1885. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 148 of 226 
that they have learned. Instances of recognition and misrecognition are also matters of 
interpretation: Individuals must themselves interpret recognition norms and apply them to 
particular situations. According to the earlier mentioned response model (which I endorse), 
recognition is also an individual’s interpretation of what qualities another individual is 
manifesting. It makes sense to extend this idea to misrecognition as an interpretation of 
other individuals’ behaviors. That responsiveness and interpretation are part of recognition 
is why the earlier discussion about engagement with norms and individuals is important to 
understand recognition and misrecognition. The response model also reinforces that 
recognition is a relation among individuals to which all involved contribute and the 
conclusion that individual agency is necessary for struggles for recognition. 
Joining individual agency with social recognition provides a fuller account of how 
individuals struggle for recognition and achieve autonomy. It is the ability to interact in a 
conscious and well-directed manner that enables an individual to struggle for recognition, 
and individual agency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for engaging in a struggle 
for recognition: necessary because no one can struggle for recognition without agency, but 
not sufficient because one can choose not to struggle for recognition. Individuals struggle 
for recognition because agency is not sufficient to attain autonomy—there are prerequisites 
of autonomy that must be acquired through interaction with partners. An individual can be 
called “free” in the full sense of the word only when that person has received recognition 
from others that enables him or her to achieve the goal of autonomy and when the 
individual has decided to exercise autonomy. We can view struggles for recognition as 
fueled by the feeling that others are unjustly failing to recognize our capability and right to 
act from our individual agency. When an individual’s intention to struggle for recognition 
takes root in a social environment where that individual receives recognition from other 
individuals, the individual’s chances of achieving self-realization and autonomy are 
enhanced. Both individual agency intending toward recognition and the receipt of 
recognition are necessary for autonomy. 
This discussion leaves unresolved the problem of why some people engage in a 
struggle for recognition while others do not, but it provides a way forward to an analysis of 
this important question. The ideas of the individual as self-constituting within social norms 
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and of habitus as embodied agency are theoretical tools that could move us toward a more 
robust and fine-grained picture of struggles for recognition. These ideas create for critical 
theory more complexity than Honneth’s narrative, and they also provide critical theory with 
greater explanatory power. 
2.3 - Honneth’s political movements problem 
I turn now to the question of the ways individuals express their motivation to 
struggle for recognition. Struggles for recognition are social actions that require interaction 
with other individuals and, in some cases, social institutions. The most discussed social 
actions of struggling for recognition are collective political movements for legal justice, 
social equality, and access to social and economic resources. For Taylor, political 
movements for recognition are also the endeavors of marginalized groups demanding 
public recognition of their particular cultural identities above and beyond equal legal rights. 
Taylor sees the politics of recognition as the tension between a group’s demands for 
particular recognition of their authentic cultural identity and the modern idea of universal 
respect and treatment.327 Honneth disagrees with Taylor’s distinction between particular 
recognition and universal respect and rejects the distinction between legal interest–based 
politics and identity politics,328 claiming that the majority of identity-political demands for 
recognition can be grasped only as expansions of legal recognition.329 However, his own 
approach is similar to Taylor’s in seeing that struggles for recognition are political 
struggles of marginalized groups for recognition.  
On why struggles for recognition manifest as political movements, Honneth begins 
with his premise that hurt feelings motivate one to a struggle for recognition because 
humiliation leaves one in a state of emotional tension that can be dispelled only by 
regaining the possibility of active conduct.330 This makes sense—when we are suffering, 
we are motivated to act to alleviate that suffering. Interestingly, Honneth moves 
immediately to the assumption that active conduct takes the form of political resistance. 
The contingency for him lies not in whether one can be motivated to forms of praxis other 
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than political resistance but in whether the injustice done to one will be disclosed enough 
cognitively to motivate political resistance:  
Empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or 
ashamed becomes a moral-political conviction depends above all on how 
the affected subject's cultural-political environment is constructed: only if 
the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the 
experience of [misrecognition] become a source of motivation for acts of 
political resistance.331  
That Honneth does not by “means of articulation” mean the availability of conceptual 
resources but an existing social movement is shown by his similar expressions of the idea 
elsewhere: 
Whether the cognitive potential inherent in the feelings of social shame and 
offence evolves into a moral conviction depends largely on the form that 
the political and cultural environment of the subjects in question takes. If 
the experience of [misrecognition] is to become a source of motivation for 
acts of political resistance, then there must exist a social movement by 
means of which it can be articulated and thus manifest itself in positive 
form.332  
These passages indicate that feelings of being unjustly treated can lead to political 
resistance only if there exists a social movement that is already articulating those feelings 
of injustice.  
Both passages occur in conclusions to chapters in which Honneth outlines his 
typology of misrecognition as the contrary of his three modes of recognition and describes 
the manner in which the different forms of misrecognition damage personal identity and 
integrity.333 His stated goal in both chapters is to show that the negative emotions in 
response to experiences of personal misrecognition are the motivations for social resistance 
and are a moral driving force in the process of societal development.334 The common thread 
for Honneth is his attempt to link the internal motivation of hurt feelings due to violated 
expectations with the motivation to external acts in society. The problem I see is that 
Honneth argues from the reality of political resistance movements to a theory of what 
motivates them by interpreting the motivations in terms of political resistance movements. 
This connects private feelings with collective action but leaves out a large section of 
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phenomena, including what other paths the motivation to struggle against injustice can take 
and the complex connections between those motivations and political resistance 
movements. Honneth never clearly defines political resistance or what makes a struggle for 
recognition political resistance aside from ascribing political actions to the institutional 
sphere of the political public sphere.335 I define political resistance as attempts to change 
social institutions, practices, and recognition norms, usually in terms of laws, though also 
in terms of social attitudes. Not all struggles for recognition are political, as I will discuss 
more fully in chapter 2.4.5. In this chapter, I will critique some of Honneth’s theoretical 
assumptions regarding political resistance and how they limit his account of struggles for 
recognition. 
Honneth may want to reserve the term “struggles for recognition” for political 
movements, arguing that only struggles at that level are normatively relevant to social 
progress. There are two problems with such a view. It theoretically admits only the waves 
atop the turbulent ocean of moral crises without addressing the active conduct percolating 
under the political surface. Plus, we would then require a different term to describe all 
struggles that seek recognition outside the political arena. It is preferable to see political 
movements as a form of struggles for recognition that moves into the political sphere. 
Recognition and misrecognition behaviors cut across Honneth’s spheres; therefore, 
struggles for recognition do also. Social conflict does not occur only at the macrosocial 
level of the cultural and political. Honneth identifies social experiences that generate 
struggles for recognition but fails to recognize that these experiences of moral injury 
motivate struggles in interpersonal and small-group levels of interaction as well. Honneth’s 
account acknowledges only a limited number of individual acts as struggles for 
recognition. 
One strength of focusing on collective political movements is that it avoids the 
theoretical pitfall of chasing episodic feelings of outrage by a few individuals.336 To avoid 
this unproductive pitfall, we must limit our inquiries to those expressions of resistance to 
misrecognition that pass a threshold of significance. The question is what that threshold is. 
It would be incorrect to say the threshold is a certain level of political success. Honneth 
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criticizes Fraser’s view of social movements as being reductive for considering as social 
movements only those social conflicts that have attracted the attention of the political 
public sphere.337 Putting aside the question of whether Fraser is guilty of Honneth’s charge, 
Honneth faces a similar criticism in considering as struggles for recognition only collective 
political movements. Honneth seems to be reducing all social struggles to those violations 
of normative expectations that attract the attention of a significant number of subjects 
within a social group to become a collective movement. There is a difference between 
attention from the larger political public sphere and attention from a particular social group, 
but there is a qualitative similarity between Fraser and Honneth on this point. Honneth is 
guilty, as he accuses Fraser, of his theory relying on the contingent success of a certain 
level of social awareness—in Honneth’s case, for moral injuries to be articulated 
collectively in a political movement.  
For both Fraser and Honneth, restricting theoretical consideration to only those social 
movements that achieve a certain size is counterproductive for critical theory. A line is still 
being drawn whether it is drawn at a society-wide level or a group level. So the question 
for Honneth is, at what level of collective sharing do moral experiences become a 
legitimate focus of inquiry for critical theory? Is there not a danger of saying to some that 
“your moral suffering is not being acted on by enough people for our theory to consider it 
significant?” It seems that moral experiences are of limited interest to Honneth until they 
have coalesced into a collective movement, yet to me it seems obvious that moral 
experiences must be experienced on an individual level before they can coalesce into a 
social movement. A rough analogy would be if we were to study those suffering physical 
disease but limit the scope of what we consider a disease to either those who have a 
foundation receiving government grants or those who have established mutual support 
groups. Honneth wants to expand the theoretical focus into feelings of misrecognition 
deeper than current social theory does. This is good, but the next necessary step is to drill 
down deeper than the group level and fully include the moral experiences of individuals 
and the way in which individuals are both influenced by and influence social movements. 
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I believe the crux of Honneth’s political movements problem is an unnecessary 
collapsing of interpretive structures and collective political movements. It is correct to 
require an existing interpretive structure for individuals to develop normative expectations 
and understand when these expectations are disappointed, but an interpretive structure 
would not require an existing social movement of political resistance. What shows subjects 
that they have experienced an injustice rather than bad luck is a semantic structure that 
enables such an understanding. The language must exist that enables the interpretation that 
certain experiences are a result of injustice, and subjects must be exposed to that language 
for them to understand that they have been misrecognized and have experienced an 
injustice. This linking of the ability to articulate feelings with existing language is 
uncontroversial. Without a moral language with which to understand and articulate the 
feelings of being injured by another person, individuals will not be able to link their 
experience of hurt to the concept of an unjust action by another person. Individuals learn 
from their society a semantic structure of moral language by which they evaluate the moral 
content of their experience and by which they communicate to others their feelings and 
moral judgments. Honneth’s position is that individual feelings of being hurt by 
misrecognition can exist but are fragmented and private until they are structured by 
communal experience, motivating collective resistance against injustice. Within Honneth’s 
conception that recognition norms guide the socialization process, the reasoning here is 
sound. For Honneth, the principles of recognition provide a basis from which individuals 
can understand that they have experienced undeserved and unjustifiable misrecognition and 
that allows them to assert their grounds for greater recognition.338 It is through the language 
of recognition norms that individuals learn what is appropriate behavior and what is 
inappropriate behavior. Therefore, misrecognition is knowable only through the experience 
of existing moral language from which they can interpret behavior directed at them as a 
moral wrong. Constructive responses to misrecognition also require a semantic structure of 
moral language that provides individuals with the capability to evaluate the institutions and 
customs of their culture with a view to whether they are morally justified and whether they 
can or should be changed.  
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Honneth needs to overcome the difficulty that an unjust recognition order probably 
will not provide a semantic structure that informs individuals that they are being treated 
unjustly. An unjust society would have negative recognition norms that socialize 
individuals into a semantic structure that justifies misrecognition and the harm it causes. 
The semantic culture in an unjust society will communicate to individuals that the various 
forms of misrecognition they receive are “normal” if not deserved. In an unjust society, the 
feelings of psychological injuries will not find an easy means of articulation, and 
individuals will remain unable to understand their hurt feelings as the result of injustice. To 
deal with this problem, Honneth posits that a subculture that is attentive to those valuable 
traits and contributions of individuals that the mainstream culture overlooks can provide 
the needed semantic structure for individuals to articulate their negative feelings. Because 
he holds that individuals learn social norms through social experience, he also holds that 
individuals learn the semantics to express hurt feelings similarly. Learned from the 
dominant culture in a society are recognition norms that include pathological recognition 
and normative discrimination that lead to misrecognition. Within a subculture, though, one 
can learn from a community of those who have been similarly affected by misrecognition. 
Experiencing injustice can bond individuals in a subculture of shared feelings and 
interpretive ideas. These interpretive ideas of a shared social community  
generate a subcultural horizon of interpretation within which experiences of 
[misrecognition] that, previously, had been fragmented and had been coped 
with privately can then become the moral motives for a collective 'struggle 
for recognition'.339  
Subjects can compare the shared experiences within their subculture with the experiences 
of those outside it and interpret their experiences as divergent from those of the broader 
culture, which can motivate a struggle for recognition to rectify the divergence. It is unclear 
whether Honneth is suggesting that shared experiences of recognitional disappointment 
necessarily lead to a shared social community. It is also unclear whether he is suggesting 
that a “subcultural horizon of interpretation” will necessarily lead to a collective struggle 
for recognition or is simply a prerequisite for one.  
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The problem with Honneth’s position is his assumption that the only conduit for hurt 
feelings is a collective resistance movement that provides a framework for the individual to 
see him- or herself as a typical member of that group. Honneth’s strong position stems 
from his contention that one needs recognition from one’s community to engage 
successfully in any social action. As mentioned earlier, Honneth sees personal identity and 
relations-to-self as dependent on the individual’s experiences of social recognition. 
Honneth sees individuals as developing their personal identities and their view of their 
place in society within the context of recognition norms that socialize individuals into an 
understanding of what recognition is. Therefore, he sees misrecognitions as understandable 
only in the context of social norms. From this, he holds that one can engage in resistance to 
misrecognition only if one can access a semantic structure in which to identify one’s 
feelings of being treated unjustly. If subjects cannot receive the interpretive structure from 
the society at large, they must then receive it from an existing social group. 
Hurt feelings … become the motivational basis for collective resistance 
only if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective 
framework of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire 
group. In this sense, the emergence of social movements hinges on the 
existence of a shared semantics that enables personal experiences of 
disappointment to be interpreted as something affecting not just the 
individual himself or herself but also a circle of many other subjects.340 
This line of argument, though seeming to place a semantic framework as a prerequisite to 
social movements, commits Honneth to seeing all struggles for recognition as being 
properly understood more as collective movements of group concerns than as expressions 
of individual concerns because a shared group semantic framework is required to enable 
personal interpretation.  
Struggles for recognition, in Honneth’s view, are struggles between social groups—a 
subculture struggling to expand the circle of recognition and/or change the recognition 
norms. Within Honneth’s recognition order, because norms are established institutionally, 
they must be changed institutionally. 
It is by way of the morally motivated struggles of social groups—their 
collective attempt to establish, institutionally and culturally, expanded 
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forms of reciprocal recognition—that the normatively directional change of 
societies proceeds.341 
This is why Honneth sees collective social movements’ struggles for recognition as a 
means of macrosocial historical progress in keeping with the tradition of critical theory and 
Honneth’s own conception of a social recognition order. Honneth holds that struggles for 
recognition seeking to repair damaged relations-to-self must be collective struggles because 
individuals can convince themselves of their moral and social worth only within public acts 
of collective resistance. In Honneth’s model, the solidarity of the collective resistance 
movement gives individuals the recognition that will restore the individual abilities that 
were misrecognized. Collective resistance can bring individuals out of the crippling effects 
of passively endured humiliation and help them toward new and positive relations-to-
self.342 Honneth’s narrative of motivations for struggles for recognition is, therefore, a story 
of how an individual would be motivated to join an existing social movement of political 
resistance. An advantage of Honneth’s model, from the perspective of social theory, is that 
if we place all motivations from misrecognition within collective movements, we avoid the 
risk of thinking that any feeling from any perceived slight could legitimately be a struggle 
for recognition. Honneth’s move maintains a theoretical grounding of feelings of 
misrecognition in objective social normativity. 
Honneth is vague about what political resistance is, and I will attempt to overcome 
this vagueness with an expanded view of struggles for recognition. In some areas, 
Honneth’s claim that struggles for recognition must exist within collective political 
resistance is correct. For example, if I wish to get a law changed in my community, I will 
need the help of a social movement beyond my individual experience to manifest this 
change. Honneth’s view can be defended by pointing out the connection between personal 
development and recognition and by pointing out that collective resistance movements 
provide solidarity that repair damaged relations-to-self and expand recognition. The 
problem with this view is that it assumes a consequence—collective resistance 
movements—before an antecedent—the motivation that instigates a collective resistance 
movement. A collective resistance movement must have one or more catalysts motivating 
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enough to engender a social movement that goes against the prevailing social order. 
Honneth’s model offers an explanation for why an individual could be motivated to join an 
existing collective resistance movement but not how such movements are formed. Honneth 
offers no substantial account for how a subculture moves from its experiences of 
misrecognition to a political movement. Within critical theory, we also need an 
understanding of how such movements begin.  
Honneth consistently speaks of morally motivated struggles in terms of social 
groups. Honneth contends that social struggles are a structuring force in the moral 
development of society by way of the morally motivated struggles of social groups. This 
contention rests on Honneth’s view that in modern society individuals’ worth is recognized 
according to the status group to which they belong. The social standing of the status group 
is graded hierarchically in comparison with other status groups according to the 
predetermined worth of properties and the purported collective contribution of the status 
group.343 From this view, Honneth sees struggles for recognition as the collective efforts of 
a status group to seek expanded recognition for their status group and contends that these 
social movements are the social actors of historical change. Collective attempts to establish 
expanded forms of reciprocal recognition generate the pressure by which normative change 
of societies proceeds.344 Thus, Honneth’s view is that a subject’s self-esteem can be 
acquired only on the basis of collectively shared goals.345 Therefore, struggles for 
recognition are group endeavors conducted with the solidarity and mutual esteem of 
collective social movements. 
This leads to two questions—what would motivate a group to interpret the 
misrecognition they receive as morally wrong, and what would motivate an individual 
within a social group to follow its interpretations and actions? On the first question, a 
subcultural group whose members have been similarly affected by misrecognition could 
certainly develop the language to articulate the shared feelings and semantic ideas about the 
injustices they have experienced. But what indicates that every subculture will use that 
language to generate a social movement to expand the circle of recognition and/or change 
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the recognition norms? Could they not instead use their interpretive language within the 
group to help each other cope with their feelings of being misrecognized without taking 
political action? On the second question, within a subculture, not every individual is 
engaged in an active struggle, even if it is correct to say the group as a whole is. We cannot 
oversimplify our view and assume that within a subculture that is, as a whole, engaging in a 
struggle for recognition every member of that subculture is a contributing part of that 
collective resistance movement.  
The issue I am raising is not whether struggles for recognition are exercised mostly 
in social groups (they are) but that Honneth has a chicken-and-egg problem similar to the 
one he has in the agency problem. Honneth believes that every collective act of social 
resistance can be traced to a set of moral experiences of being misrecognized, but he also 
claims that these feelings of being misrecognized can be expressed only in terms of 
political resistance movements. There is no question that the grounds for claims for 
recognition are always socially shaped and that the content of individuals’ expectations is 
always influenced by institutionally anchored principles of recognition.346 A semantic 
structure must exist to enable individuals to articulate their experiences of and hurt feelings 
from being misrecognized. Social movements can provide the symbolic resources by which 
individuals can see that their experiences of misrecognition are not idiosyncratic misfortune 
but experiences shared by others. It is from this realization, Honneth believes, that the 
potential emerges for collective action of resistance and revolt aimed at expanding social 
patterns of recognition.347 The question is whether Honneth has included only one path, 
albeit the most common one, for an individual to undertake a struggle for recognition. This 
question matters because it helps us address the questions of how political resistance 
movements and struggles for recognition arise and why some injustices are not struggled 
against. Honneth’s theoretical approach to struggles for recognition limits his ability to 
answer this question adequately. 
Focusing on political movements simplifies our inquiries, but it risks discounting 
important phenomena. It is my contention that Honneth has a theoretical shortfall that can 
be seen in his response to Nancy Fraser in Redistribution or Recognition? Honneth states 
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that he is focused on the question of which theoretical language is best suited to reconstruct 
and normatively justify present-day political demands within a framework of critical 
theory. Honneth wants to establish the theory of recognition as the “link between the social 
causes of widespread feelings of injustice and the normative objectives of emancipatory 
movements.”348 His theory of recognition, he argues, avoids the “abstractive fallacy” of 
theoretical attachment to publicly articulated goals (such as in Marxist theory) and instead 
focuses on the everyday dimension of moral feelings of moral injuries and injustice, which, 
Honneth says, makes it clear that what is called “injustice” in theoretical language is that 
which is experienced by those affected as social injuries to their well-founded claims to 
recognition. He calls his approach a “phenomenology of social experiences of injustice.”349 
I read this argument by Honneth with interest but wonder where is the actual 
phenomenology for which he calls. If a theory of recognition is to take up the everyday 
dimension of moral feelings, then it needs to be a deeper phenomenology that takes 
seriously the implications of the important idea that the experience of moral injuries is what 
defines injustice and is the motivational source of social resistance. Honneth’s move to 
locate the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition is a 
worthy theoretical approach, but to complete this move, we need to take in fully the 
experiences of individuals when they endure injustice, feel the effects, and respond to it. 
The shortfall in Honneth’s approach is that his consideration of individuals’ moral 
experiences of injustice focuses on the macrosocial side of struggles for recognition 
without sufficient attention to the individuals’ experiences as the loci of struggles for 
recognition. Honneth is correct that his theoretical approach is one level beneath Fraser’s 
argument,350 but to fulfill the promise of his approach, we need to go one level further into 
the microsocial level.  
Honneth is focused on how normative structures inform the feelings of subjects but 
with inadequate attention to how the feelings of those subjects inform the normative 
content of emancipatory movements. Honneth is not completely neglecting the moral 
experiences of individuals, but his consideration of them is limited by his theoretical 
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reliance on a functionalist interpretation of social movements. Collective interpretation and 
action are required to transform experiences of injustice into a political resistance 
movement, but the feelings of an individual about the injustice he or she has suffered is 
what is being collectively interpreted and acted on. Zurn’s example is the feminist struggle 
against the legal doctrine of coverture, whereby a woman lost her legal personality to her 
husband on marriage, leaving her without recourse against economic and physical 
exploitation, including marital rape.351 The determined feminist struggle and focused legal 
activism that overturned the marital exception to rape laws was a collective struggle based 
on the particular experiences of individual women, and these individual women and/or 
individuals close to them are who instigated the struggle for recognition of the rights of 
women in marriages. 
Again, I am not arguing that social movements are unimportant; I am arguing for a 
more robust picture of their role in struggles for recognition. Returning to Honneth’s 
account that both experiences of moral injuries and social movements are prerequisites for 
individuals to be motivated to struggle for recognition, Honneth’s model is unclear about 
the division of labor between feelings of moral injuries and preexistent social movements. 
If both are prerequisites for manifesting struggles for recognition, then how do they 
intersect to bring them about? Is the preexistent social movement partly responsible for the 
feelings of misrecognition? Perhaps so, if the semantic structures of social movements are 
required to articulate the feelings into moral motives. Honneth touches on the difference 
between the private and the public without delving into the connections and mechanisms. It 
also seems that it is not the case, within Honneth’s model, that there is a motivation to 
struggle separate from a motivation for acts of collective political resistance because 
Honneth sees all struggles as collective political actions. Could an individual not feel 
humiliated by misrecognition and feel motivated to correct the perceived injustice absent a 
preexistent social movement? It seems apparent that an individual can have feelings that 
are too diffuse to express effectively and also that an individual can have clear feelings but 
no constructive social outlet for them. Even if Honneth is arguing that his narrative 
addresses what motivates a particular individual to join a struggle for recognition, this still 
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leaves unanswered the question of how social movements for recognition begin. Because 
Honneth considers social movements as the manifestation of struggles for recognition, he 
needs an account of how these collective movements come to exist in the first place, which 
he does not provide.  
If, as Honneth contends, a social movement hinges on a shared semantics of personal 
experiences, that does not mean that a set of shared semantics requires a social movement. 
This is because a subcultural semantics can exist without it being a part of a social 
movement of collective political resistance. Individuals, unable to receive recognition from 
their society’s recognition order, can find a form of recognition and self-respect within the 
community of shared social status—but a subculture can exist as a source for reciprocal 
recognition without undertaking any struggle for increased recognition from the larger 
society. We therefore need to separate the notions of a semantic subculture and a social 
movement. 
Honneth is correct about the need for a subcultural horizon of interpretation, but 
Honneth derives too much from the truth of the necessity of moral language. Honneth 
collapses interpretive structures, which he calls “subcultural horizons of interpretation,”352 
with social movements and presupposes both, leaving him without an account for their 
genesis. Certainly, a subculture and an interpretive structure are mutually supporting and 
influencing, but they are separate and do not spring up together fully formed. It makes 
more sense to me to separate social movements and motivations for struggles for 
recognition and say that a subcultural horizon of interpretation is involved in both. It is true 
that an individual can engage in resistance to injustice only if the moral language of norms, 
injustice, and resistance to injustice is available to the individual, but it is part of the 
picture—there is still the need for the individual to act. The interpretive language enables 
an individual to understand, but it itself does not create collective action. The intention of 
individuals to unite in common cause is facilitated by language, but it remains for the 
individuals, not the language, to decide whether to join in common cause. The environment 
alone cannot force a struggle for recognition in an individual much less in a social 
movement. We need a phenomenology of social experiences of injustice that can illuminate 
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better how individuals respond to misrecognition. It is to that phenomenology that I now 
turn. 
An interpretive structure within a subculture explains how individuals can 
communicate with each other about their moral experiences. But Honneth’s claims are 
about more than whether one can communicate one’s suffering to another. They are also 
about whether one will be motivated to struggle for recognition. Struggles for recognition 
are more than acts of communication; they are acts of resistance and defiance. For a 
struggle for recognition to exist, it must arise from, and be, a response to misrecognition 
that is a “yes, but.” The “yes, but” acknowledges the misrecognition and the prevailing 
social situation and recognition norms behind it (the “yes”) but calls for change (the “but”). 
It is at the same time an empirical acceptance and a normative rejection. The “yes, but” is 
different from two possible versions of “no” as a response to misrecognition. One “no” 
denies that what is happening is misrecognition, probably out of reluctance to admit one’s 
situation or blame those responsible for the misrecognition. The other “no” acknowledges 
the misrecognition and resists without attempting to change the situation. This second type 
of “no” is still motivated by hurt feelings caused by moral injuries and is another reason 
why Honneth’s account needs to be expanded. A “no” can be resistance to misrecognition, 
but it is not a struggle for recognition. I could call this a “yes, no”—a “yes” acknowledging 
the misrecognition and a “no” of not seeking to change the situation, though “yes, no” 
seems unnecessarily awkward. The “no” is defiance, perhaps manifesting as a stubborn 
refusal to cooperate, but is not actively seeking recognition or change. It can be valuable 
and meaningful for the individual who, in resistance, says “no” and may be a first step 
toward a struggle for recognition. However, defiance against misrecognition is not the 
same as demanding recognition and change; it is a type of action that has limited 
consequences. The “yes, but” is akin to Fanon’s “yes” to life, love, and generosity 
accompanied by a “no” to scorn, degradation, exploitation, and the butchery of freedom.  
Key to Fanon’s “yes,” and to my “yes, but,” is that individuals are being actional 
rather than reactional.353 The “yes, but” is an individual response that may or may not be 
assisted by an existing social movement. Either way, the “yes, but” is predicated on the 
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capability of individuals to act in response to their situation. As McBride says, all 
individuals are social actors who are guided, but not determined, by social norms.354 We 
interpret and apply social norms; they do not interpret or apply themselves. For example, 
an individual woman, McBride says, must work out for herself how to define and inhabit 
the roles in her life “and to cope with the inevitable mixture of recognition and 
misrecognition that must accompany her judgement.”355 We find ourselves in a world of 
other individuals and, what is more, in a plural world of differing and conflicting claims. 
McBride says that we rely on recognition norms to guide our actions but that we are free to 
assess each particular situation in which we find ourselves. Our plight is that we must 
decide for ourselves what actions to take. When others claim to have the authority to 
recognize us, McBride says, “We are always agents who must endorse the authority claims 
of others before their recognition is of any value to us.”356 Similarly, when we are 
misrecognized, our plight is to decide whether that misrecognition is valuable to us, or 
whether to reject it, and decide what action to take. If an interpretive structure is available, 
an individual can interpret that language as applying to her life. She can then say “yes, but” 
in response to the misrecognition she is receiving. If a social movement is available to her, 
she could decide to take action to join it. If no social movement is available to her, she 
could decide to take action on her own. I do not suggest that an individual can create a 
struggle for recognition out of nothing, but the individual agent is an important and 
necessary ingredient in struggles for recognition. To postulate that social movements are 
required for all struggles for recognition would be making the mistake of arguing from 
effect to cause. There is no unequivocal rationale to argue that a struggle for recognition 
requires a social movement, even if we say that it requires a set of shared semantics. 
In the discussion of the dimensions of misrecognition, I talked about the importance 
of a dimension of action. A dimension of action also applies to struggles for recognition 
because the capability to act can actualize in varying degrees of action. Feelings that one 
has been misrecognized do not necessarily manifest as acts of misrecognition behavior. 
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Similarly, feelings from moral injuries do not necessarily manifest as struggles for 
recognition. An interpretive language provides the tools that individuals can use to 
articulate their feelings of moral injury but does not mean that an individual will articulate 
his or her feelings. Even if individuals do find the language, they may not articulate their 
feelings to another individual. A teen bullied at school could know how to express that he 
is being misrecognized but keep his thoughts to himself or express it in words that he does 
not share with anyone. When two or more individuals begin to communicate about their 
feelings of being misrecognized, they may find solidarity and common cause. They could, 
though, go no further than conversation without taking any action beyond commiseration. 
The move from conversation to action is a big one. It may be too psychologically or 
materially demanding to press one’s legitimate recognition claims. We do not need to 
resort to Marxist ideology theory to explain reluctance to engage in political resistance. The 
risks are high, the odds of success are low, and individuals have other needs that require 
tending.  
We also need to include nonrational reactions to misrecognition. The emphasis 
throughout critical theory has been on describing social pathology and the remedy to it in 
terms of rationality. As helpful as that is for a theoretical approach, in everyday life, 
rationality is not the source of all individual actions, and that includes responses to 
misrecognition. Emotional reactions of rebelliousness can also motivate individuals to 
engage in a struggle for recognition and could also spur the development of the semantics 
needed to interpret behavior. In such a case, emotional actions could facilitate rational 
interpretation as members of the subculture seek to interpret the emotional reactions of 
others. Social movements can be sparked by individuals who act having reached their 
breaking point of tolerance for misrecognition, and that emotion-fueled action encourages 
others to, either emotionally or rationally, join in actions of resistance. The 1969 Stonewall 
rebellion in Greenwich Village, New York City, began as a spontaneous emotional reaction 
against police oppression. The initial riot sparked street protests the next night and led to an 
organized social movement in Greenwich Village that struggled for recognition of gays and 
lesbians. The nonrational riot led to a rational rebellion and struggle for recognition. The 
movement for gay rights spread nationwide, then worldwide. The initial emotional reaction 
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to misrecognition is widely acknowledged as the beginning of the gay liberation movement 
and is commemorated by a national monument.357 
These types of emotional responses are different from the hurt feelings that Honneth 
sees as motivations for struggles for recognition. Despite the emotional content, Honneth 
considers an individual’s hurt feelings as motivational grounds only if they are rationally 
articulated in terms of “universal ideas and appeals in which individual actors see their 
particular experiences of misrecognition eliminated in a positive manner.”358 By contrast, 
the type of emotional reaction to which I am referring is not rationally articulated and has 
no basis in rational reflection. A lack of rational content or rational justification does not 
mean that an act cannot become motivation for others to struggle for recognition. Another 
point worth making is that, in Honneth’s account, negative emotional reactions arise only 
when rational normative expectations are disappointed. In 1969, society gave homosexuals 
no rational normative expectations that they would receive recognition. So what rational 
normative expectations of theirs were disappointed? Certainly, one could respond that any 
denigrated and excluded person can rationally link the general idea that all human beings 
deserve recognition with the reality that they are excluded from that recognition. Again, 
though, that does not mean an individual would make that rational connection, especially 
given the prevailing normative discrimination that socializes individuals into a seemingly 
rational recognition order. 
From the above, it makes sense to consider a narrative of struggles for recognition 
that places social movements in the middle of a social process. Widespread and persistent 
misrecognition generates marginalized subcultures. The relative insularity of these 
subcultures generates an interpretive structure within society’s larger set of established 
norms that supplies the language with which members of the subculture can speak of their 
experiences as a marginalized subculture. The interpretive language could speak of the 
marginalization of the subculture as a moral wrong. If so, then individuals within the 
subculture could draw on the resources of the interpretive structure as a motivation to 
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struggle against the moral wrongs of their marginalization. If enough individuals come to 
be similarly motivated, they could coalesce as a social movement resisting injustice. The 
multiple “coulds” of this formulation are not hand waving but reflect the real-life variations 
in marginalized subcultures that must be accounted for within critical theory. How much 
and in what ways a subculture is in dialogue with the mainstream culture is different for 
each subculture. Within what dialogue there is, it would be incorrect to assume that a 
particular subculture is struggling for increased recognition from the general society.  
Honneth misreads the role of individuals in struggles for recognition because he 
believes that hurt feelings are not necessarily morally valuable unless they are articulated 
according to social norms. Honneth distinguishes individuals articulating their experiences 
in the democratic public sphere from individuals “living them out in a counterculture of 
violence.”359 
The sense of no longer being included within the network of social 
recognition is in itself an extremely ambivalent source of motivation for 
social protest and resistance. It lacks any normative indication or direction 
that would stipulate in what ways one would struggle against the experience 
of [misrecognition] and humiliation.360 
There is a problem with structuring the normative value of emotional response in this way. 
A subculture that is not included within the network of social recognition is almost 
certainly also excluded from the socially acceptable modes of rational and emotional 
expression. Structures of dominance dictate the normative direction allowable to 
marginalized groups. This includes how they should respond to their social treatment and 
status. The ways a marginalized group would be permitted to struggle against their 
experiences of misrecognition and humiliation would be restricted, including in political 
avenues. In the U.S. South during segregation, there was little to no legal or political path 
allowed for African-Americans to struggle within the legal or political system against 
misrecognition and humiliation. Even when avenues of redress were not closed by the letter 
of the law, such as they were for black South Africans under apartheid, prevailing norms of 
discrimination prevent many marginalized groups from having fair access to the legal and 
political systems. For Honneth to say that the victimized, misrecognized, and ostracized 
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should have the “individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public 
sphere, rather than living them out in a counterculture of violence”361 misses the reality that 
being victimized, misrecognized, and ostracized usually also means being blocked from 
articulating one’s experiences in the democratic public sphere.  
McNay justifiably accuses Honneth of neglecting power structures and power 
inequalities that keep individuals from undertaking struggles for recognition.362 To improve 
Honneth’s theory, we must include the reality that power structures use recognition norms 
to suppress individuals and that individuals must work outside those recognition norms in 
order to struggle against misrecognition. This could mean a spectrum of behavior from 
acting outside proper etiquette to the extreme of actual violence. It is true that well-behaved 
women seldom make history. The American civil rights movement was an expression of 
individuals who were not being included within the network of social recognition and, thus, 
who were forced to conduct actions that were outside the behaviors stipulated as acceptable 
for them. Commendably, they largely did not resort to violence, but must we condemn the 
Palestinian intifada and other struggles for justice because they did? Perhaps we must, but 
that is a question that needs to be considered separately for each particular conflict. 
The possibilities for response to misrecognition are wider than social movements. 
Honneth is correct that it is “only by regaining the possibility of active conduct that 
individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result 
of humiliation.”363 However, active conduct toward this end does not have to be political or 
even social. A woman who has been humiliated by sexual or physical abuse has a number 
of avenues to take action to dispel her moral crisis aside from partaking in a political 
movement to change the legal system. At the most personal level, women survivors of 
abuse can seek personal recognition for their moral injuries from friends and family or a 
counselor. Only if the woman sought changes in the broader culture would she require a 
social movement. At a small-group level, Zurn mentions “Take Back the Night” or 
“Reclaim the Night” marches that are not waged through the legal system but are directed 
at cultural attitudes that enable the minimization of abuse of women364 and are also 
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designed to raise awareness about sexual assault and rape prevention. Some U.S. university 
campuses have created a safe zone or rape-free zone.365 Such zones do not, in themselves, 
attempt to change the laws, but they do provide solidarity for women who have been, or 
fear being, assaulted and abused. Despite their group coordination, such social efforts 
would fall short of the definition of a political resistance movement, yet these active efforts 
have the potential to empower women and give them a sense of solidarity and self-
confidence.  
These types of active conduct on the personal and small-group levels are struggles 
for recognition, and such personal acts of struggling for recognition are what lead to social 
and political struggles for recognition. Social movements do not spring up out of nothing. 
They arise from small groups of individuals discussing their experiences and what they 
hope and intend to do in response. These small groups arise when individuals, maybe even 
just one, start communicating their moral feelings and normative expectations. The 
semantic structure of moral language that is required to motivate a struggle for recognition 
is enacted only when individuals communicate; therefore, all social movements grow from 
individuals communicating. Social movements and political resistance movements bubble 
up from these communicative interactions among individuals. 
We need to consider the possibility that moral injuries can be motivating without 
being politically motivating—meaning attempting to change legislation or governments. It 
is not a given that individuals who are motivated to struggle for recognition will choose to 
act to affect the political institutions in their society. What goes into their decisions is 
difficult for theory to discern without delving into an individual’s personal life. McNay 
observes that “it is not possible to understand what makes an action political or not, or 
indeed what disinclines individuals to behave in a political manner in the first place, 
without engaging with their own understandings and interpretations of self and world.”366 
We can begin to engage with how individuals understand and interpret themselves and 
their world through a phenomenology informed by the multidimensional view of 
misrecognition and our emerging rethinking of struggles for recognition. Only by letting 
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the individual inform us about him- or herself can we hope to begin to understand his or 
her choices. How an individual views the political and his or her relation to it factors into 
that individual’s willingness to take on the political. Individuals may feel that attempting to 
change their recognition relations in the political sphere is too difficult or dangerous. They 
may instead opt to change their recognition relations with other groups on a more 
interpersonal level outside of political means. In such a case, the laws of the society do not 
change, and the subculture does not see expanded legal recognition, but individuals may 
win increased personal recognition from others. 
Looking at some other examples, we can see that the importance of social 
movements is slightly different from what Honneth portrays. Social groups are not required 
to struggle for recognition, but depending on the social level of the misrecognition, they 
can facilitate individuals’ responses to misrecognition, especially in the ability to 
communicate. If a friend misrecognizes me, I do not need a social movement to articulate 
to my friend my experience of being misrecognized. My struggle for recognition is part of 
an interpersonal relationship between my friend and me, and I can hope to communicate 
directly with my friend about my normative expectations. Beyond personal relationships, 
obstacles to communicating my normative expectations usually amount to a matter of 
access to those who can hear and act on my complaint. My workplace may not have a 
procedure for dealing with employee grievances, and my supervisors may be inaccessible. I 
may need the help of a labor union to be heard and recognized at work. Fundamentally, in a 
struggle for recognition, what is sought are visibility and the understanding from others that 
is needed to have our recognition claims answered. Existing social movements facilitate 
struggles for recognition in situations in which direct personal communication is not 
possible, such as changing a nation’s laws. If I want to change a law, my elected officials 
may not be able or willing to hear me. I may need the help of an organized advocacy group 
whose numbers can attract attention. The dynamic involved is the difference between 
horizontal recognition—individuals relating to another individual or a small group—and 
vertical recognition—the individual relating to cultural and legal institutions. An individual 
cannot easily take on “the system” on her own, though she could, on her own, make 
recognition claims on another individual or a small group.  
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Social movements are needed to overcome obstacles to being heard in one’s 
struggles for recognition but are not needed for the struggle itself. The lone protestor 
standing outside the council office or the White House is struggling for recognition of his 
or her cause, even if no one notices or cares. It is when those who struggle are noticed and 
get other people to care that social movements emerge. Honneth ties struggles for 
recognition to political movements, but it is better to see struggles for recognition as 
manifesting along a continuum. Individuals enter the political arena out of necessity, and 
perhaps only out of necessity. Even when they do enter the political arena, struggles for 
political recognition of ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity are ultimately struggles for 
personal security and well-being within a more inclusive culture. All struggles over 
personal identity and cultural recognition operate along a continuum of social scale. It is in 
this sense that Honneth’s social spheres make some sense, but their usefulness is limited 
because the boundaries are diffuse and fluid and relative to individual circumstances. I 
propose that it is better to think of struggles in terms of social avenues through which 
individuals act—the personal, small groups, or social movements, which do not map 
directly to the tripartite structure of family, civil society, and state. 
Honneth’s contention that struggles for recognition manifest as political resistance 
movements does not address the question of whether an individual is motivated actually to 
join such a movement. Honneth has no significant account of how political resistance 
movements begin, and he does not provide a clear account of why an individual would join 
a social movement. I contend that we must not lose sight of the reality that individuals are 
the social forces that initiate, build, and continue struggles for recognition. I agree with 
Zurn who warns that the view that social change is simply a case of ideals being worked 
out in practice hides the actual social struggles and serious conflicts involved in realizing 
such ideals of expanded recognition.367 I stress that these struggles and conflicts are 
undertaken by individuals and point to the examples previously given.  
All told, the resistance to misrecognition is more complex than Honneth’s mapping 
them exclusively to collective social movements involved in political resistance. Joining a 
collective movement is only one way to resist injustice, and, even if an individual has 
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joined a group, it is the individual who has engaged in that course to articulate his or her 
personal struggle for recognition. That preexistent social movements motivate individuals 
who have experienced misrecognition and facilitate individuals in struggling for 
recognition is certainly true, but the question of what generates social movements for 
recognition remains. One answer would be that social movements are generated by 
historical processes and are a product of progress. Another is that they are generated by 
individuals who decide to act on their feelings of being misrecognized and engage in 
struggles for recognition. Both are possible, and probably both contribute to the generation 
of each particular social movement for recognition.  
2.4 - Expanding the story of struggles for recognition 
Building on the discussion of misrecognition and struggles for recognition, I now 
seek to craft a narrative of struggles for recognition that solves problems within Honneth’s 
account. In this chapter, I will blend the strengths of Honneth’s account of recognition with 
the multidimensional account of misrecognition and the discussion on the problems in 
Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition to craft a more robust view of what is 
involved in recognition, misrecognition, and the struggles to correct injustices. Struggles 
for recognition are both how individuals become themselves and how societies change, 
both of which Honneth’s theory acknowledges. What I see as a central problem in 
Honneth’s theory is that although his guiding intuition is that intersubjective recognition is 
the normative structure of human personal development and ethical life, Honneth’s theory 
fails to include the full importance of individual contributions to intersubjective 
recognition. It is true, from one perspective, that social institutions are present and 
individuals are thrown (in a Heideggerian sense) into that social structure, but we would be 
negligent not to admit that as individuals interact they affect that social structure. That 
individuals have an effect on society and, thus, have the potential to change social 
structures and norms is crucial to the concept of struggles for recognition. It is true that 
individuals become who they are only through interacting with others, and it is also true 
that society becomes what it is only through individuals interacting with each other. 
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Perhaps no one would dispute that second point, but I argue that more emphasis needs to be 
placed on it. An expanded view of struggles for recognition is a step in that direction.  
The agency and political movements problems show the need to expand the concept 
of struggles for recognition. Honneth’s formula of a struggle for recognition—the response 
to feelings of being misrecognized manifesting through a social movement seeking 
political change—is only part of the story. Individuals seek rectification for misrecognition 
in a variety of ways, not all of which can be classified as political and/or collective 
struggles for recognition. Honneth could argue that struggles for recognition, because they 
are responses to social misrecognition, require a social movement. If this were true, it 
would be true only for macrosocial institutional misrecognitions—for example, apartheid 
or women being denied equal legal rights—situations in which systematic, mostly legal, 
change would be required. To be true to the phenomena of social life, we must 
acknowledge that some social struggles occur outside of social movements and for reasons 
other than effecting political change. It is a better expression of Honneth’s basic concept of 
struggles for recognition to expand the model of these struggles to include the wider variety 
of individuals’ efforts to restore healthy recognition relations. By tying struggles for 
recognition to collective political movements, Honneth creates a lacuna that hides other 
forms and aspects of struggles for recognition—most specifically, the very personal aspects 
that we can find in struggles for recognition. By decentralizing struggles for recognition 
from collective political movements and adding the concept of individual agency, we can 
craft a more robust picture of struggles for recognition. 
To expand a view of struggles for recognition that takes into account the above 
issues, I begin by identifying two types of struggle for recognition—affirmational and 
rectificatory. I argue that the presence of affirmational struggles in individuals’ lives is a 
resource that helps bridge the gap in Honneth’s theory between hurt feelings from being 
misrecognized to undertaking a rectificatory struggle for recognition. I then turn to how 
struggles for recognition are shaped by social power relations and the vying for the 
authority to claim recognition. These insights help us explain the ways that struggles for 
recognition extend beyond political resistance into personal relations that either connect or 
divide individuals. Finally, I address a further dilemma in Honneth’s account of struggles 
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for recognition: how it is that individuals who have not suffered misrecognition would join 
other individuals’ struggles for recognition. 
2.4.1 - Affirmational and rectificatory struggles 
The discussion so far about struggles for recognition indicates that there is more to 
the story of struggles for recognition than is present in Honneth’s account. Honneth 
predominantly uses the term “struggles for recognition” to refer to collective political 
resistance, but he also mentions Hegel’s notion of an ongoing struggle for recognition. In 
Honneth’s version of Hegel, an individual’s ethical progress toward self-realization unfolds 
within the Hegelian tripartite structure. The three Hegelian stages impose on individuals 
increasingly demanding patterns of mutual recognition as they gain positive confirmation 
of their identity. Hegel’s public spheres structure the intersubjective struggle for 
recognition, and an individual must progress through each of the three stages in turn. When 
Honneth uses “struggle” to describe the individual’s ethical progress through the Hegelian-
defined three stages of individual development, he is referring to an intersubjective struggle 
to gain positive relations-to-self in that dimension of one’s identity. Honneth sees Hegel as 
establishing 
that ethical progress unfolds in a series of three levels of increasingly 
demanding patterns of recognition, and that an intersubjective struggle 
mediates between each of these levels, a struggle that individuals conduct 
for the purpose of having their identity claim confirmed.368  
This kind of struggle for recognition drives communalization among individuals by making 
them aware of their subjective normative claims. The struggle for recognition within the 
three spheres is a mechanism of social integration that rationally informs individuals not 
only about their differences but also about their similarities; it both individuates and 
communalizes individuals, allowing them to form rational conceptions of themselves as 
individuated subjects.369 Not surprisingly, this ongoing process of confirming oneself 
Honneth describes as “an agonistic relationship that requires a permanent ‘struggle’ for 
recognition.”370  
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We need to ask what distinguishes a struggle for recognition from the constant 
seeking of recognition. We seek recognition always, even from infancy, Honneth says, and 
yet what Honneth means by a “struggle for recognition” is clearly something different from 
the everyday need for recognition. The everyday seeking of recognition needs to be parsed 
out and its relation to what Honneth means by struggles for recognition explored. The 
permanent ongoing struggle to confirm identity claims I will term “affirmational 
struggles.” They are the ongoing efforts of individuals to seek recognition that constructs 
and affirms their personal identities and their place in society. Whether or not we adopt the 
concept of self-constitution mentioned earlier, affirmational struggle is the intersubjective 
social process through which individual practical identity is constructed. The second type 
of struggle I will term “rectificatory struggles.” They are responses to circumstances or 
instances of misrecognition that seek to rectify perceived injustices and restore healthy 
recognition relations. Both types of struggle involve the intersubjective quest for 
recognition, but they differ in an important way. The affirmational struggle is a need prior 
to any particular social interaction and is the constant general condition of being a social 
individual. A rectificatory struggle is a specific response to a specific situation—a moral 
struggle to correct a perceived injustice or heal a moral injury—and it answers needs that 
arise subsequent to a particular social interaction. We can also view the distinction in these 
terms: Rectificatory struggles are secondary attempts to repair interruptions and 
interferences with the ongoing process of primary affirmation of social relations and 
belonging. In other words, there is cause for a rectificatory struggle only when something 
goes wrong, whereas the affirmational struggle remains necessary even if all is well. We 
could summarize that an affirmational struggle is necessary to and inseparable from social 
life, and a rectificatory struggle is a contingent response subsequent to social life going 
wrong. This distinction remains even if we were to argue that things always go wrong in 
recognition relations.  
This distinction between affirmational and rectificatory struggles for recognition 
clarifies without contradicting Honneth’s theory and helps us understand the motivations 
for different struggles for recognition. The differentiation is between a struggle for 
affirmation and a struggle for justice, with the former being in service of the latter. Much of 
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Honneth’s discussion of struggles for recognition can be placed under the label of 
rectificatory struggles that seek to change social conditions. Other accounts of struggles for 
recognition, such as the kind outlined by Taylor, would also describe rectificatory 
struggles. The distinction also helps us understand the agency and political movements 
problems mentioned earlier by seeing them in terms of the relationship between 
rectificatory struggles and affirmational struggles.  
Affirmational struggles can be seen as the process through which individuals affirm 
their practical identities, which coincides with Korsgaard’s concept of self-constitution. We 
do not come into the world with a constituted identity, but through seeking and receiving 
affirmation we continually constitute our social practical identity, and this makes us who 
we are. Absent from Korsgaard’s account is a full appreciation of the difficulties involved 
in maintaining a practical identity. Korsgaard does admit that it is our plight that we are 
compelled to respond to our world.371 But beyond our existential plight is our continual 
practical plight that we must continually act in accordance with our normative 
responsibilities associated with our social roles. Especially in today’s world, protecting and 
enhancing our social relations are imperatives; therefore, seeking recognition from others is 
imperative. Affirmational struggles are a struggle because of the nature of recognition 
relations. We are compelled not just to respond to the world but to interact with others and 
maintain healthy and beneficial relations with them. The normative structure of society 
continually places demands on us, which places our practical identity at risk. These 
demands increase the more we interact with others, also increasing the risk to our social 
standing and autonomy.  
Understanding the importance of affirmational struggles provides an answer to the 
objection that recognition assumes human relations are essentially warlike, thereby making 
it problematic to imagine that struggles for recognition can lead to peaceful recognition 
relations.372 Affirmational struggles are not necessarily struggles against others, and they 
do not reflect a war of all against all. Mostly, affirmational struggles are an attempt to fit in, 
to belong, and to be accepted, so they are the opposite of oppositional struggles. Certainly, 
there is competition among individuals for honors and prizes, but competitions for esteem 
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are different from the need to affirm one’s sense of identity. Many of us do want to be 
exceptional, to be a winner and acknowledged as such, but our sense of identity probably 
does not depend on being seen as exceptional.  
The idea of affirmational struggles can be further unpacked by using McBride’s 
“interactionist” approach to recognition in contrast to what he calls Honneth’s 
“developmental” approach. McBride’s approach “focuses on the way recognition-
sensitivity is a basic aspect of social interaction, and of the daily exercise of individual 
agency, rather than of the way we come to achieve this competence.”373 McBride uses the 
term “recognition-sensitivity” to describe a basic aspect of all individuals in the social 
world. McBride observes that the role Honneth ascribes to recognition in the acquisition of 
autonomy and social capacities implies that the work of recognition is over when relevant 
capabilities have been acquired. McBride says that “the developmental approach appears to 
treat recognition as a sort of scaffolding necessary to the construction of personhood, but 
which then becomes redundant once personhood has been achieved.”374 McBride likens 
Honneth’s developmental approach to the view of an individual as an empty vessel that 
must be filled by the various modes of recognition in order for the individual to function in 
the social world. Honneth does mention that continued recognition is needed not just to 
develop relations-to-self but also to rebuild healthy relations-to-self damaged by 
misrecognition and to regain the confidence to function in the world. McBride 
acknowledges this, but asks what purpose recognition continues to serve if we currently 
have basic functioning capabilities. The developmental approach seems to leave no reason 
for individuals to continue to want to seek recognition but they clearly do continue to seek 
it. I think McBride’s comments show that Honneth’s account is too inclined toward the 
view of the individual as a passive empty vessel that recognition makes autonomous and 
misrecognition renders nonautonomous. Such a view does not sufficiently describe how 
recognition works in everyday lives as an active ongoing interactive process. 
McBride’s interactionist approach sees recognition as a guide for learning how to act 
in ethical space and as social feedback that allows us to correct our actions.375 Our 
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recognition-sensitivity, McBride says, helps us get our bearings in the normatively 
constituted world that we inhabit. As we interact with others in our everyday lives, we 
adapt and revise our understandings and expectations of appropriate behaviors, others, and 
ourselves. McBride says that individuals seek recognition because recognition is a resource 
in our everyday interactions with others. Thus, we desire recognition not just to feel good 
about ourselves but to function fruitfully in society. Our interactions with others form a 
continuous feedback loop in which the more we receive recognition the better we are able 
to function in the social world, which earns us more recognition, which hones our social 
functioning, and so on. We can convert respect and esteem into power and wealth, which 
explains why individuals continue to pursue recognition interactively after they have 
achieved autonomy. We can see the truth of McBride’s description in that within 
recognition of one’s capabilities are different kinds of recognition. For 
example, recognizing one’s capability to do tasks does not necessarily include the 
recognition that one is capable of doing them unassisted. Thus, an individual may develop 
the self-confidence to do a certain activity but only with guidance or only in certain safe 
social situations. An individual’s social life is a web of recognition relations, with shifting 
connections and dispositions. We learn different roles and identities for different 
circumstances—child, sibling, spouse, employee, friend, and so on—and we learn how to 
express ourselves through our roles. As much as we assert ourselves and our sense of our 
identities, however, we remain dependent on the recognition of others to assess our 
performance and affirm us in our roles; and, ultimately, our community is the arbiter of 
whether we are playing our roles properly. Thus, every life is a constellation of 
affirmational struggles in continual interaction with others. 
Affirmational struggles are constant and formative. To be a social individual means 
that recognition claims are inescapable because one cannot function in a culture without 
receiving recognition from others as a member of that culture. This means that being 
involved with affirmational struggles for recognition is an “ineliminable feature for social 
life and the exercise of our autonomy.”376 There are a bewildering and almost frightening 
number of norms by which one will or will not be recognized as behaving properly, from 
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not committing violence to how one should blow one’s nose in public. If we run afoul of 
cultural conventions, we pay a price in negative judgments from others, which could affect 
our interactions with them. It is our plight that we are compelled, not only to respond to the 
world, but to seek its response to us. Complicating our plight, our culture does not always 
give us a clear and coherent set of normative expectations and feedback. Part of our 
affirmational struggles is to understand and interpret what is expected of us. We are forced 
to learn to become adjudicators of the norms and the various interpretations of how to 
apply them and affirm ourselves through them. 
In the process of socialization, individuals become accustomed to the seeking of 
recognition as a constant in their lives. Learning recognition norms, learning how to 
interpret normative claims, and developing a practical identity are continual processes that 
take place in social life. In the socialization process, we all learn our culture’s recognition 
norms and what behaviors on our part bring us recognition. Experiences of affirmational 
struggles for recognition structure individuals’ normative expectations and how they see 
and interpret their world. As an individual experiences instances of recognition and 
misrecognition, that individual constitutes his or her worldview and sense of identity. 
When we do not receive the affirmation we need and believe we are entitled to, we may 
seek other individuals from whom and communities from which we can receive it. 
Achieving recognition is a social skill that is necessary to navigate social life and must be 
learned through the socialization process. As social beings, individuals cannot help but 
develop at least some skill in affirmational struggles; to fail to gain that skill is to fail at 
life.  
2.4.2 - Affirmational struggles as foundation for rectificatory struggles 
We saw earlier that experiencing moral injuries from misrecognition is insufficient 
motivation for an individual to undertake a struggle for recognition. The presence of a 
subcultural interpretive structure and language is also insufficient to move an individual to 
a rectificatory struggle. The individual’s movement to a struggle for recognition remains 
insufficiently explained, and I think that reframing the issue by including the presence of 
affirmational struggles in an individual’s everyday life will help answer it. Honneth’s 
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framing is too optimistic, which ironically creates difficulties for his theory. He never 
explicitly says subjects are in a condition of positive relations-to-self from receiving 
recognition prior to experiencing moral injuries, but that is implied from his idea of a 
subject moving through the spheres of recognition, beginning with the love recognition one 
receives from one’s mother. We can recall Honneth’s idea that after recognition is learned 
within the family sphere, other relations of recognition are “merely filled out at later stages 
through the acquisition of conceptions about the reciprocal ascription of abilities and 
rights.”377 The suggestion throughout Honneth’s work is that misrecognition happens to a 
previously recognized subject whose society has, through recognition, given it an 
understanding of normative expectations and can for these reasons understand it is being 
misrecognized. The social reality is that individuals do not go from experiencing a positive 
state of relations-to-self, then experience a negative state of misrecognition, only to be 
ready to respond with a positive struggle for recognition. Instead, individuals constantly 
need recognition; constantly are engaged in seeking it; and, in real ways, constantly lack 
recognition.  
I view the individual’s movement to a struggle of political resistance as a movement 
from one mode, a continual affirmational struggle, to another mode, a contingent 
rectificatory struggle. There is still a gap between affirmational and rectificatory struggles, 
but that gap is not as wide as is the one in Honneth’s account. Honneth relies on individuals 
being convinced by an existing political resistance movement, but he cannot explain how 
this movement came into existence, nor does he adequately explain how the presence of a 
movement provides an internal resource for the individual to move toward engaging in a 
rectificatory struggle for recognition. We can rely instead on individuals having the internal 
resources that they have developed through their past affirmational struggles for 
recognition. The human need for affirmation of being socially adept and accepted is ever 
present. Affirmational struggles are constant, but rectificatory struggles are not, even if 
they seem to be always around the corner. The former are necessary, even when 
recognition relations are healthy, but the latter are contingent and require a “yes, but” 
decision and action. Recognition and misrecognition are personal rather than abstract 
                                                 
377
 Honneth, “Rejoinder,” 392.  
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 180 of 226 
instances for us. As Honneth is correct to point out, the experience of misrecognition is an 
emotional injury more than an intellectual issue. What we can add to that picture is that 
misrecognition also interrupts the everyday affirmational struggle. The state of emotional 
tension that Honneth identifies results not only from a rational comparison of experience to 
normative expectations but also from a disruption of relations-to-self and practical projects. 
Honneth’s insight that emotional experiences are at the core of struggles for recognition is 
enhanced by including the frustration of interruption in our daily lives. Whether or not we 
have rational reasons, we have a natural expectation that events in our lives will unfold as 
we desire. When that desired for flow of events is interrupted, we take action to rectify the 
situation, often emotionally. Individuals perceive moral injury more in terms of a hindrance 
of their involvements than as a violation of society’s norms. I concede there is a legitimate 
concern that we not lump the normative concerns of recognition and justice with the 
mundane concerns of everyday activities—being misrecognized is not equivalent to one’s 
appliance malfunctioning; however, the human responses to these very different events are 
not entirely dissimilar. The human responses to misrecognition are usually not high-minded 
and normatively guided rational political struggles but instead are a more personal struggle 
limited to restoring a personal sense of well-being or basic functioning, such as in food 
riots. 
Because affirmational struggles are constant in our lives, we are familiar with 
recognition being an issue for us even if we do not think of it in rational, theoretic terms. 
Affirmational struggles for recognition are an important part of intersubjective relations 
and the fabric of human society, and we cannot conceive of social life without them. As 
social beings, we are recognition-sensitive beings and because affirmational struggles are 
constants in our lives, we are also sensitive to rectificatory struggles for recognition. 
Individuals are already exercising their agency to varying degrees of action in their 
everyday affirmational struggles, and they can draw on these experiences to overcome 
moral injuries, a possibility not accounted for in Honneth’s theory. That we are all familiar 
with affirmational struggles still does not answer why one individual engages in a 
rectificatory struggle while another does not. This is where we return to the “yes, but” 
described earlier, and we can see that it is the prelude to a rectificatory struggle for 
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recognition. Affirmational struggles are a struggle for recognition from others, ideally 
based on successful engagement with recognition norms. In this way, affirmational 
struggles are acts in accordance with those with whom we interact. As responses to 
misrecognition, rectificatory struggles are acts in conflict with those with whom we 
interact. The move from affirmational struggles to rectificatory struggles takes place in 
response to a misrecognition that violates our normative expectations, harms our identity 
claims, and interrupts the expected flow of our lives. The “yes, but” is a rejection of 
acquiescence to one’s situation along with an active attempt to change it. That individuals 
desire recognition and are sensitive to misrecognition is not enough for them to struggle for 
recognition when it is denied them. An individual must draw on his or her agency and 
make a decision to undertake a struggle for recognition.  
What is the “yes, but” act founded on? I described earlier how the concepts of self-
constitution and habitus give us a conceptual basis for how an individual could come to 
undertake a struggle for recognition. An individual acts out of individual agency and draws 
on an interpretive structure, but, also, the individual draws on the practice that comes from 
participating in affirmational struggles. By learning how to participate in affirmational 
struggles, an individual develops skills that are a reservoir from which to draw on for 
rectificatory struggles. We continuously try to be seen by others in the right way in terms 
of recognition. From this familiarity, we can move to rectificatory struggles that are also 
about being seen in the right way but in response to misrecognition. Affirmative struggles 
are ways to avoid misrecognition; rectificatory struggles are ways to correct 
misrecognition. Affirmational struggles are preemptive, and because we are already in this 
mind-set of continually avoiding misrecognition, we can switch our efforts into how we 
can correct misrecognition when it occurs. We can directly connect our rectificatory 
struggles with our ongoing affirmational attempts to stave off misrecognition, and we are 
capable of using our agency to move from one struggle to the other. Honneth has no such 
account.  
The constant of recognition in our lives gives us internal resources to draw on when 
faced with misrecognition. These resources enable us to relate better to rectificatory 
struggles, understand the recognitional issues involved, and move toward action. Our 
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familiarity with affirmational recognition struggles gives us intersubjective resources to 
draw on so that we can respond to injustice with something other than brute force. 
Acknowledging this partially fills the gap in Honneth’s account. An acknowledgment of 
individual agency is still needed to explain the move from suffering misrecognition to 
struggling for recognition, but now that move is not as far as it is in Honneth’s account. We 
saw earlier from McBride the idea of virtual recognition—the idea that one can imagine 
virtual recognition. Because we can imagine the cessation of experiencing misrecognition, 
it may motivate us to take action toward that end and consider what steps we can take to 
minimize misrecognition of ourselves and rectify the damage done to us by it.  
The role of affirmational struggles in rectificatory struggles also helps us to think 
about where to place the emancipatory interest in struggles for recognition. Honneth argued 
that critical theory must acknowledge that the emancipatory process must manifest itself in 
the moral experiences378 of the individuals involved and that the impairment of an 
individual’s freedom must be pretheoretical379; individuals must “experience an impairment 
of what we can call their moral experiences, i.e., their ‘moral point of view,’ not as a 
restriction of intuitively mastered rules of language, but as a violation of identity claims 
acquired in socialization.”380 This is true because we do not live according to theory, nor do 
we live primarily reflectively. Individuals also do not act in response to theory; they act in 
response to their moral experiences, which theory only helps to interpret. We can better 
understand this through affirmational and rectificatory struggles. A weakness in much of 
critical theory is that it places the emancipatory interest in social class, not in individuals. 
We can remedy this by turning the focus to the microsocial level, redefining emancipatory 
interest in terms of individuals’ practical projects within their everyday affirmational 
struggles. Individuals desire to understand and be understood, to recognize and be 
recognized, mostly in terms of fulfilling their everyday needs. Methods of understanding 
and being understood by others are learned through experience, and this learning is 
necessary to manage one’s involvements in the world successfully. The “yes, but” of 
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rectificatory struggles comes from individuals who desire an end to their suffering from 
misrecognition. They draw on their familiarity with everyday affirmational struggles for 
identity and social belonging to seek changes in their circumstances. Again, misrecognition 
can not only injure an individual’s self-esteem but also interrupt the everyday affirmational 
struggle. A very simple motivation for rectificatory struggles can be to return one’s 
situation to what is perceived as normal. Not everyone is motivated by high-minded 
conceptions of justice for one’s social class.  
We can also see how the power structure can exploit individuals’ needs for 
recognition and their familiarity with affirmational struggles. Critical theory has long 
shown an interest in the question of why the class struggle has not resulted in a revolution 
by the proletariat. Honneth’s theory about why it has not happened is that in response to 
workers’ demands for justice, the dominant class uses a combination of social mechanisms 
to narrow the possibilities for the suppressed proletariat to articulate their experiences of 
injustice rationally. In this sense, capitalism has evolved into a “new capitalism” that has 
romantically charged the idea of individualism and, changing the recognition norms, 
shifted the onus for bettering their circumstances onto individuals. Workers are no longer 
recognized for fulfilling hierarchically defined roles within a large enterprise, Honneth 
argues. Now, workers must become “entreployees”—entrepreneurs of their own labor—
showing self-motivated initiative and bringing their abilities and resources to 
individualized projects to seek recognition for their achievement and move their career 
ahead.381 What Honneth has astutely noticed is how capitalism and corporations have 
learned a way to channel employees’ personal affirmational struggles into serving the 
interests of the capitalists. The normative structure of new capitalism is that workers are 
responsible for whether they are noticed and appreciated by employers, so workers are 
responsible for whether they are hired or fired, promoted or not, their employment status 
now tied to their need for affirmational recognition. The structural contradictions of 
capitalism are “no longer even perceived as those of capitalism as such, since subjects have 
‘learned’ in their role as entreployees to assume responsibility for their own fate.”382 
Meanwhile, the actual freedom and compensation given to workers by the system is not 
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commensurate with the promises made to workers if they adopt the new labor paradigm. 
Capitalism has managed to divert consciousness of economic exploitation and workers’ 
emancipatory interest from rectificatory struggles into affirmational struggles. 
It makes sense, theoretically, to view rectificatory struggles for recognition as closely 
related to affirmational struggles and even as a further expression of affirmational 
struggles. What this does for us is place the rectificatory struggles undertaken by social 
movements in the context of personal affirmational struggles, bridging the gap between the 
political and the personal. The extent to which an individual is already engaging in 
affirmational struggles contributes to his or her capability of undertaking a rectificatory 
struggle. When we explore particular incidents of rectificatory struggles for recognition, we 
see how they can be sparked by an individual act and how political movements depend on 
those individual acts. The Montgomery bus boycott is an example. It began at a particular 
moment in time: December 5, 1955, inspired by the solitary act of resistance a few days 
earlier by Rosa Parks. Within Honneth’s framework, we can ask whether a political 
resistance movement already existed and whether that movement was what motivated 
Parks to act. The particular political resistance of the boycott did not exist at the time Parks 
acted, though her solitary act did spark a social movement to begin such resistance. Parks 
did have an interpretive structure—her church community and her involvement in the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Honneth could 
argue that the NAACP constituted a broader social movement that motivated Parks to act 
despite there not being a particular political movement to boycott the Montgomery City 
Lines bus company.383 However, the language of rights and justice had been there for 
centuries—even language that addressed the injustice and misrecognition directed at the 
African-American community. Similarly, the interpretive structure of Marxism has existed 
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for decades, and the predicted rising up of the proletariat has not occurred. This is why 
some point to power structures as the force that squelches resistance. 
Why did Rosa Parks act that day? Honneth’s resources to answer that question are 
external factors such as existing political resistance movements. I expand the resources by 
including Rosa Parks’s capacity to use her own embodied agency within a particular social 
situation to respond to misrecognition. For Honneth, the question is how a collective 
political resistance movement influenced Rosa Park’s actions on the bus. For me, the 
question expands to include what Rosa Parks herself felt, thought, and did on that bus. Both 
external forces and individual agency must be taken into account to explain what makes 
struggles for recognition possible. Did Parks need a social movement to feel motivated to 
resist? She needed an interpretive structure, but what else she needed was, as she said, 
determination: 
When that white driver stepped back toward us, when he waved his hand 
and ordered us up and out of our seats, I felt a determination to cover my 
body like a quilt on a winter night.384 
How are we to understand what Rosa Parks experienced and the action she performed that 
evening? To say she could act only if there was an existing political movement around her 
would be to render her without power or autonomy. To say she could act entirely 
spontaneously would be to neglect the realities of her being embedded within and 
socialized by the power structure. The answer lies between the extremes: Despite the power 
structure and the long history of misrecognition of African-Americans, women, and her 
personally, Rosa Parks, a self-constituting African-American woman, exercised her agency 
that day. There was no existing political movement, but she was involved in affirmational 
struggles, both to affirm her own practical identity in her own life and with the NAACP to 
affirm a social identity for African-Americans. Thus, she could, at that fateful moment on 
the bus, draw on her agency and familiarity with struggle to become determined to resist. 
Parks called on what McBride terms a “virtual public,” appealing “over the head” of the 
bus driver who refused to recognize her claims. She could, as Zurn says, anticipate full 
recognition from her community, even in the face of misrecognition from the broader 
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society.385 That Parks had reasonable expectations that her subcultural community would 
support her undoubtedly contributed to her determination. But, ultimately, it was her on 
that bus at that time who made the decision to act, not in opposition to how the white 
power structure had defined her as an actor, but to act instead from her love for herself that 
was not defined by white domination. She was “tired of giving in”386 and said “yes, but.” A 
social movement can help individuals by affirming them in developing more positive 
relations-to-self, giving them a better position to say “yes, but,” and this is part of what the 
NAACP was doing for individuals like Parks. Ultimately, though, individuals need to act. 
Honneth would hardly disagree that Rosa Parks made an individual decision to act, 
but lacking an adequate account of individual engagement and agency, he is unable to 
explain how struggles for recognition can begin. Political resistance movements cannot 
bear all of the weight of moving an individual from hurt feelings to actions that struggle for 
recognition. By including individual agency, we can construct a narrative for struggles for 
recognition in that an individual, suffering hurt feelings for misrecognition and having 
individual agency and familiarity with affirmational struggles, responds to his or her 
misrecognition with “yes, but” and overcomes socialization to act and attempt to change 
the situation. If the individual receives from others recognition that he or she is seeking 
rectification (a recognition that can come only from other individuals who use their own 
agency to overcome socialization), it actualizes and strengthens the individual’s struggle 
for recognition, enabling the individual to take further action, which could lead to further 
recognition of the struggle from others, and so on. Perhaps others recognize in the 
individual’s struggles that they have suffered similar misrecognition and can use their 
agency to engage with the emerging rectificatory struggle against a shared injustice. 
Individual engagement is crucial for struggles for recognition to begin, and because 
Honneth does not talk about individual engagement and agency, he misses one of the 
necessary elements of struggles for recognition. Amending Honneth’s account with 
individual agency enhances his theory and provides us with more resources to explore how 
individuals’ capacities and dispositions may motivate them to resist or not to resist. 
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There is a further move from rectificatory struggles to social movements. What 
motivates struggles for recognition is being an individual embedded in a culture. What 
motivates social movements is individuals joining in common cause in response to 
perceived injustices within their culture. Rosa Parks’s action precipitated a political 
movement only because others joined with her in a rectificatory struggle to change social 
conditions and their culture’s recognition norms. The paths from individual acts to social 
movements are complex, the discussion of which requires considerable input from social 
movement studies that I cannot take on in this study. However, the emerging picture of 
struggles for recognition that I outline here can inform a deeper study of those paths. 
2.4.3 - Power relations in misrecognition and struggles for recognition 
Obviously, a struggle for recognition is not as simple as an individual’s decision to 
act because individuals are embedded in a social environment that is influenced by a power 
structure. Recognition relations are shaped by social norms that are intertwined with a 
power structure. The dynamic interactions between norms and individuals, including 
misrecognition and responses to misrecognition, play out within a social environment of 
institutionalized patterns of cultural value. We therefore must have at least some 
conception of how power structures affect recognition relations. 
Honneth has been criticized for not having a sufficient conception of power in his 
theory of recognition. McNay says that Honneth’s limited view of power binds agency with 
identity, which dilutes the effects of power on subjectivity, particularly how power 
mediates the relation between agency and identity.387 Petherbridge also criticizes Honneth 
for an inadequate conception of power, though she observes that Honneth prefers 
Foucault’s relational theory of power over the one-dimensional notion of structural power 
in Althusser and Adorno. Honneth, writing with Hans Joas,388 saw Althusser’s theory of 
power as limited to the manipulative strategies and procedures of the state. Honneth and 
Joas prefer Foucault’s concept of the “microphysics of power,” which places the genesis of 
power relations in local-level confrontations such as in factories, families, and schools. 
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Foucault’s theoretical model is a great advance, Honneth and Joas believe, because it 
reveals that power relations are reproduced and maintained in a society’s everyday 
conflicts between opposed interests; indeed, this is the sole way through which a social 
system of power maintains itself. Honneth, on his own in The Critique of Power, agrees 
with Foucault that power is not something that can be possessed but is a relation, “a fragile 
and open-ended product of strategic conflicts between subjects.”389 Honneth also agrees 
with Foucault’s idea that power lies at the everyday level of social life, formed in the 
strategic changes of everyday conflicts.390 These important conceptions of power, included 
by Honneth in his early work are, Petherbridge claims, largely dropped in his later work. I 
agree with Petherbridge that the radical contingency and indeterminacy of the human 
condition revealed by Foucault’s “micro-analysis” of power opens up questions concerning 
Honneth’s critical project.391 I believe Petherbridge is also correct that Honneth has tended 
to overlook the complexity of the constitutive dimensions of power.392 This leaves 
Honneth’s theory without a robust account of forms of productive power at the level of 
intersubjective relations.393 
Recognition is bound up with power. As Allen says, “a state of human 
intersubjectivity that is completely free of power relations and is structured entirely by 
mutual recognition is an illusion, and a pernicious one at that.”394 Petherbridge is correct 
that recognition may only be enacted within the context of power relations and that it might 
be the case that the normativity of recognition must always exist within the context of 
power relations.395 Importantly, Petherbridge and Allen both state that not all forms of 
power are forms of domination but that some are constitutive and enabling. It makes sense 
to think that individuals seek to avoid dominating power and acquire enabling power by 
acting strategically within the context of power relations. Because individuals are 
embedded in a social environment, and expressions of recognition and the seeking of it are 
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shaped and restrained by power relations, it is in individuals’ self-interest to act in 
accordance with the prevailing recognition norms. Allen correctly observes that: 
if individual identity is always constituted and sustained through 
intersubjective recognition, then we will have an interest in sticking with 
those modes of communication and recognition that serve to stabilize and 
confirm our identities, whether they are systematically distorted by 
asymmetrical relations of power or not.396  
When seeking recognition, individuals have little choice but to work within their culture’s 
recognition norms.  
Petherbridge argues that “Foucault’s ‘micro-analysis’ of power enables a 
consideration of power as a modality of everyday relations and forms of interaction,”397 a 
consideration she thinks that Honneth would have done well to consider in his theory of 
recognition. It seems almost self-evident to view recognition relations within power 
relations, though perhaps they are one and the same. If, as McBride argues, recognition 
includes a struggle for authority, then recognition is about power. Struggles for recognition 
are then struggles about and for power—the power for the authority over recognition 
relations and norms. If power produces the social, then recognition and misrecognition 
contribute to the social. Petherbidge’s notion of productive power in subject-formation and 
intersubjective relations is useful here.398 Power not only can oppress and dominate 
individuals but also can enable their productive capacities and relations-to-self. 
Petherbridge refers to constitutive or productive power and says, on the basis of Foucault, 
that it is distinguishable from forms of domination by always being changeable, reversible, 
and unstable. How I interpret this idea as fitting into recognition and misrecognition is that 
behaviors of recognition and misrecognition are expressions of intersubjective power, both 
dominating power and productive power. Individuals are vying for power in their everyday 
interactions, and this power struggle is part of affirmational struggles. When power within 
intersubjective relations is changeable and reversible, healthy recognition and productive 
affirmation are possible. When power relations are not changeable and reversible, such as 
in pathological recognition and normative discrimination, misrecognition is inevitable. 
Dominating power impedes intersubjective relations, which renders us irrelevant in our 
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interactions with others; it impedes our capability to contribute to and appropriate our own 
practical identity, and it disturbs our relations to ourselves and the world.399 Affirmational 
and rectificatory struggles both use productive, enabling power within intersubjective 
relations both in terms of using the power structure in service of one’s own interests and in 
developing countercultural identities, communities, and even institutions. 
There is a tension between power relations and recognition relations, but there is also 
a strong connection between them. Like recognition, power is a relationship. When we see 
that they are interactive elements within interpersonal relations, we get a fuller picture of 
intersubjective relations. Foucault’s view of intersubjectivity is as mutually constructing 
subjectivity, in which each individual’s subjectivity is constructed through his or her 
relations with others.400 At times, Foucault’s notion of the social construction of the subject 
reduces the individual to an entity subjected to control by others and tied to the identity 
created by others for him or her, which is a problematic view if taken to extremes. If 
intersubjectivity means anything, it cannot mean that an individual is affected only by 
others but has no effect on others. At other times, Foucault steers clear of this problematic 
view, saying that “to live in society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is 
possible—and in fact ongoing.”401 The possibility of action that affects other actions is 
what makes social struggle possible. As Foucault also says, “power relations are rooted 
deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted ‘above’ society”402 Combining these thoughts 
with the idea of recognition as an intersubjective relation shows that recognition, and 
especially struggles for recognition, is an issue of power aiming to influence the 
constitution of subjectivity in oneself and others. Recognition operates within power 
relations because both recognition and power relations work within normative structures. 
By construing recognition as the valuing of others, we can see how recognition carves out a 
space of significance within relations, including power relations. Struggles for recognition 
are not only struggles against domination or subjectification but also struggles for meaning 
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and significance. Our intersubjective actions construct us as individuals and construct our 
social world; we construct each other and the culture we inhabit. We act to modify the 
attitudes and actions of others just as they act to modify our attitudes and actions. These 
actions, both supportive and conflictual actions, construct and structure the field of our 
interactions and possible responses to each other. Struggles for recognition have ambitions 
other than changes in social institutions; they also seek to change the field of personal 
interactions. Struggles for recognition are complex and varied. Exchanges of recognition 
“may not merely enact forms of positive affirmation but exchanges may involve 
compromises, negative constructions, or even maintain power relations.”403 
Rectificatory struggles seek to change the recognition order and the power structure 
behind it. A central paradox of struggles for recognition is that for those struggles to exist 
at all, the individuals involved must act in a way that is contrary to the prevailing power 
structure. Rectificatory struggles are possible because the power structure does not 
completely determine individuals’ actions. As Allen says, the regulatory regimes of power 
structures cannot maintain and reproduce themselves without the involvement of the 
individuals whom they regulate.404 Individuals are not merely passive objects; they are 
social actors with their own involvements. When individuals come together in common 
cause to engage in rectificatory struggles, they cease to maintain and reproduce the power 
structure; and with persistence and good fortune, they can change their culture. Such 
change is possible because individual subjectivity is not entirely the product of the social 
process of recognition. As Honneth observes, if it was, there would be no space to consider 
the presocial constitution of the individual and no possibility to consider the force of 
negativity in the individual that is responsible for nonconformism, resistance, and revolt.405 
Resistance and revolt are correctly understood as a negative force in that they are an 
individual’s negative response to his or her current situation. This negativity, though, is a 
means by which positive results can be won. A struggle for recognition is a negative 
response to a negative situation that attempts to create a more positive situation. If 
oppression is intrinsic to the social structure, then we cannot expect society to solve it. 
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Oppression is a problem that can be solved only by individuals stepping outside the 
dominant power structure and acting separately from it. To fight injustice, we need 
continually to assess and reinterpret our perceptions and actions. This is a personal activity. 
Only we can do it. 
Despite the prevailing power structure, power relations emerge from individual 
interactions and involvements. Social institutions are not the only sites of action and 
interaction—intersubjective relations are also. Recognition is usually discussed in terms of 
a state recognizing individuals, such as the recognition of same-sex marriage. Honneth’s 
work opens up the importance of discussing individuals recognizing each other. What 
Honneth brings to critical theory is the possibility of normative-based resistance to power, 
though he places this possibility within collective political resistance. I believe that 
Honneth is correct that the consideration of a normative dimension is important in 
developing a theory of the social that can account for how a stabilization of power can arise 
out of social conditions of continual struggle. A consideration of power in interpersonal 
relationships is important in a theory of recognition and misrecognition because any 
recognition or misrecognition behavior takes place within a power dynamic that includes a 
struggle. But I suspect a difficulty for social theory arises if it adopts a particular 
characterization of struggle as being true among all individuals. I believe more work 
remains to develop an account of how the disparate instances of individual social action 
form a social order. I argue that it is more productive to characterize power within the 
dynamic tension of individuals’ involvements that are played out in terms of physical 
actions, communications, and cultural expressions. Placing the focus on individual 
interactions and involvements will better illuminate the reasons for misrecognition and the 
effects on those who suffer from it.  
2.4.4 - The authority to claim recognition 
Because recognition is a specific response to how a specific individual is, the 
question arises as to who has the authority to recognize another, and what is the authority 
that sets the standards for recognition norms? The temptation is to say that social 
institutions, perhaps the state, can and should establish and guard social norms. Aside from 
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the question of the moral legitimacy of the state or other institutions imposing norms on 
individuals, there is the practical question of how much any institutional authority in 
practice dictates how individuals recognize the recognition norms. An institution can guide 
behavior only if individuals recognize the authority of that institution and follow its 
guidance. Whether an individual follows authority out of respect for the institution or fears 
negative consequences for not following, each is a kind of recognition. 
Both affirmational and rectificatory struggles are not only over who receives 
recognition but also over who has the authority to grant recognition. As McBride says: 
At the heart of the struggle for recognition is a struggle for authority; 
authority, firstly, over our self-interpretations, and secondly, over the 
authority of the normative expectations which we have of others and of 
ourselves, and which others, in turn, have of us.406  
There are two important insights in McBride’s statement. The first is that recognition 
norms and our relations to them are subject to interpretation. The second is that the struggle 
for recognition is not just to receive recognition but to be able to influence recognition 
relations. Instances of recognition and misrecognition are inherently interpersonal, and 
interpersonal relations are inherently and inescapably bound up with recognition concerns. 
Likewise, struggles for recognition are inherently interpersonal. In seeking recognition 
from another, we recognize the other as having an amount of authority and power over us. 
We are seeking something that the other can give to us or withhold from us. The double-
edged nature of recognition reveals that part of recognition is that we recognize another as 
having the authority and power to recognize us. Conversely, if we do not recognize another 
as having that authority and power, then whether he or she recognizes us would not matter 
much to us. I will get recognition from you only if I recognize you first. Recognition can 
happen only intersubjectively. This reason we need others (in addition to the many other 
reasons we need others) adds to the tensions surrounding recognition. 
Many expressions of power, including domination and oppression, reflect conflicts 
about recognition norms and the authority over them. Targeted violence by whites 
intending to terrorize and subjugate African-Americans had, as Zurn says, a specific moral 
meaning that nonwhites were not worthy of the most basic consideration given to humans 
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as humans.407 This means that these acts of violence were about recognition: who should 
and who should not receive it. Collective movements in support of segregation of the races 
in the United States were struggles to support a recognition order that recognized the white 
race as superior to the black race, or, to be more accurate, recognized their conceptions of 
what white race and black race meant. To call collective segregation movements struggles 
for recognition would certainly be perverse, but that would reflect the perversity of the 
normative discrimination behind these collective movements. The American civil rights 
movement was a political resistance movement against the segregation recognition order 
and was clearly by definition a struggle for recognition.  
What are we to make of the white resistance to the civil rights movement? As 
repulsive as their racism and oppression was (and still is in some quarters), their struggle is 
based on recognition norms. Obviously, those norms are morally lacking, but we must not 
discount the fact that in the minds of those fighting to maintain norms of racial supremacy, 
their struggle is about recognition. We do not in any way condone their immoral bigotry by 
acknowledging this. The white supremacist movement is a struggle for recognition of 
normative discrimination and a fight against those who will not recognize those norms. 
White supremacists speak of defending the existence of white people and fighting against a 
“white genocide” they believe is coming because their meaning of American identity is 
under threat from civil rights being granted to nonwhites and the immigration of nonwhites 
to America. As Barbara Perry has argued, this movement is bound up with particular 
notions of race, gender, and sexuality that extol the virtue of reproducing the white race in 
the face of perceived threats to racial purity and white social supremacy. This putative 
virtue also is behind the white supremacists’ opposition to abortion rights and 
homosexuality and requires the control of women.408 Perry does not use the language of 
recognition, but I think what she accurately describes as the “age-old canons of the white-
supremacist movement” are recognition norms. The white supremacists see themselves as 
defending a moral recognition order with a “white man’s struggle” for the moral superiority 
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of white male heterosexuals.409 Perry concludes that the white supremacist movement is not 
the lunatic fringe we would like to think it is but reflects mainstream racist and gendered 
views that she calls asking “all Others to conform to an artificial set of norms and 
expectations.”410 Perry’s suggestion is that we counter this recognition order (my term, not 
hers) by ceasing to define different as inferior. I think this is correct, and the point I wish to 
take from this discussion of white supremacist movements is that racism is perpetrated by 
means of recognition and fought by means of recognition and that it is incumbent on us to 
discern which recognition is healthy. With forms of bigotry against difference, the 
discernment is easier, but I think it good to identify the general idea of struggles for and 
against pathological recognition for use in understanding social struggles in which the 
discernment may be less evident. 
Also relevant to the personal aspect of recognition is that struggles for recognition 
are not binary struggles over yes-or-no normative judgments. Often the struggles are over 
the interpretations of what the relevant norms are, how they are to be applied, and who the 
arbiter is of these questions; there is perhaps even a dispute over whether norms apply in a 
particular case. This interpretive process is also a question of authority. Certainly, social 
institutions offer an authoritative stance on questions about norms and their applications, 
but that authority is not as clear or strong as portrayed. Again, McBride cuts to the heart of 
the issue: 
The social world does not address us with a transparent and coherent set of 
normative expectations. Consequently, we cannot hope to hand over the 
authority to resolve struggles for recognition to the 'community'.”411  
It is left to each individual to interpret the norms as they apply to particular circumstances. 
The question of whether recognition or misrecognition has occurred is a judgment that an 
individual needs to make. Even if an interpretive structure is available to help an 
individual, he or she still must make a judgment based on that structure. Our claims about 
recognition and misrecognition are also claims that we have the authority to make our 
claim. One’s recognition of one’s own authority extends to all aspects of recognition in 
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interpersonal relationships. If an individual cannot recognize his or her own moral 
authority, then he or she cannot bring him- or herself to demand, and perhaps not even to 
seek, recognition from others.  
To be affirmed, we need guidance; support; and, of course, recognition. We learn to 
follow the authority of others, and we learn to trust others to guide us in how to behave and 
think, starting with our parents or guardians. We also sometimes learn not to trust others as 
reliable authorities, even those on whom we previously relied. In the constellation of our 
affirmational struggles, we are constantly switching between roles of claimant and judge412 
and constantly struggling over who has the authority in our recognition relations. This is 
the case even when all we are asking for is to be listened to when speaking: We are heard 
only after we are recognized as one worth hearing. The struggle for recognition is also a 
struggle for sincere recognition. We are less satisfied with the recognition of others if we 
learn that it is not sincere, and though it is difficult if not impossible to demand sincerity, 
we will press for sincere affirmation of ourselves and our contributions. Here too, we are 
forced to judge whether or not the recognition we receive is sincere. In seeking 
affirmational recognition, we seek out individuals from whom we can receive it. At the 
same time that we need support and approval from others, we also need to maintain some 
distance and autonomy from them. Struggles for recognition are often, if not usually, 
struggles to maintain autonomy and not be overly defined by others, and this requires 
enough authority to accomplish that. What makes true friendship special and prized is that, 
ideally, it is a relationship without struggles for power and authority or doubt about the 
sincerity of mutual recognition. Friendship is an intersubjective relationship in which two 
individuals are affirming each other in their affirmational struggles. A true friend values 
our autonomy, our viewpoints, and our desires, and we reciprocate. 
We can make more sense of the complexities involved with the multidimensional 
approach by inquiring as to which norms are being engaged with, and to what extent, and 
which individuals are being engaged with and to what extent. All struggles for recognition 
are struggles over normative interpretation; even the question of whether a norm applies in 
a particular case is a normative question. This means that recognition relations have an 
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ineliminable element of conflict. Perhaps, as Georg Bertram and Robin Celikates claim, 
recognition relations are constituted precisely in and through interpersonal conflicts.413 This 
is easily seen in the political arena where political discourse and actions are defined by 
conflict. It is also fairly easily seen in the social competition for jobs or status within a 
group. Even among friends and family, only a completely ideal personal relationship would 
be without some level of conflict over recognition norms and their application. 
2.4.5 - Struggles beyond political resistance 
Political resistance is but one variety of struggles for recognition, specifically a 
variety of rectificatory struggles. Renault stated that struggles against misrecognition are 
political and involve political normativity “only when individuals and groups are fighting 
against the denial of recognition produced by the institutions of social life.”414 This fits 
with my definition of political resistance as attempts to change social institutions, practices, 
and recognition norms, usually in terms of laws and political norms, that I see as a kind of 
rectificatory struggle. However, Renault, with Jean-Philippe Deranty, later claimed that 
“the normativity immanent in demands of recognition is not just ethical but political in 
nature, in that it questions the institutional contexts and contains the implicit potential for a 
universalistic project of community.”415 To say that the ethical or the personal is political is 
an admission of an important social reality, but another important admission is that 
individuals experience in their social reality a division between their personal lives and the 
political sphere. In this chapter, I will discuss the reality of this division, especially for 
individuals in groups targeted by normative discrimination, revealing why many opt to 
struggle for recognition outside a political struggle for rectification of misrecognition.  
Not all efforts to alleviate the effects of misrecognition are rectificatory struggles, 
and not all rectificatory struggles seek to change a culture’s laws or recognition norms but 
may seek only to restore social balance within a local community. All rectificatory 
struggles attempt to revalue meanings, interpretations, and values,416 but an extent and a 
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scale are involved. The American civil rights movement or women’s suffrage movements 
are archetypal political resistance movements in which there was extended involvement by 
large numbers of individuals and organizations to change society’s laws and institutions. 
Struggles for recognition are conflicts, but not all such conflicts are large-scale political 
ones. They can also be more internal to a small group or between individuals. Joining an 
existing political resistance movement is just one possible path that individuals take in 
response to experiencing misrecognition. There may be little in Honneth or other critical 
theorists that directly denies other possible responses to misrecognition, but these other 
responses are certainly underexplored. This lacuna within critical theory leaves out 
important social phenomena, hindering critical theory’s ability to understand individuals’ 
actual social aspirations and conflicts as they seek relief from their experiences of 
misrecognition. This lacuna in turn hinders critical theory’s ability to describe and explain 
social reality and diagnose moral problems in a way that contributes to positive social 
change. A robust theory of struggles for recognition needs to take into account the varying 
ways in which individuals struggle for recognition short of attempts to change social 
institutions. 
Political theory understandably focuses on macrosocial political struggles, which are 
not entirely disconnected from individuals, but are often portrayed by theorists in terms of 
conflicts between groups. Taylor speaks of a politics of recognition as conflicts between 
social groups in defense of their cultural identities. He describes misrecognition as a 
condescension by dominant groups toward other groups’ cultural identities, harming those 
cultural groups. Similar to Honneth, Taylor says that: 
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to 
them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-
recognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning 
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.417 
The potential harm we can do to others by withholding or denying recognition makes it a 
moral demand that we approach other cultures with a presumption of equal worth. Taylor, 
however, sees recognition and authenticity to be ideals in opposition to each other. Equality 
                                                 
417
 Taylor, 25-74. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 199 of 226 
demands that we recognize individuals as possessing the same qualities, but authenticity 
demands we recognize individuals as distinct in their unique qualities. Taylor further 
argues that the view that everyone is equal means, ideally, that one’s ethnicity or gender is 
politically and morally irrelevant. Taylor’s thinking of individual differences, though, 
remains based on group identities—his example being the unique identity of the 
francophone Quebecois. Taylor’s concern is for the identity rights of groups more than for 
that of individual persons. This is problematic because if the criticism is that distinct 
identity should not be subsumed to an idea of equality, this concern should extend not only 
to a group but also to individuals. If it is good to say that the distinct cultural identity of 
francophones should be respected within a liberal society and not subsumed under 
universalist norms, then it is also good to say that a particular individual’s distinct identity 
similarly should be respected. What would the case be to draw a line such that groups 
larger than a certain number deserve consideration of their distinct identity but groups 
smaller than that number and individuals themselves are beneath consideration? If we take 
autonomy seriously, then we must take individual differences seriously. However, it would 
be difficult to argue that every individual difference should take precedence over 
considerations of moral equality and that every individual claim of uniqueness must be 
accommodated. At what point would the idea of equality and universal norms be so eroded 
as to be meaningless? McBride argues that the focus on the “unfortunate association” 
between recognition and cultural identity politics has obscured the important interactions 
among recognition, social norms, and individual agency. I agree with McBride that the 
“relations of mutual recognition between us are not external to who we are and how we act, 
but are inextricably bound up with our relations to ourselves and our lives.”418  
Taylor’s picture of struggles for recognition as political conflicts between 
subcultures and the dominant culture identifies one set of phenomena. The question is 
whether a subculture would respond to misrecognition with a struggle against other groups 
or against the dominant social institutions. A marginalized subculture will not always 
respond to misrecognition with political resistance. Another path for the subculture, which 
may be a rational path in some circumstances, is to turn inward rather than try to win legal 
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recognition through the social conflict of political resistance. As Du Bois describes, if 
individuals cannot see themselves positively through the conceptions of the dominant 
culture, it does not mean they cannot find worth in themselves. Individuals can cognitively 
understand the distinction between the attitudes and treatment they receive from members 
of their subculture and what they receive from those outside it. Melvin Rogers is correct 
that it is a theoretical mistake to assume that reciprocal social respect among members of 
marginalized groups is not sufficient to help individuals form positive relations-to-self. 
Social recognition from a community is possible even if the community is a subculture that 
is misrecognized and oppressed by social institutions, a possibility that Rogers says is not 
found in Honneth’s account. I agree with Rogers that we need to take seriously the creative 
abilities of subaltern groups to forge meaning and to generate and define 
countercommunities, which constitutes a form of resistance that Rogers terms “counter-
publics” that he distinguishes from subcultures actively engaged in political resistance419 
Zurn observes that members of denigrated groups still may not have full and equal 
opportunities to develop healthy self-esteem and that positive mutual affirmation within a 
group denigrated by society may be the best one can hope for.420 However, being esteemed 
by those closest to one should not be treated as a mere consolation. True, subcultures 
supply the esteem needed for self-esteem but not institutional legal rights. Contrary to 
Zurn, however, it is not impossible for members of a denigrated subculture to understand 
themselves and their characteristics and accomplishments as worthy.421 A subculture 
provides an interpretive structure that members can draw on to develop positive relations-
to-self. For this reason, members of a denigrated subculture may elect not to seek solidarity 
with the wider culture but take satisfaction in the mutual recognition of their social group. 
And if their recognitional needs are satisfied from others within their group, they might not 
feel motivation to struggle for recognition from the larger society despite the 
misrecognitions they receive from others outside their group. The humiliations will still 
hurt, but the emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of humiliation will be 
dispelled through active conduct within the group rather than through political resistance. 
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As Rogers concludes, members of a subculture have the ability to build a community of 
mutual recognition that can sustain their psychological integrity and moral autonomy 
outside of the formal structure of recognition of which Honneth speaks.422 
Similarly, struggles for recognition are not limited to collective struggles for legal 
rights or social esteem; they include struggles over personal identity, which, though they 
have personal, social, and political dimensions, remain anchored in the individual. 
Struggles for recognition, McBride says, center on the clash between how we recognize 
ourselves and how others see us.423 What is at stake in struggles for recognition is not only 
overcoming oppression and injustice but also using one’s power to create meaning and 
value for oneself. If we couch the issue of recognition only within group dynamics, we 
miss what I argue is a principle motivation for struggles for recognition—the construction 
and maintenance of our sense of self and sense of the world in which we find ourselves. 
Recognition enables an individual to gain a sense of self, or a sense of practical identity, a 
sense that is molded by social norms and experiences. Our sense of self is a sense that is in 
relation to our social environment, especially in relation to the people who are most 
important in our lives. We are not born with a pure and transparent identity waiting to be 
discovered; it is constituted through our experiences and our responses to those 
experiences. It is an affirmational struggle because it is an ongoing effort to constitute our 
practical identity and our sense of self in terms of our community and its norms. Because 
we are unavoidably continually interacting with our social community and its norms, we 
also often run into our sense of self being misrecognized. It is to this personal rectificatory 
struggle that I now turn. 
My sense of my identity is in tension with the identity that others attribute to me, 
both of which are potentially in tension with the norms of our culture. For each of us, 
recognition and misrecognition are judged by us not only in terms of the culture’s 
recognition norms but also, if not more so, in terms of how we view ourselves. McBride 
writes of one important aspect of affirmational struggles: “The struggle for recognition 
which we all experience, to some extent, in our lives centres on the ever-present possibility 
                                                 
422
 Rogers, 201. 
423
 McBride, 41. 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 202 of 226 
of a serious clash between how we recognize ourselves and how others recognize us.”424 
How we see ourselves is not always how others see us, and others may not understand our 
identity claims, much less grant them. What matters to us is not what the terms of the 
recognition are from a critical theoretical standpoint but whether they are the terms under 
which we want to be recognized. Quoting Hume, McBride notes that we accept praise from 
others only when their opinion agrees with our own self-assessments.425 The clash between 
how we recognize ourselves and how others recognize us is an inextricable part of social 
life and a continuous source of tension. Each time it occurs, we ask ourselves how serious 
that clash is and what its repercussions are. When the clash occurs, we do well to ask 
ourselves whether the fault lies in us or in the other, even though the human tendency is to 
blame others for the clash. 
The struggle for my sense of identity has a character different from that of other 
struggles. In a struggle for legal rights, for example, I know that the final arbiter is the 
applicable legal norm. But in the struggle to maintain my sense of identity, I feel that I am 
the final arbiter. There is good reason for this (or so I think): My identity is unique to me, it 
is a product of the collection of my personal experiences, it affects me far more than it 
affects anyone else, and who knows me better than myself? Or so I think. The problem 
with that view is that all of those truths do not mean that my view of myself is complete 
and infallible. This is why we have to say a “sense” of identity because our identity is not 
concretely known, even by us. In our interactions with others, we encounter others having a 
sense of who we are that may differ from our own. Generally, we would prefer that others 
see us the way we see ourselves, and as annoying as is someone else disagreeing with our 
sense of identity, a more troubling prospect is that the other individual’s sense of us may be 
more accurate than ours. Part of our socialization and development process is learning that 
others recognize aspects of ourselves of which we were previously unaware. We need to 
learn about ourselves from others, yet this disagreement is a risk to our sense of identity. 
Are we wrong about ourselves? Are what other individuals see in us really our own traits, 
or are what they see traits they are projecting onto us that are not part of us? 
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Our struggles for a sense of identity take place within a social environment. A 
significant threat to our personal identity is the culture of prevailing social norms, which 
could suppress our self-expression, especially if we are members of a group targeted by 
normative discrimination. As McBride points out, “To have the opportunity to be esteemed 
by others for one’s traits and abilities one must have the freedom to present these features 
for social evaluation.”426 McBride gives the example of gay people who could not be 
openly gay and thus were unable to connect with some of their own traits through 
recognition from others. In the same vein, Allen gives an excellent example of one aspect 
of the social difficulties of a sense of identity: 
Having a coherent gender identity is, in a society such as ours, necessary 
for social recognition and thus for having a social existence at all. In this 
sense, given that the attainment of a coherent gender identity is predicated 
upon the disavowal of homosexual attachment, the subject’s very identity is 
constituted by the disavowal of homosexual attachment.427 
There is truth in this—our options for a self-identity are limited by dominant social 
norms—but Allen misses the dynamic that it raises. This scenario shows how identity is a 
dynamic tension between cultural norms and something personal in an individual. One 
struggles against the cultural identity because one’s own sense of identity is at odds with it. 
If identity were not partly a personal sense, then there would be no struggle about whether 
to accept or avow the cultural identities. Conversely, this also helps illustrate the impetus 
for the bigotry of homophobia—the idea of homosexuality as anything other than a 
perversion is threatening to a heterosexist identity that being heterosexual is “natural” 
while being homosexual is “unnatural.” 
Many of our struggles for recognition are personal struggles to affirm our own sense 
of identity or our place within our immediate social environment. For the most part, we are 
not involved in larger political resistance to change our culture’s recognition norms, though 
the struggle for one’s sense of identity certainly can become an attempt to change the 
recognition relations in which we are involved. When we acknowledge the power relations 
in which we find ourselves and our investments in them, we may decide to attempt to 
change the structure of those relations.428 In this attempt, we are looking for more than 
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affirmation from others; we are looking to change the ongoing recognition relations with 
others, and the struggle has moved from an affirmational one to a rectificatory one. These 
rectificatory struggles can take the form of political resistance or various other forms of 
social action.  
There is a line that must be crossed to engage in political resistance, a line that is 
difficult to define. There are several reasons why crossing the line into political resistance 
is difficult for individuals. One is that the political sphere is restricted if not closed to 
subaltern groups, such as homosexuals or racial minorities excluded by normative 
discrimination. Another reason is that struggles for recognition are usually interpersonal 
within one’s community, whereas the political realm is outside our community and 
interpersonal relationships. We are used to affirmational struggles that occur within our 
everyday involvements, and we largely engage other individuals with whom we have direct 
contact. Despite the tensions inherent in affirmational struggles, we have familiarity with 
them. The issues around them, possible courses of action, and the effects of our actions are 
more readily discernable. Rectificatory struggles that seek to change the norms of small 
groups with which we have direct contact is more daunting but can be seen as a logical 
extension of affirmational struggles. If one wants to change the culture of one’s workplace, 
for example, there is a finite social scope with which one is engaging. To seek to change 
social institutions, such as laws, practices, or social attitudes, is a much larger task not just 
in terms of scope but also because direct engagement is more difficult. In the workplace, 
one can more easily speak directly with authority figures who have direct influence on the 
norms we seek to change. Such direct access is much harder to come by in political 
struggles, even at a local level. Political struggles at the national level are different 
situations in which social institutions are distant in social connections if not also in 
geography. We do not have direct access to most of the decision makers in legal and 
political institutions, nor do we have many relations with those with the power to influence 
those social institutions. The asymmetrical relations of power within society are strongest 
in the political sphere in which access and dialogue are granted to a favored few and others 
are largely excluded.  
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Engaging in political resistance requires stepping outside of one’s subcultural sphere 
and into an uncertain world, which requires self-confidence and some understanding of 
how to proceed. The agency problem discussed earlier applies strongly to political 
resistance—how can individuals who are damaged by misrecognition undertake political 
resistance? An existing political resistance movement is certainly helpful, but even when a 
relevant movement is extant, the difficulties of political resistance are still a disincentive 
for individuals. The difficulties may not be alleviated by the potential solidarity they may 
find with others in a political resistance movement. It would seem that what is needed is 
the existence of a strong subculture already engaged in political resistance. This is what 
Honneth seems to hold, putting aside the dilemma of how such a subculture came into 
being, much less how it came to be moved into political resistance.  
Subcultures do come into being, but not all are involved in political resistance. Other 
than political resistance, subcultures play a role in affirmational struggles.429 Honneth 
emphasizes the importance of community solidarity and shared values for an individual to 
develop self-esteem. Individuals develop self-esteem through being part of some kind of 
community and receiving recognition from others within that community. That individuals 
depend on a community to receive social recognition explains why they seek to belong to 
various forms of social associations.430 But as Joel Anderson points out: “It remains 
somewhat unclear exactly what determines the boundaries of the community in Honneth’s 
account—what if one is esteemed only by other Jews or other lesbians?”431 This is an 
important question that shines more light on Honneth’s problematic implication that 
struggles are significant only when they are collective political movements. Honneth’s 
discussion of subcultural communities considers them in terms of the class struggle–
oriented political debates and activities of 18th and 19th century bourgeois and proletarian 
social clubs.432 It is doubtful that Honneth would hold that subcultures are produced only 
by class struggle, but a robust theory of struggles for recognition needs to be clear that 
class-based social groups are only one type of subculture. Communities of Jews, lesbians, 
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and many other marginalized groups are subcultures in which individuals engage with each 
other in mutual recognition, providing success in affirmational struggles and perhaps 
providing support for rectificatory struggles directed outside their subculture. The 
composition of subcultures is deeply affected by economic class structure, but subcultures 
form in a variety of circumstances, especially in contemporary societies.  
Mutual recognition can be shared in any subculture, but we can distinguish between 
subcultures of circumstance and subcultures of volition. Subcultures based on cultural 
divisions—race, religion, economic class, and so on—are not chosen, and their members 
are victims of circumstance. Individuals in oppressed groups are born into these 
subcultures and find themselves misrecognized by the dominant society without much 
opportunity to escape being so characterized. There are also voluntary subcultures, such as 
groups with common interests in music, art, or hobbies, which are certainly more 
accessible to individuals not in oppressed groups than to those who are, but nevertheless 
individuals can voluntarily associate with others and form groups of common interests. 
Individuals will seek recognition from groups on the basis of common interests either out 
of a perceived lack of recognition in their social lives or to supplement the recognition they 
already receive. A voluntary subculture can be an expression of struggles for recognition, 
certainly affirmational, but also possibly rectificatory. Subcultures can be sources of both 
affirmation and conflict, of both recognition and misrecognition. Many of the instances of 
recognition found within a subculture are affirmational struggles that do not challenge the 
marginalization of the subculture. These instances of recognition are still empowering to 
recipients, and whether or not they use the space provided by intrasubcultural recognition 
to undertake a rectificatory struggle beyond their subculture is up to them, and we have 
little right to judge them on it.  
Voluntary subcultures form when individuals’ experiences of recognition and 
misrecognition reveal their common interests. Individuals need to receive recognition to 
develop positive relations-to-self, particularly a sense of connection with others. Ideally, 
individuals receive recognition through healthy recognition relations within a morally 
healthy culture. The reality is, however, that the normative discriminations and 
pathological recognitions of a culture deprive many of recognition. I previously outlined 
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some of the ways in which individuals experience misrecognition. Individuals certainly 
have the option to accept the limiting recognition offered by the stereotypes of pathological 
recognition or to accept living under the oppression of normative discrimination. Such 
concessions are insufficient, though, and individuals need to find recognition through other 
means. Alternatives to the prevailing recognition order are available to most individuals. 
When individuals do not receive recognition, one possibility for them is to “shop around” 
for others to recognize their identity claims, viewpoint, or behaviors. In response to 
misrecognition, some individuals will seek recognition where they can find it. It is a search 
for interpretive authority as much as for recognition. We form and join subcultures to 
increase our potential recognition relations. When we fail to receive the recognition we feel 
we deserve, we think that there must be the “right” group of people who, unbiased against 
us, will see clearly and agree with us. This shopping around for recognition is informed by 
the “virtual public” McBride talks about, and we seek a real recognition that corresponds to 
the virtual recognition we can imagine. One option is to find recognition within a 
subculture that provides recognition relations outside the prevailing cultural 
misrecognitions. Another option is to adopt behaviors and appearances to create at least a 
sense of recognition (which I will address in chapter 2.4.6). 
Amidst the wide variety of subcultures, I will use subcultures coalescing around 
music as an example. Musical culture is a set of subcultures oriented around musical 
genres. Those who enjoy jazz and those who enjoy heavy metal are in different subcultures. 
Certainly, one can enjoy both genres of music, but the number of others with whom one 
can share the enjoyment of both is limited. One is probably attending jazz concerts with 
one set of friends and heavy metal concerts with a different set of friends. Fans of a 
particular artist constitute a subculture different from that of fans of another artist, even in 
the same genre. Directioners are fans of boy band One Direction, and this is a separate 
subculture from that of fans of boy band 5 Seconds of Summer, a social reality that the 
separate fan subcultures will eagerly verify. Musical subcultures can form countercultures 
that encompass more than music—clothing, slang, and other lifestyle choices mark each 
member as belonging to the subculture, with the accompanying concepts of group 
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distinction and status. Teddy boys, mods, rockers, rude boys, punks, and Deadheads 
provide examples of such countercultures.  
A significant drawback of many subcultures is that, although there is absolutely 
nothing wrong in having an extensive collection of Grateful Dead bootleg tapes, being an 
expert on Star Wars trivia, or having great cosplay outfits, it is difficult to get anyone 
outside the subculture to care about and recognize these activities. Certainly, we all should 
respect the right of individuals to express themselves and find satisfaction and self-esteem 
as they wish—no harm, no foul. But although one can demand an equal opportunity to gain 
esteem, one cannot demand being esteemed for a particular act or set of acts. The further a 
subculture’s common traits diverge from the social norms of the prevailing culture, the less 
likely individuals in the subculture will be esteemed by members of society not part of their 
subculture, and the more likely they will receive normative discrimination misrecognition. 
Stamp collectors, no matter how obsessive in their hobby, are unlikely to suffer the same 
level of social disapproval as, for example, participants in the “living doll” subculture. 
Members in a subculture may experience increased isolation from those outside the 
subculture. If one’s sense of identity is tied to a status that has very little symbolic capital 
in the wider culture, one may become increasingly dependent on the subculture for one’s 
sense of identity and well-being, which could lead to negative consequences, including 
isolation, resentment, and conflict with the rest of society. 
2.4.6 - Separating from others: subcultural antagonism and 
manufactured recognition  
In the discussion of subcultures, I touched on their positive role in affirmational and 
rectificatory struggles for recognition. Subcultures can provide the interpretive structure 
that enables struggles for recognition, but subcultures also can enable misrecognition. The 
impetus behind struggles for recognition can also manifest in antisocial and harmful ways. 
It is possible within struggles for recognition to descend into exclusion of and even cruelty 
to others. Struggles for recognition are not engaged in entirely for noble moral motives; the 
motives may be self-serving. Honneth portrays recognition in a positive light of a 
constraint of our actions in a nonegotistical manner such that we no longer oppose each 
other but join in solidarity with others and share experiences and agree on ethical goals. He 
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assumes that “acts of recognition are oriented not towards one’s own aims but rather 
towards the evaluative qualities of others.”433 This assumption may help establish 
normative justification for social criticism, but individuals do not think and act in terms of 
theory, and the aims behind their recognition and misrecognition behaviors are also 
relevant. Acts of recognition can be committed for personal aims, the most prevalent of 
which is that conducting acts of recognition are acts that earn one the recognition of being a 
respected person in one’s community. The nature of mutual recognition is that, by 
according recognition to another, one is reciprocally recognized for it. Because recognition 
of recognition directly benefits the individual, and the individual would have been 
socialized into understanding that benefit, it is certainly more than possible that an 
individual would perform an act of recognition not out of respect for and observance of 
moral values but in service of his or her own aims and without engaging with others. The 
pull to descend into antisocial behaviors comes from the individual’s need for affirmation 
from others and the social value of esteem. To possess both is to have social capital, which 
is desired for its own sake. Social capital comes from recognition of others, and if not 
received from the dominant culture, it can be received from a subculture. 
For the most part, subcultures are not in open conflict with the rest of society, though 
as we saw earlier, members of a subculture may experience conflict directed at them in the 
form of normative discrimination and social ostracizing. The question is whether the 
subculture sees itself as simply separate from the mainstream or as antagonistic toward it. 
The punk movement was, as Renault labels it, engaged in an agonistic struggle of 
recognition as opposed to a struggle for recognition from society. Punks wanted to deepen 
the conflict they had with the rest of society, Renault says, embedding the conflict in their 
music, words, and appearance.434 As Honneth observes: “Social esteem can just as well be 
sought in small militaristic groups, whose code of honor is dominated by the practice of 
violence, as it can in the public arenas of a democratic society.”435 In social conflicts, 
enemies can be identified and targeted with reactive normative discrimination. Subcultures 
can also develop attitudes of overprotectiveness, resentment, and vengefulness. This is 
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especially true in political resistance movements when those who are seen, rightly or 
wrongly, as those responsible for the oppression struggled against are targeted. Anger at 
the oppressors is understandable and, to an extent, necessary and commendable, but the 
moral aims of the struggle could be lost amidst the anger. 
Anger and defiance against misrecognition from the dominant culture can manifest 
as a small group in opposition to the rest of society. The unequal distribution of justice and 
opportunities for recognition in the dominant culture can lead to “a counterculture of 
compensatory respect”436 that recognizes the status of those within the group but not the 
status of those outside the group. It is this opposition to the outside world that makes a 
subculture a counterculture. Honneth believes such a counterculture is a limited, 
uncoordinated prepolitical reaction to misrecognition that will emerge only “so long as the 
identity-supporting milieu of a collective social movement is lacking.” Honneth dismisses 
countercultures as inadequate expressions of social solidarity because they lack the 
coherent linguistic expression of a collective political movement. Honneth fails to 
appreciate the power of small groups of individuals to grow a counterculture that supports 
each others’ identity claims organically from the constituting actions of individuals. No 
doubt, a small counterculture does not have as much capability as a large, coordinated 
social group to affirm its members’ identities or engage in rectificatory struggles for 
recognition. Nevertheless, anger is an energy, and an attitude of “us against the world” is a 
source of solidarity that motivates actions that have real effects on individuals both within 
and outside the counterculture. A counterculture may engage in antisocial actions of 
hostility or destruction that manufacture a sense of solidarity and power to compensate for 
its marginalization from society. A street gang is not engaging in a collective social 
movement of political resistance, but its members are, in their minds, resisting society. A 
counterculture’s limited capability to react to the dominant culture is in fact part of its 
identity, an embracing of one’s status as a social outcast. Involvement in the counterculture 
becomes an affirmational struggle to be seen as belonging to it in the eyes of other 
members of the counterculture—the counter recognition norms of the counterculture 
replace the recognition norms of the dominant culture. 
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Compensatory respect is not limited to countercultures but is an attitude and action 
that any individual can undertake. When one feels a lack of recognition from others, one 
can compensate by engaging with recognition norms and esteem oneself. This type of 
behavior I will call “manufactured recognition” because it is a self-recognition created by 
an individual for him- or herself, not recognition received from others. Manufactured 
recognition plays off of prevailing norms of honor or esteem that elevate individuals who 
display certain traits. Traditionally, the idea of honor was associated with certain 
individuals who were by their birthright worthy of honor and greater social esteem. As the 
values of liberal democracy have increased, the concept of honor associated with birthright 
has decreased, and social esteem has increasingly become associated with conceptions of 
earned worth, which in capitalist society, largely means accumulation of wealth. Awards, 
honors, privilege, and earning power now reflect accomplishments that are worthy of 
respect and reward. Manufactured recognition distorts and often inverts the relation 
between behavior and the rewards of recognition. Therefore, it is a distortion of 
affirmational struggles. Traditional ideas of social status have lingered, and wealth and 
fame, plus the trappings associated with them, still engender a sense that those with wealth 
and fame deserve recognition. In today’s consumerist society, one may not have social 
wealth and power, but one can have at least some of the trappings of it. Plus, ideas of being 
“fashionable” and “on trend” have developed as new forms of social status. One can 
literally buy forms of esteem recognition by purchasing the right clothes, the right car, and 
not just a luxury watch but an X brand watch and by appearing at the right restaurants, 
clubs, or social gatherings, and so on. Corporations that produce consumer goods and 
services know this and are quite eager to sell this form of social status recognition. This 
“recognition for sale” is a social structure that can be exploited by individuals to give 
themselves a sense of recognition. 
Manufactured recognition is different from positive self-esteem, healthy pride in 
one’s accomplishments, or enjoyment of the finer material things in life. That is because 
there is a short path from manufactured recognition to misrecognition for the simple reason 
that it is a recognition drawn in terms of superiority to others. Self-esteem does not require 
the lessening of others, but the structure of manuf
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don’t, therefore I deserve more recognition than you.” X can be a material item, a physical 
or mental skill, a belief or creed, or a social affiliation. The emphasis is less on solidarity 
with others and more on separation from others. If individuals cannot easily manufacture a 
sense of their own recognition, they can try to make themselves respectable by judging 
others as unrespectable. One can feel better about oneself despite being poor because at 
least one does not drink, one’s daughter does not have a tattoo, or one is not a gossip like 
those people are. Marginalized whites can still feel superior to any black person, an 
insecurity-driven bigotry easily exploited by the corporate media and politicians. This 
denigration of others to tolerate one’s own deficiencies is different from adaptive 
preference formation, in which poor people strive to be happy despite their poverty without 
needing to diminish others.437  
It is not only those who are misrecognized who seek to manufacture recognition. 
Individuals are capable of desiring to receive more esteem than they deserve regardless of 
their social status. The middle class couple may desire to appear more wealthy and better 
connected. Men will act out attempting to draw attention to what they believe to be esteem-
worthy expressions of masculinity such as misogynist acts toward women or bullying of 
others. Cliques, both teenage and adult ones, are ways to manufacture a sense of 
camaraderie that excludes and denigrates others. Parents push their children to excel in 
sports or the arts or to get into a good school more to increase their own social distinction 
than for the child’s benefit. The social and personal benefits of recognition that encourage 
individuals to seek it also can encourage them to manufacture it. Like-minded individuals 
who seek to manufacture recognition in similar ways can form voluntary subcultures, such 
as elitist social clubs, to share their manufactured mutual recognition for their alleged 
superiority to those outside the group. Such a subculture lacks the social capital and power 
truly to perpetrate normative discrimination, but they still perpetrate misrecognition on 
nonmembers and cut off recognition relations with others. The influence of all forms of 
manufactured recognition on individuals should not be underestimated. 
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2.4.7 - Joining others’ struggles 
One more question involving struggles for recognition needs to be addressed. If the 
experience of moral injuries is a prerequisite for struggles for recognition, then how is it 
that anyone not so injured can join in solidarity with those who have been injured by 
misrecognition? Honneth’s model is that struggles for recognition are social movements of 
groups suffering the same moral injuries who in their shared suffering find common cause. 
If experiences of a moral injury are a prerequisite to feel motivated to struggle for 
recognition, then would it not be the case that we would engage in a rectificatory struggle 
only in response to our direct experience of a moral injury? How and why would 
individuals join rectificatory social movements when they do not share the moral injuries 
that the common cause of the movement seeks to rectify? Why did white people join the 
American civil rights movement? Why do men join pro-choice movements? Why do 
heterosexuals join same-sex marriage legalization movements? Why do city dwellers 
march to save the rainforests? Broadening the question: Why would we ever join anyone 
else’s struggle for recognition? This is an important question because the potential for 
collective political resistance exists when there is sufficient shared concern for a particular 
political cause. This includes, but is not limited to, shared experiences of injustice. Often, 
because groups victimized by injustice are in the social minority, political change cannot be 
achieved until those not directly affected by the injustice join in common cause, and this 
does happen. Sympathy from others is an important factor in struggles for recognition. 
That there is a problem to be solved can be seen in the example of the recent 
dramatic changes in the struggle for recognition of gay rights, in particular same-sex 
marriage. The attitude of hostility toward homosexuals in prevailing social mores or 
normative discrimination against homosexuality encourages or at least enables hostility 
against that sexual identity. Given the prevailing social mores against homosexuality, we 
would expect, and indeed have historically seen, widespread hostility. We have even seen 
self-loathing among homosexuals caused by their society’s prejudice. Opposition to same-
sex marriage is partly due to cognitive dissonance from a perceived violation of the norm 
of patriarchal traditional marriage—if there is no man ruling over wife and kids who honor 
and obey that superior male, how can it be marriage? Given that there is entrenched 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 214 of 226 
normative discrimination against homosexuals and that homosexuals are a small minority 
(approximately 10 percent), we would think that the power structure is strongly against a 
rectificatory struggle for gay rights. Could we, however, say that in a society that 
condemns homosexuality that every individual is hostile toward homosexuals? No. We 
have seen in the past few decades a dramatic shift in public attitudes toward homosexuality, 
most concretely evident in the legalization of same-sex marriage in multiple countries. In 
Ireland, for example, same-sex marriage was legalized by popular vote.438 How can we 
explain this change? The prevailing attitude was not removed by some force of nature; it 
changed from within. One answer possible from critical theory is to say that rational 
awareness has reached the point at which the hostility has been replaced by rational 
acceptance. But this seeming explanation does not actually explain how this rational 
change was achieved, if indeed we could say it is rationally or was intentionally achieved, 
as the answer implies. Even if it is correct to say that a rational attitude has replaced an 
irrational attitude, we still must explain how that change occurred in defiance of the 
prevailing social mores. What forces could contribute to overcoming prevailing normative 
discrimination? Changes in the environment external to the society, or in technological 
development, could alter attitudes toward social norms. Social movements definitely 
change social norms, but the problem remains of why social movements would go against 
those social norms. To my mind, the best way to explain this is to understand that 
individuals have the agency to undertake rectificatory struggles for recognition beyond 
their own life experiences and the agency to care enough about others to join them in their 
rectificatory struggles for recognition. Enough people who were not homosexuals and were 
not personally harmed by misrecognition of homosexuals joined with homosexuals’ 
struggles for recognition to struggle for recognition for gay rights.439 
Why do individuals join other individuals’ rectificatory struggles for recognition? 
One possible answer for Honneth is that in his account, the semantic structure that 
motivates struggles for recognition does so because the moral language is shared—the 
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individual understands misrecognition as affecting both him- or herself and others.440 This 
is also Zurn’s answer, which he expresses as recognition providing the connection between 
social structures of moral regard and an individual’s practical sense-of-self, a connection 
the individual can use as a resource to make sacrifices to promote the welfare of others.441 
Honneth could also argue that the subspecies of recognition he associates with solidarity 
enables individuals to join the morally injured in their struggles for recognition. Or, if they 
are loved ones with whom we have intimate relationships, then perhaps the love 
relationship is the motivation for joining in common cause. Honneth rejects this latter idea, 
saying that because the enclosed goals of love relationships cannot be generalized into 
matters of public concern, love does not entail moral experiences that can lead to social 
struggles for recognition—what I am calling rectificatory struggles.442 It seems odd to 
suggest that we would not stand up for our spouse, children, or friends out of love for them 
when they are wronged. Honneth, on the basis of his tripartite view of the recognition order 
and normative expectations, could say that if we stand up for a loved one, it is not out of 
love but out of the universal recognition of their legal rights or social value. In Honneth’s 
account, the shared semantics of love do not transfer to the public sphere. This does not 
seem correct and cannot explain why we are more likely to support the social and legal 
struggles of those we are intimately involved with than of those we are not. It would seem 
that love relations do extend into matters of public concern. When we love someone, the 
goals of love are added to the recognition of rights and value. Perhaps it is the case that 
love makes the misrecognition more real to us. Or perhaps, if Honneth is correct about 
feelings of being treated unjustly being a motivation for struggles for recognition, when 
injustice happens to our loved ones, it is felt by us, and this feeling motivates us. None of 
this, though, explains why we would join a social movement in which neither we, nor 
someone we are in intimate relations with, belongs. 
There seems to be a different kind of recognition at work in joining with others in 
their struggles for recognition. Our acknowledgment of legal rights, social worth, and even 
love, is not joining another in his or her struggle. When we see someone who has suffered 
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from misrecognition, we may or may not join with that person in his or her struggle. If such 
individuals are engaged in a rectificatory struggle for recognition, we may wish to join 
them in their struggle. If they are not engaged in a rectificatory struggle for recognition, we 
may wish to struggle on their behalf—or we may do nothing to assist them. Joining 
another’s struggle for recognition is a movement in addition to an understanding of 
circumstances, and this movement is informed by an interpretive structure that others are 
being misrecognized in addition to our recognizing them. Even if we both understood 
others as subject to misrecognition and recognized them, that is not sufficient to struggle 
actively for their recognition. It could be argued that, ideally, every individual who has had 
a legitimate recognition claim denied is worthy of our solidarity with their struggle for 
recognition. It would be impossible, though, for us to join every legitimate struggle for 
recognition—our time and energy are limited. Why, then, do we choose to support the 
particular causes that we do?  
Even if we are not a member of the aggrieved group, in response to such movements, 
we could believe that marginalized people deserve recognition, and we could resolve to 
help them achieve the goals of their struggles for recognition. Here, we do recognize them, 
we observe that they are not being granted the esteem or legal rights they are due, and we 
act on our recognition. A social movement to defend the National Health Service could be 
termed a recognition of everyone’s right to healthcare. But how far can this extension of 
recognition of others go? In joining an environmental social movement, do we recognize 
that others have a right to a clean environment and health and safety? Is the phenomenon of 
participating in walks to raise money for medical research to cure a particular disease a 
struggle for recognition? Breast cancer charities could be said to recognize the value of 
women and their health in resistance to cultural disregard for women’s health issues. We 
could be connecting our sense of virtual recognition with the plight of others and come to 
sympathize with them, understanding to a degree how we would feel if we were in their 
situation. We may want to defend the National Health Service or promote cancer research 
not out of fear that we may need to benefit from these services, but out of compassion for 
those who do. 
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The decision of whether to join in another’s struggle for recognition is different from 
recognizing the legal rights of others or recognizing their accomplishments. Recognition 
behavior is a valuable affirmation of an individual’s qualities and circumstances, whereas 
joining with an individual’s rectificatory struggle is seeking to change his or her 
circumstances. The complicated decision-making process to join others’ rectificatory 
struggles cannot be reduced to a single factor, but we can identify some. Aside from 
instrumental reasons—curiosity, political calculations, and so on—joining another’s 
struggle could be a recognition of him or her as someone worth our time and energy. Or we 
could agree with a social movement that its members’ goals would be good for some 
individuals or for society. Either way, it is a move out of the world of our personal 
concerns into the world of others’ concerns. Such a movement is opening up to perceive 
others and allowing them to perceive us. Joining in others’ struggles is connecting with 
them in solidarity and some degree of intimacy. Joining another’s rectificatory struggle is a 
movement beyond affirmation into another’s world of experiences and concerns.  
To connect with and understand others, even others physically close to and similar to 
us, requires a journey that goes beyond a general feeling of moral responsibility to fellow 
human beings. Maria Lugones calls these journeys “world travelling,” by which she means 
traveling from our “world” to another individual’s “world” with a loving perception of 
identifying with and making connections with him or her.  
Loving my mother also required that I see with her eyes, that I go into my 
mother’s world, that I see both of us as we are constructed in her world, that 
I witness her own sense of herself from within her world. Only through this 
traveling to her ‘world’ could I identify with her because only then could I 
cease to ignore her and to be excluded and separate from her.443 
We need not require deep intimacy to come to understand each other. It is more an 
openness to see others for who they are both in their differences from and similarities to us. 
World traveling works at a group level in that individuals of one culture or subculture can 
connect with individuals of another culture or subculture by traveling to their worlds. 
Lugones’s example is women of color traveling to the worlds (subcultures) of other women 
and seeing with their eyes. Such travels require dropping the arrogance of thinking oneself 
a privileged subject and instead being open to surprise and creativity—an attitude Lugones 
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labels “playfulness.”444 Our possibilities for playfulness are limited by the power structures 
of our culture. As Lugones says, within a dominant culture where she, a woman of color, is 
marginalized, it is difficult for her to play in settings dominated by Anglo whites. In the 
language of recognition, a woman of color is not recognized by whites and is not included 
fully in recognition relations. To survive in a dominant culture, marginalized people learn 
that their opportunities to express themselves and travel are limited by the normative 
discrimination of the dominant culture, which includes a lessened ability to travel in the 
political sphere. Women of color, Lugones claims, despite being in different subcultures, 
have more room to express themselves and play in each other’s worlds because they are not 
(to use Du Bois’s language) on the other side of the veil of whiteness. In world traveling, 
we are energized by our relations with others. We learn to love and understand by means of 
such traveling, and experiencing hindrances in our travels and play awakens us to the need 
to change hierarchies. It is from such individual choices to reach out to others, understand, 
and join with them that rectificatory struggles can begin.  
Cornel West insists that racism is a disease of the soul that cannot be overcome by 
arguments or analyses but can only be tamed by love and care. Love, he says, “has nothing 
to do with sentimental feelings or tribal connections. Rather it is a last attempt at generating 
a sense of agency among a downtrodden people.”445 The movement into others’ worlds is 
different from supporting a cause to make ourselves feel good—for example, a kind of 
manufactured recognition emblemized by the “slacktivism” of “liking” the page of a cause 
on Facebook. Such disconnected and self-limiting behavior is not productive either in 
working toward justice or in personal growth; it is simply behavior to give ourselves a 
sense that we have done something. It is a thin substitute for the world-expanding behavior 
of seeking to understand and join with others as we see in Lugones’s idea of world 
traveling.  
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Conclusion and future foreword 
 
The subtitle of this study, “critical theory beyond Honneth,” was suggested to me 
half in jest by a colleague, but it immediately resonated with me. Although I have in this 
study been critical of Axel Honneth, I recognize my debt to him for providing the 
groundwork for my investigations both here and in the future. My focus here has been to 
harvest Honneth’s insights, fill in some of the gaps in his accounts, and build on his work 
to revise and extend critical theory. I believe that Honneth’s account of recognition 
ultimately falls short not because he is wrong about what recognition means for an 
individual or for society, or is mistaken about its intersubjective nature, but because the 
account is insufficiently complex. Honneth expands social critique to include the 
intersubjective, personal experiences of individuals, but he does not fully embrace the 
implications of these experiences. Expanding the inclusion of individuals’ experiences is 
primarily what I mean by critical theory beyond Honneth, though I believe that most of 
what I have set forth are friendly amendments and corrections not contrary to Honneth. I 
have not solved all of the issues that I have raised in this paper, but I have attempted to 
establish concepts on which we can base the further exploration of social justice and 
responses to injustice. 
This study sets forward two main conceptualizations to assist future research in 
various fields of critical social theories. In Part One, I focused on the issue of 
misrecognition in order to clarify and expand a conception of how recognition relations can 
cause misrecognitions that lead to injustice. In Part Two, I focused on the issue of struggles 
for recognition to clarify and expand how individuals respond to injustice. The more we 
can clarify these issues, the more explanatory power our critical analysis will have. 
The first conceptualization is that recognition and misrecognition behaviors are 
better understood along the dimensions of engagement with norms, engagement with 
individuals, and the engagement with action. The three dimensions of misrecognition are 
not formal categories but features that help us to understand the nature of misrecognition 
behaviors and enlighten us as to misrecognition’s causes and possible remedies for it. In 
comparing misrecognition behaviors in this way, we can craft a better picture of social 
  
 
  
Giles - Rethinking misrecognition and struggles for recognition - page 220 of 226 
injustices by analyzing how they manifest within individual lives. In general, we can 
identify misrecognitions in which the problem is in vertical recognition, either 
disengagement from norms or engagement with problematic norms, and misrecognitions in 
which the problem is in horizontal recognition, during which there is insufficient or 
improper engagement with other individuals. That some injustices are perpetrated through 
engagement with recognition norms helps explain their persistence. Individuals have an 
incentive to adopt their culture’s recognition norms in interpersonal relations, even when 
those recognition norms structure some of their relations as asymmetric and oppressive. 
The second conceptualization set forward in this study is an expanded view of 
struggles for recognition that takes such struggles beyond identity politics and group 
political conflicts into everyday social experiences. The emerging picture of struggles for 
recognition that I have outlined here can inform a deeper study of the complex paths 
individuals take in response to injustice. The picture of struggles for recognition is a 
complicated one, with multiple reasons for why an individual would engage in a struggle 
for recognition and multiple ways an individual can undertake the effort to rectify injustices 
in his or her life. This is not surprising given that misrecognition is, as we have seen, a 
complex phenomenon. In his formulation of struggles for recognition, Honneth focuses on 
the individual’s experience of moral injuries to his or her identity claims, but in that 
formulation are signs of a needed further shift. Honneth is seeking to explain political 
resistance and protest action, but these are not the only forms of struggles for recognition. 
Claims of moral injuries to normative expectations are not just collective claims—
individual claims are also in play. Expanding the model of these struggles to include the 
wider variety of individuals’ efforts to restore healthy recognition relations better helps us 
understand social conflict, including understanding rectificatory struggles for recognition 
as beginning with an individual’s “yes, but,” and the roles of subcultures. 
The common thread in these two conceptualizations is the importance of individuals’ 
normative experiences in ethical life and social change. Zurn remarks that Honneth 
acknowledges that cultural factors alone cannot explain all social processes but does not 
really tell us what would provide such an explanation, and he calls for more work to be 
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done in this area.446 I agree and suggest that the two conceptualizations this study raises 
contribute to that explanation. The focus on individuals’ experiences and involvements in 
misrecognition and struggles for recognition will help us understand how power operates in 
social relations. By going beyond abstract theory and into individual experiences, we can 
shed light on the ways power can structure intersubjective relations and contribute to 
recognition and misrecognition. 
My hope is that this study’s two main conceptualizations will assist in crafting an 
account of the causes of injustice. The multidimensional view of misrecognition overcomes 
Honneth’s overly optimistic picture of recognition and shows how negative recognition fits 
into the normative structure of social life while acknowledging the positive value of 
recognition. The next step, I believe, is to understand that the causes of social injustice 
exist not only within macrosocial structures but also in individuals’ intersubjective 
relations. Power structures shape social relations, but individuals are active in many forms 
of injustice because individuals act out of their own interests and perceptions, which are 
not shaped entirely by social processes. Increased attention to how individuals respond to 
power, norms, and each other in terms of their involvements will illuminate domination, 
exploitation, exclusion, and oppression, even when we can identify that the origins of those 
injustices lie within social institutions and structures. 
Corollary to the question of the causes of injustice is the issue of responses to 
injustice. Honneth is correct that struggles against injustice are often attempts to expand 
recognition. The expanded account of struggles for recognition shows that political 
resistance is only one possible path for those who experience misrecognition. Exploring the 
varied ways that individuals do respond to misrecognition will help us understand how 
social change happens and also how, at times, injustices are not resisted. The study of 
struggles for recognition must also acknowledge the social reality that it is individuals who 
instigate social change, usually for personal emotional reasons. What historical progress 
has been made has come about not only from rational arguments and moral appeals but 
also from the pure stubborn love, sacrifice, and perseverance of many, many individuals. 
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The importance of recognition in individuals’ lives and in social justice movements 
makes it a vital element in social and critical theory. Recognition theory can provide 
insights into a broad range of practical social issues. With the inclusion of a more robust 
account of misrecognition and an expanded account of struggles for recognition, 
recognition theory can be more effective within social justice theory in analyzing social 
problems and conflicts past, present, and future.  
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